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Abstract
Contemporary reinforcement learning (RL) theory suggests that choices can be evaluated ei-
ther by the model-free (MF) strategy of learning their past worth or the model-based (MB)
strategy of predicting their likely consequences based on learning how decision states even-
tually transition to outcomes. Statistical and computational considerations argue that these
strategies should ideally be combined. This thesis aimed to investigate the neural imple-
mentation of these two RL strategies and the mechanisms of their interactions.
Two non-human primates performed a two-stage decision task designed to elicit and
discriminate the use of both MF and MB-RL, while single-neuron activity was recorded
from the prefrontal cortex (frontal pole, FP; anterior cingulate cortex, ACC; dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex) and striatum (caudate and putamen). Logistic regression analysis revealed
that the structure of the task (of MB importance) and the reward history (of MF and MB
importance) significantly influenced choice. A trial-by-trial computational analysis also
confirmed that choices were made according to a weighted combination of MF and MB-
RL, with the influence of the latter approaching 90%. Furthermore, the valuations of both
learning methods also influenced response vigour and pupil response.
Neural correlates of key elements for MF and MB learning were observed across all
brain areas, but functional segregation was also in evidence. Neurons in ACC encoded
features of both MF and MB, suggesting a possible role in the arbitration between both
strategies. Striatal activity was consistent with a role in value updating by encoding reward
prediction errors. Finally, novel neurophysiological evidence was found in favour of the
role of the FP in counterfactual processing.
In conclusion, this thesis provides insight into the neural implementation of MF and
MB-RL computations and their various effects on diverse aspects of behaviour. It supports
the parallel operation and integration of the two approaches, while revealing unexpected
intricacies.
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Long abstract
Even for some of our most basic daily behaviours, such as taking the underground, our brain
engages complicated systems that compete and cooperate to achieve good solutions. When
deciding on the best course of action, or route, one can either make use of accumulated past
experience, or plan ahead using information from an internal or external map. Most often
we end up combining both strategies to a degree that depends on factors such as fatigue,
or indeed external challenges such as ”planned” engineering works. Increasing evidence
suggests that separate neural circuits learn the value of actions in different ways. Studying
these distinct mechanisms of learning as well as how their interactions are implemented
could provide foundational explanations for reward-guided choices. Furthermore, the more
we understand the mechanisms and constraints of normal learning and decision-making
the better we can understand what happens when this goes wrong, as in neurological and
psychiatric diseases that exhibit maladaptive decision-making.
This thesis used behaviour, computational modelling and single-neuron physiology in
the prefrontal cortex (frontal pole, FP; anterior cingulate cortex, ACC; dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex, DLPFC) and dorsal striatum (caudate and putamen), to advance our current
understanding of the neural mechanisms about how the two forms of instrumental control –
model-free (MF) and model-based (MB) – interact and determine action choice in animals.
In chapter 1, we introduce reinforcement learning (RL) theory as a normative and ex-
planatory theoretical framework for studying how agents interact with the environment,
predicting rewards and optimizing future benefits. We use RL-based accounts of behaviour
to expose the computations underlying decision-making; these accounts are of particular
relevance when there are different sources of information that can inform choice. Here, we
concentrate on model-free (MF) and model-based (MB) RL methods, which resemble the
two strategies given in the underground example. Model-free RL bases choice on caching
previous experience without directly estimating the structure of the environment. By con-
trast, MB valuation techniques exploit a model of the world for planning or to simulate
possible futures. Both methods rely on previous experience but they differ as to how this
information is used to infer the long-run future values of choices. It might be natural to
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think of competition between MF and MB methods; however, statistical and computational
considerations argue that it may be ideal for a learning agent to combine both strategies.
How these two forms of learning could work towards a common goal is a topic under active
investigation. We discuss various theoretical proposals.
In chapter 2, we provide a neuroscience perspective on the different reward-learning
systems, focusing successively on anatomy, neuropsychology and electrophysiology. The
basic anatomical connectivity of the prefrontal cortex with its three main subdivisions (or-
bital, medial and lateral networks) as well as the main organisation of the basal ganglia and
its prefrontal connections are detailed. This is important because the anatomical incom-
ing connections of a brain region constrain the type of information it can process, and its
outgoing projections dictate the influence this processing can have on other brain regions.
In terms of neuropsychology, from the famously unfortunate case of Phineas Gage – the
rail worker who suffered in 1848 a traumatic accident in which an iron rod was propelled
through the front of his left brain hemisphere causing orbital and medial prefrontal damage
– to the multiple descriptions of patients with similar prefrontal cortex damage, value-based
decision making deficits have been consistently emphasised. More recently, the use of more
focal lesions in non-human primates has helped to unmask functional subdivisions within
the prefrontal cortex, and the chapter highlights the importance for learning of each re-
gion. Neuropsychological studies in rodents have also played an important role in teasing
apart the neural bases of MF and MB control, based on the relationship between these and
the behavioural notions respectively of habitual and goal-directed action selection. They
highlighted that dorsolateral striatum has an important role in MF learning, whereas dor-
somedial striatum and some areas of the frontal cortex seem to be more critical for a MB
system. However, such traditional studies have exploited manipulations such as outcome
devaluation that offer limited opportunities to explore continuing trade-offs.
Finally, primate neurophysiological studies have provided complementary insights into
the actual neuronal computations preformed, with the reward prediction error signal of
dopaminergic cells and the role of striatum in action selection being two particularly good
examples. However, as a whole, very few studies have focused on detecting simultane-
ous neuronal signals of both learning strategies and, only more recently has a class of new
tasks been invented for human subjects to specifically examine how the two strategies are
combined. We adapt one such task for primate subjects.
In chapter 3, we describe how two subjects were trained to perform a two-stage decision
task, similar to the one used in a previous human study. This task is intended to induce
trial-by-trial adjustments in choice that combines both MF and MB learning control. We
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used a more descriptive method of regression analysis together with a computational trial-
by-trial RL-based method, to assess quantitatively the signatures of both learning strategies.
With the first approach, outcome history (relevant for both learning strategies) and state-
transition knowledge (used in MB computations) had a significant impact on choice, to
an extent that decayed exponentially as a function of trials into the past. The computa-
tional analysis confirmed that choices were made according to a Hybrid model which used
a weighted combination of MF and MB-RL, with the influence of the latter approaching
90% and remaining at this level across weeks of testing. Comparison of the actual data and
choices simulated from the best-fitting Hybrid model showed that some significant structure
in the behaviour had not been captured, in particular an excessive influence of events that
happened on the immediately previous trial. Hence, we built a new combined Hybrid+ RL
model which incorporated a credit assignment weighting procedure. Finally, it was also
found that both forms of RL influenced the alacrity of responding, in agreement with the
speed-accuracy trade-off associated with their computations. In conclusion, the behavioural
results presented in this chapter enrich modern views of MB and MF integration.
In chapter 4, we describe analysis of the dynamics of pupil dilation in our two subjects.
Changes in pupil diameter have long been reported in cognitive processes and a relationship
with learning processes has recently been emphasised. It was found that pupil diameter
tracked the expected value of choices at both pre- and post-decision moments, and these
choice valuations were best correlated with value estimates derived from a MB system. Fur-
ther confirmation of task-specific features of MB calculations came from the observations
that pupil diameter also independently coded information about the state transition in the
task in a way that was modulated by expected values. Finally, when feedback was provided,
pupil diameter reflected a reward prediction error signal. Overall, several essential elements
of value-based reinforcement learning processes were evident in pupillary response at dif-
ferent key behavioural stages of the task.
In chapter 5, we present neuronal correlates of key elements of RL – such as reward,
state-transitions and first-stage choices. These factors were encoded in the activity of sin-
gle units and across the population of neurons in prefrontal and striatal regions at different
time points in the behavioural task introduced in chapter 3. As a region, the ACC most
prominently encoded reward and transition information, with both types of information be-
ing coded concomitantly at feedback epoch. There were specific relationships between the
transition selectivity of FP neuronal activity at the time of transitions and their reward cod-
ing later at feedback.
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At the time of choices in the task, we considered the distribution of three types of neu-
rons: those selective solely to MF or MB action-values, and those that covaried with both
(or the Hybrid action-value). All types of units were found across the recorded regions,
but the ACC had a significantly greater proportion of Hybrid action-value neurons than any
other region. We found that FP neurons increased their firing rate more when rare transitions
happened and the expected chosen value was high. We interpreted this coding as a quantity
akin to the foregone expected value or regret. On the other hand, caudate and, to a lesser
extent putamen, decreased their firing rate for the same situation consistent with a negative
prediction error but just for rare trials.
Finally, neurons in both caudate and putamen encoded the second-stage reward predic-
tion error, although we found small qualitative differences between these areas. As a whole,
the neural evidence was consistent with the view that MF and MB controllers operated in
parallel, but their associated signals were more richly intertwined than had originally been
expected.
In chapter 6, a brief summary of the main results of this thesis are outlined, along with
an attempt to fit them into a broader understanding of the field of MF- and MB-RL. We
also highlight the many questions raised by our study which could fruitfully be addressed
in future theoretical and experimental work. This thesis concludes that strong evidence was
found in favour of a parallel organisation of MF and MB valuations but more complex and
richly intertwined across the prefrontal-striatal circuitry than previously thought. However,
through analysis of the different algorithmic elements expected by RL, we also found func-
tional subdivisions performing specific and unique reward-based learning computations.
Chapter 1
Reinforcement learning
This chapter aims to provide a short introduction to reinforcement learning theory, focus-
ing specifically on work related to the theoretical issues of model-free and model-based
approaches. It also establishes notation and describes algorithms relevant to the scientific
content of the thesis. More comprehensive descriptions can be found elsewhere (Bertsekas
and Tsitsiklis, 1996; Sutton and Barto, 1998).
1.1 Reinforcement learning: introduction
Reinforcement learning is a formal framework that studies how to learn in order to maxi-
mize reward over time. It requires an agent that observes states describing features of its
surroundings, chooses and performs actions that change the state of the world and receives
in return either positive (rewards) or negative (punishments) payoffs. (Figure 1.1). The re-
turns define the goal of the agent and the learning aims to choose the best actions to obtain
the best long term rewards.
The dynamic interaction between agent and the environment is framed according to
a Markov decision process. In a Markov decision process, the world is described by a
set of environmental states S evolving in discrete time steps t and conditional on a set of
possible actions A made by the agent at each stage of the decision process. When the
environment has a finite horizon, the learning experience is broken into episodes (or trials)
and the Markov decision process is called episodic (non-episodic Markov decision processes
will not be the focus of this review).
Importantly, the current state st ∈ S contains all information needed for the agent’s
decision about the current action at ∈ A and the choice made gives rise to a next state
st+1 ∈ S and a potential reward rt+1. This is known as the Markov property, which relies
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Fig. 1.1 The reinforcement learning problem. The agent observes the state of the envi-
ronment and, according to its policy, takes an action. Depending on the state and the agent’s
action, the environment evolves to a new state and provides a reward. The goal of the agent
is to improve its policy so that it can get more rewards in the long run, implying an opti-
misation of not only the immediate reward but also of all future returns. From Sutton and
Barto (1998).
on the equality between the probability distributions including information about all past
events and the most recent event:
P(st+1 = s′, rt+1 = r|st, at, rt, st−1, at−1, ..., r1, s0, a0) = P(st+1 = s′, rt+1 = r|st, at) (1.1)
The environment’s structure of such state changes is given by a transition function:
T(s, a, s′) = P(st+1 = s′|st = s, at = a) (1.2)
specifying the probability P that the state changes from s to s′ given that the action a
was taken. On the other hand, the returns obtained from the world formalise the agent’s goal
and could be mathematically defined by a reward function:
R(s, a, s′) = E
[
rt+1|st = s, at = a, st+1 = s′] (1.3)
which represents the expected value of the upcoming reward given the current state and
action, as well as any next state.
A policy is a stochastic rule formalised as a function which maps states to probabilities
of actions and where π(s, a) is the probability that action a is taken in state s. However,
an important challenge that the agent faces is to balance immediate rewards with long-term
ones that rely on the sequence of actions taken and the future encountered states. To achieve
the optimal balance, it is crucial for the agent to evaluate the expected long-term outcome
if action a is taken in state s given that policy π is followed thereafter. This is achieved by
having a policy’s value function assigning the return from a state-action pair as a discounted
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sum of future rewards:
Qπ(s, a) = E
 ∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1|st = s, at = a
 (1.4)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a discount factor which models the fact that future rewards are worth
less than immediate ones. The larger γ, the more weight the agent’s give to distant rewards,
and, typically, the harder the optimization problem. The discounted reward essentially mea-
sures the present value of the sum of the returns earned in the future, where the rewards are
weighed by a factor γ that decreases exponentially as the time step increases:
E
 ∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1
 = rt+1 + γrt+2 + γ2rt+3 + ... (1.5)
Dynamic programming offers methods to efficiently solve multi-stage decision pro-
cesses (Bellman, 1957). According to its Principle of Optimality, an optimal sequence
of decisions has the property that whatever the initial state and initial decision are, the
remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy (denoted as π∗) with regard to the
state resulting from the first decision. Therefore, for a given state-action pair and assuming
such consistency at successive time points, the sum of the discounted future rewards of all
successor states-action pairs could be contracted to the optimal value (denoted as Q∗) of the
very next state-action pair under policy π:
Q∗(s, a) = Qπ
∗
(s, a) =
∑
s′∈S
T(s, a, s′)[R(s, a, s′) + γ argmax
a′∈A
Qπ(s′, a′)] (1.6)
The above equation, also known as the Bellman equation for a state-action pair, includes
the immediate reward and the discounted long-term value averaged over the probability of
the subsequent state given by the transition function. Two main methods can be used for
solving such optimisation problems: policy iteration and value iteration.
The policy iteration procedure works by iteratively evaluating the policy, and then im-
proving it. The policy evaluation step consists of computing the state-action value function
Qπ starting from state s and following policy π, given by:
Qπ(s, a) =
∑
s′∈S
T(s, a, s′)[R(s, a, s′) + γQ(s′, π(s′))] (1.7)
Once the evaluation process is completed, the Qπ(s, a) values assign credit to the advan-
tageous actions and can then be used to determine a new policy π′ where Qπ
′
(s, π′(s)) ≥
Qπ(s, π(s)). When the policy π′ is the same as the policy π, then an optimal policy is
4 Theoretical RL
achieved. The improvement of the policy occurs concurrently at every state and involves
a maximisation over the action space:
π′s = argmax
a∈A
Qπ(s, a) (1.8)
Despite being the optimal solution when there is full knowledge of the available state-
action values in stationary environments, it may not be the best approach for dealing with
uncertainty of value estimates or in a changing world. In these scenarios, choosing actions
that are believed to be suboptimal might actually be good and the correct balance of such
exploration-exploitation trade-off is key to the reinforcement learning optimization problem.
Other methods, such as the ε-greedy algorithm, exploit the best action most of the time but,
with a small probability (ε), an action is selected at random independently of the action-
value estimates. This selection technique achieves good performance in several learning
situations, but can fail when very low value options exist because the algorithm explores
equally among all possible actions. Given these limitations, an alternative and most com-
monly used method is the softmax function where the probability of choosing an action a in
state s, is a function of the estimated state-action values Qπ(s, a) obtained from the policy
evaluation procedure:
π′s,a =
exp(βQπ(s, a))∑
a′∈A exp(βQπ(st, a′))
(1.9)
where β ∈ [0,∞] is the so called inverse temperature parameter that modulates how
deterministic are the choices. Low inverse temperatures cause greater choice randomness,
whereas high values cause greater difference in selection probability for actions with differ-
ent value estimates.
Value iteration is another method for finding the optimal policy. In contrast to policy
iteration that waits for full value convergence to improve the policy, the value iteration
approach truncates evaluation after just one iteration, combining the policy improvement
step into its iterations. By directly computing a sequence of state-action value estimates
which converge to the optimal value function, this procedure solves the Markov decision
problem. It updates the expected value of each state-action pair until the values calculated
on two successive steps are close enough and according to the update rule:
Q′(s, a) =
∑
s′∈S
T(s, a, s′)[R(s, a, s′) + γ argmax
a′∈A
Q(s′, a′)] (1.10)
Iterating this equation infinitely often, guarantees that optimal values can be obtained.
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Once that is achieved, the optimal policy can be easily defined by applying the same princi-
ples as defined in policy improvement.
The way both policy and value iteration methods are implemented by reinforcement
learning theory is the basis of the differences between model-free and model-based learning
strategies. In the model-free reinforcement learning framework, the agent does not have
knowledge of the transition and reward functions and it learns by trial-and-error which ac-
tion is best at each state. On the other hand, a model-based learner finds the best policy
by rather using a predictive model of the transition matrices or the expected outcomes its
actions produce.
1.2 Model-free reinforcement learning
Model-free reinforcement learning attempts to estimate the long-term value without storing
in a model information about the structure of the environment or how the world may respond
to a given action. In formal terms, it does not take explicit advantage of the transition func-
tion to estimate future values. Alternatively, state-action values are estimated by sampling
the Markov decision problem in order to obtain statistical knowledge and to help the agent
formalising a choice given the state of the world. Most of these algorithms achieve such
objective relying on temporal difference methods. At the heart of the incremental updates
of these algorithms is a measure of the difference between estimates of the value function at
two successive states, known as the temporal difference prediction error δ:
δt = rt + γQ(st+1, at+1)− Q(st, at) (1.11)
This error in the estimate drives learning by correcting the prediction through the fol-
lowing update rule:
Q(st, at) ← Q(st, at) + αδt (1.12)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the learning rate that determines by how much values get updated.
This iterative error based rule was inspired by previous mathematical treatments of psycho-
logical theories of learning (Bush and Mosteller, 2006), as well as on the famous Rescorla-
Wagner model (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972).
Several temporal differences methods were developed to find an optimal policy but three
have been particularly used to account for behaviour of animals in psychological experi-
ments: the actor-critic architecture, the Q-learning and the S ARS A algorithm. Overall, they
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either keep a separate policy independent of the value function (as in the actor-critic learn-
ing) or they learn state-action functions generating a look-up table representation of these
values (as in the Q-learning and in the S ARS A).
The actor-critic method is similar to policy iteration, as it improves the policy on the
basis of a computed value function (Barto et al., 1983, 1995). It takes advantage of a two-
process structure, an actor and a critic (Figure 1.2). The actor is responsible for selecting
actions according to a modifiable policy π(s), without explicit knowledge of their conse-
quences and based on a set of weighted associations from states to actions, often called
action strengths. The critic estimates the value function V(s) and computes a temporal
difference prediction error δ used to criticise the actor’s decision as well as its own value
estimation. Both the action strengths and the value function must be learned based on ex-
perience with the environment and as this interaction evolves, the critic’s value function
becomes progressively more accurate, and the actor’s action strengths change so as to yield
progressive improvements in behaviour.
Fig. 1.2 The actor-critic architecture. Schematic of the relationship between agent and
environment according to the basic actor–critic architecture, where arrows represent direc-
tion of computations. π(s): policy, determined by action strengths; R(s): reward at state s;
δ: temporal- difference reward prediction error; V(s): value function. From Botvinick et al.
(2009).
Q-learning is probably the most commonly used model-free temporal difference version
of a value iteration algorithm (Watkins, 1989). It starts from an arbitrary initial state-action
value function and updates it using observed state transitions and rewards, according to:
Q(st, at) ← Q(st, at) + α
[
rt + γ argmax
a∈A
Q(st+1, a)− Q(st, at)
]
(1.13)
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The prediction error of Q-learning is originated from value estimates that are indepen-
dent of the policy being followed, an off-policy method, and based on the estimated best
next action in the sequence:
δt = rt + γ argmax
a∈A
Q(st+1, a)− Q(st, at) (1.14)
As in value iteration, the policy can then be defined following the same action-selection
methods as described for policy improvement (for example, equations 1.8 or 1.9). Inter-
estingly, the Q-learning algorithm learns the optimal policy even when actions are selected
according to a more exploratory or even random policy. In fact, the requirement for correct
convergence is that all state-action pairs are tried often enough. In other words, although
the exploration-exploitation trade-off needs to be taken into account, the details of the ex-
ploration strategy will not affect the convergence of the Q-learning algorithm. However, in
some cases such as in situations with large negative rewards, it could be disadvantageous to
adopt an off-policy strategy and ignore what the agent actually does.
The SARSA algorithm (Rummery and Niranjan, 1994) is another model-free method
that learns state-action functions but, in contrast to Q-learning, it takes into account the
temporal difference of the state-action value of the actual action being selected according to
the current policy:
δt = rt + γQ(st+1, at+1)− Q(st, at) (1.15)
Being especially useful in non-stationary environments, a SARSA agent is an on-policy
learner because it evaluates the policy that is currently being followed by using state-action-
reward-state-action experiences to update the state-action values:
Q(st, at) ← Q(st, at) + α [rt + γQ(st+1, at+1)− Q(st, at)] (1.16)
Because the value function convergence can take a long time and in the meantime po-
tentially suboptimal actions can be performed, SARSA improves the policy at every time
step combining a greedy component with exploration (by using, for example, the softmax
function) being a type of online model-free policy iteration.
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1.3 Model-based reinforcement learning
In contrast to all the above learning methods, which learn directly from experience, model-
based reinforcement learning solves the valuation problem by learning the state-transition
probabilities defining the structure of the learning task, as well as the returns obtained from
the world. Such knowledge of the consequences of actions at states can then be used to guide
decisions by estimating the expected rewards in a forward manner or through simulated ex-
perience, instead of relying exclusively on real experienced information as it happens in
model-free learning. More formally, the agent learns both transition function and reward
function that fully describe the Markov decision. This description of the model of the envi-
ronment, in the form of a probability distribution of all possibilities, is then used to produce
or improve a policy. In computational terms, this process of calculating a policy based on a
predictive model is often called planning.
In order to illustrate the key principles of model-based learning as well as its main differ-
ences with the model-free approaches, an example of an episodic Markov decision process
is given in Figure 1.3. In this hypothetical experiment, the goal of the reinforcement learn-
ing agent is to maximise its return by making two choices per episode. There are three
states (s1; s2; and s3), each with two possible actions (L: left; and R: right). To note that
there is also a special absorbing state, corresponding to the end of an episode and allow-
ing a new trial to start. State s1 is always the starting state and the transition structure
of the task follows a probability (P) that depends on the choice made in this initial state:
P(s2|s1, L) = 0.7 ∧ P(s2|s1,R) = 0.3 ∧ P(s3|s1, L) = 0.3 ∧ P(s3|s1,R) = 0.7. There is no
reward after the first action in sI , but the second choice is rewarded according to the reward
structure shown in (Figure 1.3). The optimal policy is simply obtained by choosing left in
s1 and then right if transitioned to either s2 or s3.
In reinforcement learning the model-based approach to the search for the optimal policy
is most often defined over the space of states. Here, the agent computes the action values by
searching through the tree of potential future states, summing rewards over state-trajectories
and averaging them with respect to the state-transition matrix. Following the example of
Figure 1.3 and using Bellman’s equation, a model-based learner solves the Markov decision
problem by computing the state-action values for sI according to:
Q(s1, ai) = P(s2|s1, ai) argmax
a∈{L,R}
Q(s2, a) + P(s3|s1, ai) argmax
a∈{L,R}
Q(s3, a) (1.17)
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Fig. 1.3 Example of a Markov decision task with different model-based (a) and model-
free (b) representations. In this episodic Markov decision problem the agent has to perform
two sequential binary decisions. There are three states (s1; s2; and s3), each with two
possible actions (L: left; and R: right). A special absorbing state (represented as a grey
square) exists, corresponding to the end of an episode and allowing a new trial to start. At
the starting state (s1) each of the choices could lead to either a common (70% probability
from left to s2 or right to s3) or a rare (30% probability from left to s3 or right to s2) second-
stage state. This state transition was not associated with any reward (r). In the second-
decision (either in s2 or in s3), another two-option choice was required and it was reinforced
according to different rewards (in s2, left has reward=1 and right has reward=3; in s3, left
has reward=0 and right has reward=1). The decision tree of model-based representation (a)
of the task structure includes the state-transition structure, whereas a model-free controller
(b) represents only the expected future value (Q) for each action in each state, without the
tree sequence or identity of future consequences.
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An important component of the model-based approach is learning the model that is
needed to simulate the outcome of taking an action. This is achieved while the agent in-
teracts with the environment but different methods can be used for that aim. A common
and simple way for model-learning is to use a tabular maximum likelihood approach, which
estimates each transition probability as the ratio of transitions between two states versus the
total transitions out of a state (Brafman and Tennenholtz, 2003). In addition, the expected
reward for a particular state-action is also computed. In the given example, based on the
counts of each experienced transition to either s2 or s3 given the choice made in s1, the
agent can make predictions about the actual transition probabilities. The transition matrix
estimation will improve as the number of trials increase.
Once the agent has learned the structure of the environment, the policy can be improved
given the predictive model. Planning methods can either compute the state-action value
functions for the entire state space through policy or value iteration (as described above), or
they can focus on the states that the agent is more likely to encounter in the future. In fact,
the latter methods can be also used while evaluating the tree of possible future state-action
sequences. This on-line search consists of a forward algorithm that recursively estimates
the value of each possible state-action pair rooted at the current state. A common way of
achieving such goal is by using Monte-Carlo simulations to recursively average the value
of each possible state-action pair, where each simulation starts from the current state and
extends across the decision tree until the end of an episode. Methods that use such strategy
can be more efficient than planning over the entire state space and are called Monte Carlo
Tree Search (Browne et al., 2012).
1.4 Interaction between model-free and model-based rein-
forcement learning
In the field of reinforcement learning, there is an active debate as to the situations in which
one of the two model-free or model-based learning strategies is best. This can depend on the
learning problem itself as well as on intrinsic properties of the learning agent. Furthermore,
there are also complementary proposals that either integrate both approaches or suggest a
hierarchical architecture to the reinforcement learning problem. It is therefore important to
consider some of the main pros and cons of each learning process.
Model-based methods, as a consequence of their knowledge about the reward and tran-
sition function, can take fewer actions to learn state-action values (i.e. they are statistically
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efficient) and achieve a better policy than model-free methods. However, this implies that
the algorithm can learn quickly enough an accurate structure of the environment and the
prospective nature of the model-based approach is computationally demanding if the deci-
sion tree is complex (Daw and Dayan, 2014). Another advantage of model-based learners is
the way they readily adapt in situations where the reward structure changes rapidly. Given
its knowledge of the consequences of actions at states, a policy can be planned without
even requiring further experiences in the world. In addition, there is also the opportunity
to use simulations to perform targeted exploration and plan a policy that explores states not
recently visited or those the agent is uncertain about. Contrasting with this computational
complexity, model-free strategies are computationally simple and require much fewer mem-
ory resources. However, due to their statistically inefficiency they are more inaccurate as
well as less sensitive to changes in goal values. The reason for this is the fact that these
approaches learn directly from experience and have to repeat many times the interactions
with the real world before the values propagate all the way back to the initial states.
Given these reasons, it seems advantageous for a learning agent to have both strategies
and take advantage of the benefits of each one according to the task design or the phase
of learning. In fact, some hybrid algorithmic attempts have been made in order to com-
bine model-free and model-based learning systems (Tamar et al., 2012). Notwithstanding,
such approach prompts the issue of how interaction occurs and what formally arbitrates be-
tween the two when they run in parallel, due to occasional competing control signals. Daw
and colleagues (Daw et al., 2005) proposed uncertainties in the value estimates as a way
of assigning control, whereas others highlighted a speed-accuracy trade off criteria (Kera-
mati et al., 2011) or the statistical properties of the environmental returns (Simon and Daw,
2011). In all these suggestions, theoretical simulation results were not only in line with
the properties of each learning strategy described above, as for example the case of a less
uncertain model-based system in initial phases of learning given its statistical efficiency,
but they could also provide new insights into the experimental results from animal learning
psychology.
The complex interactions between model-free and model-based control is under active
investigation as various possibilities exist (Daw et al., 2011; Dayan, 2012a; Huys et al.,
2012). Most easily viewed as a competitive process, the interaction between both model-
free and model-based systems can also involve cooperation. Reinforcement learning theory
also accommodates this idea of mutual assistance in working towards a common goal. The
Deep blue chess-playing computer project is a good illustration of an application of such
principle, where pruning algorithms used model-free values to substitute for the values of
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whole branches when the decision tree gets too big to evaluate directly by a model-based
search (Campbell et al., 2002).
Another example is the idea of the Dyna architectures (Sutton, 1990), which com-
bines model-free learning with planning (Figure 1.4). In these algorithms, model-based
trains model-free offline by simulating transitions and rewards and replaying experienced
state–action pairs. Such simulations can then be used by a model-free learner in control
of behaviour to amplify its experiences, reducing the number of environmental interactions
needed to update values. If the selection of state-action pairs to be updated is not done
randomly (as in Dyna), but instead based on state–action pairs whose values have recently
changed, then the method is called prioritized sweeping.
Fig. 1.4 The Dyna arquitecture. In Dyna, action selection is controlled by a model-free
system that learns values from both real and simulated experiences. These hypothetical ex-
periences are provided by a model-based system that takes advantage of its world’s knowl-
edge to replay state–action pairs. This way, both model-free and model-based systems are
combined in order to achieve better learning performance. From Botvinick et al. (2009).
Finally, although the experimental work of this thesis involves a reinforcement learning
problem with a relatively small state-space, it is relevant to mention some recent computa-
tional developments addressing the scaling problem.
Hierarchical reinforcement learning methods (Barto and Mahadevan, 2003; Hengst, 2012)
extend standard reinforcement learning algorithms (both model-free and model-based ap-
proaches; see Botvinick and Weinstein, 2014) in order to address the problem of the expo-
nential growth of the number of states and learning parameters in more complex scenarios.
To achieve such goal the computations require some sort of abstraction, where representa-
tion of the learning problem only includes relevant features to behaviour. If the abstraction
is applied to states it is called state or structural abstraction (Li et al., 2006), and if it is
employed in actions then it is termed temporal abstraction (Sutton et al., 1999). The lat-
ter case, for example, involves a behavioural repertoire of sequences of primitive actions
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or subroutines that can be considered as one-step options, allowing the system to have an
option-specific policy and solve problems with fewer decision steps (Figure 1.5).
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 1.5 Temporal abstraction in hierarchical reinforcement learning. In this Markov
decision problem the agent has to perform six sequential binary decisions. Only one of
the branches yields reward. Standard reinforcement learning methods (a) use only primitive
actions, therefore, six decisions have to be made. Assuming the agent has previously learned
the red and blue sequences of actions (b), then the scaling problem is greatly facilitated (c).
From Botvinick et al. (2009).

Chapter 2
Reinforcement learning in the prefrontal
cortex and basal ganglia
The neural mechanisms of reward-guided decision making and learning processes comprise
complex cortico-subcortical circuits (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2009; Ito and Doya, 2011;
Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Samejima and Doya, 2007; Sesack and Grace, 2009). Midbrain
dopaminergic cells (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Schultz, 2002), striatum (Balleine et al.,
2007; Bornstein and Daw, 2011; Ding and Gold, 2013; Hikosaka et al., 2008), the prefrontal
cortex (Kennerley and Walton, 2011; Rushworth et al., 2011) and the amygdala (Balleine
et al., 2003; Baxter and Murray, 2002; Paton et al., 2006) are the key players in reward
valuation and learning. This functional view is also supported by the anatomy (Haber and
Knutson, 2009). The contemporary view of the reward circuit is of a spiralling and very
interactive midbrain-striatal-prefrontal network (Figure 2.1), which takes into account prin-
ciples of parallel processing (Alexander et al., 1986) as well as information convergence
(Percheron and Filion, 1991).
The next part of this section will provide an overview of the basic anatomy of both
the prefrontal cortex and striatum of primates with particular attention paid to its intrinsic
and extrinsic connections. A more detailed description will be additionally provided for the
brain regions experimentally targeted in this project: the dorsal bank of the anterior cingulate
cortex (area 24c), the dorsolateral prefrontal region (area 46), the frontal pole (area 10) as
well as the dorsal parts of striatum (caudate and putamen).
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Fig. 2.1 The prefrontal-basal ganglia reward circuit. A complex network of connec-
tions within ventral and dorsal cortico-subcortical structures support reward learning. The
former is mainly composed by the dopaminergic ventral tegmental area (VTA), nucleus ac-
cumbens and ventral parts of caudate and putamen, together with orbitofrontal (OFC) and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). The dorsal component includes mostly the sub-
stantia nigra (SN) pars compacta, putamen, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DPFC) and
motor/premotor regions. Intermediate areas include central parts of striatum as well as the
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). Abbreviations: amygdala (Amy); hippocampus (Hipp);
shell of the nucleus accumbens (s); thalamus (THAL); mediodorsal (MD); lateral habenula
(LHb); ventral pallidum (VP); subthalamic nucleus (STN); hypothalamus (Hypo); pedun-
culopontine tegmental nucleus (PPT). Adapted from Haber and Knutson (2009).
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2.1 The anatomy of prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia
The prefrontal cortex networks
The prefrontal cortex consists of a heterogeneous region rostral to the motor areas of the
frontal cortex in both humans and primates, despite some variations between species (Fuster,
2001; Petrides and Pandya, 2012; Wise, 2008). Studies of the prefrontal neuroanatomical
connections have shown a high local connectivity (Averbeck and Seo, 2008). In addition,
statistical analyses of these anatomical networks also suggest that every area within the
prefrontal cortex is able to access all types of extra-prefrontal cortex information within
two connections of its anatomical position, with hippocampal projections being particu-
larly prevalent (Averbeck and Seo, 2008). Such connectivity pattern may explain why the
prefrontal cortex has been associated with many high-order cognitive functions. Despite
the broad and complex prefrontal networks, the existence of cytoarchitectural heterogeneity
and results of many lesion as well as neurophysiological studies suggest that regions within
these networks perform specific computations (Petrides and Pandya, 2004). In primates, the
patterns of cortico-cortical and cortico-subcortical connections of the prefrontal cortex give
rise to a generally accepted subdivision into three distinct anatomical networks: the orbital,
the medial and the lateral networks (Murray et al., 2000; Petrides, 2005a; Saleem et al.,
2014; Öngür and Price, 2000) (Figure 2.2 and 2.4).
The so-called orbital network consists solely of areas found on the orbital surface of the
brain which show a high degree of interconnectivity (Figure 2.2). This network receives a
huge sensory input from multiple areas including olfactory and gustatory cortices, visual-
related areas in the inferior temporal gyrus as well as somatosensory and visceral areas in
the insula and frontoparietal operculum (Öngür and Price, 2000). It also has important re-
ciprocal connections with limbic structures such as the entorhinal and perirhinal cortices as
well as the basal and lateral nuclei of the amygdala (Carmichael and Price, 1995a; Öngür
and Price, 2000). Further relevant projections exist to distinct portions of the central region
of the striatum, particularly to the lateral caudate nucleus and the ventromedial putamen, and
to more central parts of the mediodorsal thalamic nucleus. These connections suggest that
the orbital network receives and processes information about internal motivational states
(Baxter and Murray, 2002). Despite being located in the orbital surface of the prefrontal
cortex, the connections of areas 13a and 13b as well as 12o seem to span medial and or-
bital networks and, therefore, provide connectivity between the two networks (Barbas and
Pandya, 1989; Price, 2007).
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10mm
Fig. 2.2 The medial and orbital prefrontal networks in monkeys. The medial prefrontal
network is shown by red shading and projects mainly to the hypothalamus and periaque-
ductal gray. The orbital network is yellow shaded and receives several sensory inputs. Blue
shaded areas show an intermediate pattern, connecting both networks. Abbreviations: cor-
pus callosum (CC); cingulate sulcus (cis); superior temporal sulcus (sts). Scale bar = 10
mm. Adapted from Saleem et al. (2014).
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The medial network consists of brain areas located on both medial and orbital surfaces
(Figure 2.2). Contrary to the orbital network, the medial network has few sensory inputs
and it seems to be an area that rather projects outputs (Öngür and Price, 2000). It is known
to send strong projections to the hypothalamus and periaqueductal grey, which are both as-
sociated with visceral and autonomic functions (Keay et al., 1994; Öngür and Price, 2000).
Despite sharing similar limbic inputs with the orbital network, the medial network exhibits a
host of distinct cortical connections. It has connections throughout the temporal lobe (dorsal
temporal pole, rostral superior temporal gyrus and the dorsal bank of the superior temporal
sulcus), the cingulate, retrospenial, entorhinal, posterior parahippocampal and dorsomedial
prefrontal cortices (Price, 2007). Many of these areas are thought to encode a more complex
and invariant source of sensory information than that of the areas connected to the orbital
network (Price, 2007). The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex explored in this thesis is part
of the medial network and corresponds to area 24c of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
region (Figure 2.3). The ACC encompasses areas within the ACC gyrus including areas
24, 25, 32 and area 9 within dorsal ACC, but controversies exist regarding its precise bor-
ders, cytoarchitectural nature and subdivisions (Sallet et al., 2011; Vogt et al., 2005). The
view adopted in this thesis is that the middle of the dorsal bank of the cingulate sulcus is
part of the ACC in non-human primates (Sallet et al., 2011). However, it is important to
note that other authors regard this region as part of adjacent medial frontal cortex (area 9)
and only consider areas ventral to the dorsal bank of the cingulate sulcus (ie, the ventral
bank and below) to be part of ACC (Vogt et al., 2005). The rostral area 24c receives heavy
limbic projections, particularly from the amygdala, lateral orbitofrontal cortex, and insula,
justifying its role in the emotional influences of voluntary actions (Morecraft and Hoesen,
1998). Furthermore, this region also receives substantial input from medial temporal areas
(perirhinal, entorhinal, and the parahippocampal cortices, hippocampal formation and the
temporal pole) widely recognized in subserving memory-related functions (Arikuni et al.,
1994; Barbas et al., 1999; Carmichael and Price, 1995b; Mishkin et al., 1997; Rosene and
Van Hoesen, 1977; Squire et al., 2004; Vogt and Pandya, 1987). On the other hand, its vast
efferents towards frontal motor cortices, corticospinal pathways and brainstem nuclei im-
plicate this region in visceromotor, skeletomotor, and endocrine outflow (Vogt et al., 1992).
In fact, prefrontal efferents to the ACC are stronger than its reciprocal prefrontal projec-
tions, with projections being strongest to the rostral portion of area 24 (Arikuni et al., 1994;
Bates and Goldman-Rakic, 1993; Pandya et al., 1981; Vogt and Pandya, 1987). Overall, this
connectivity suggests a critical role of ACC in adaptive behaviour by integrating past and
present experiences with motivational significance (Sallet et al., 2011).
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Fig. 2.3 The anterior cingulate cortex and its subdivisions. The cingulate sulcus is di-
vided into two parts by a vertical line passing through the anterior commissure (VCA):
anterior (ac) includes areas 24c and 24c’; and posterior (pc) composed of the posterior part
of area 24c’, which contains the rostral cingulate motor area. Abbreviations: retrosplenial
cortex (RSC), rostral sulcus (rs), cingulate sulcus (cgs), genu of the corpus callosum (gcc),
anterior commissure (ac), central sulcus (ces), marginal ramus (mr), callosal sulcus (cas),
splenium of the corpus callosum (scc), splenial sulcus (spls), caudomedial lobule (cml),
parieto-occipital sulcus (pos), posterior commissure (pc). Adapted from Vogt et al. (2005).
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The lateral network includes several brain areas of the lateral surface of the prefrontal
cortex (Figure 2.4), including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (area 46d) and the frontal
pole (area 10) regions explored in this thesis. Recently, an anatomical subdivision of this
network has been proposed based on the unique patterns of cortico-cortical connections:
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dorsal region to the principal sulcus and frontal pole),
the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (ventral region to the principal sulcus) and the caudolat-
eral prefrontal cortex (around the arcuate sulcus and parts of the caudal principal sulcus)
(Saleem et al., 2014). Brain areas of each subdivision are connected primarily with other ar-
eas in the same subnetwork, but some connections also exist across the principal sulcus. The
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is strongly connected with the orbital network and similarly
with somatosensory brain regions (Saleem et al., 2014). By contrast, the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (areas 9d/m and 10, but not area 46d) contains prominent links with regions
of the medial network as well as with the posterior cingulate cortex, the superior temporal
gyrus, superior temporal sulcus and the posterior parahippocampal cortex (Saleem et al.,
2014). Despite some similarities with the medial network, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
receives much fewer inputs from limbic structures and projects much less to visceral control
regions (An et al., 1998; Saleem et al., 2014; Öngür et al., 1998). Unlike most dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, the projections of area 46d (specially its midportion) are unique and tar-
get the medial parietal and parieto-occipital areas. As a whole and given its connections,
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has been more often implicated in maintaining the rep-
resentation of goals and means to achieve them, important for behaviour monitoring and
subsequent choice (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Petrides, 2005b). A more specific involvement
in multitask processing has been attributed to the frontal pole of humans, which is detailed
later in this chapter (Burgess et al., 2000; Koechlin et al., 1999). It is important to note
that in a comparative functional connectivity study it has been suggested that while human
medial FP resembles macaque FP, human lateral FP resembles dorsolateral area 46 in the
macaque as opposed to macaque FP (Neubert et al., 2014). Nonetheless, one of the poten-
tial limitations of the study is the fact that these patterns of connectivity were obtained in
different cognitive states (i.e. anesthetized animals versus restive awake humans), making it
hard to directly relate findings from both species.
A relevant feature to highlight is the interconnectivity between the three prefrontal re-
gions specifically addressed in the experimental section of thesis – the FP, the ACC and
the DLPFC. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has reciprocal connections with the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex, representing between twenty and thirty percent of their prefrontal
connections (Averbeck and Seo, 2008). Several studies have found reciprocal connections
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Fig. 2.4 The lateral prefrontal network and its subdivisions. The lateral prefrontal cortex
is divided into: the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC; shades of yellow), the dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex (DPFC; shades of red/orange) and the caudolateral prefrontal cortex
(CLPFC; green shading). The region indicated by a question mark (pale red in the mid-
portion of 46d) has a pattern of connections different from the patterns of other parts of
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as it targets the medial parietal and parieto-occipital areas.
Abbreviations: arcuate sulcus lower limb (asl); arcuate sulcus upper limb; Adapted from
Saleem et al. (2014).
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between area 46d and the rostral aspect of area 24c, particularly in the area just rostral to the
genu of the corpus callosum (Barbas and Pandya, 1989; Bates and Goldman-Rakic, 1993;
Morecraft and van Hoesen, 1993; Vogt and Pandya, 1987). The anterior cingulate cortex
projects back to area 46d, but these efferents are not consistently seen across studies and
may only be present in the rostral part of area 46d. Projections from area 10 to dorsal an-
terior cingulate cortex are restricted to its more rostral part, and also only the more rostral
parts of the anterior cingulate cortex project back to area 10 (Petrides and Pandya, 2007).
A recent study aimed to specifically study the anatomical relationship between the FP, ACC
as well as DLPFC, and ended up proposing a circuit of interactions based on their connec-
tivity pattern (Figure 2.5) (Medalla and Barbas, 2010). Interestingly, the authors found that
previously described projections from anterior cingulate cortex to dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex have a higher prevalence of large boutons than other dorsal prefrontal inputs, reflect-
ing better synaptic efficacy. In addition, the anterior cingulate cortex projections innervate
preferentially inhibitory neurons in area 46d and large boutons on spines of excitatory neu-
rons in area 10. These results led the authors to suggest that such specific synaptic findings
may be key when explaining the anterior cingulate role in modulating working memory pro-
cesses and its involvement in multi-task functions (Badre and Wagner, 2004; Ghering and
Knight, 2000; Koechlin et al., 2000). However, it is important to note that the anterior cin-
gulate area investigated in this anatomical study corresponded to area 32, although strong
similarities with area 24c exist regarding other connections.
The basal ganglia anatomy and its prefrontal connections
The basal ganglia are a group of evolutionary primitive forebrain nuclei in both cerebral
hemispheres that receive inputs from nearly all cortical areas and project back, via the tha-
lamus, primarily to the frontal cortex. Even the very first anatomical descriptions prompted
speculations about the crucial role of these structures in dealing with sensory impulses as
well as the execution of willed action (Thomas, 1664). In mammals, the basal ganglia are
generally divided into dorsal and ventral complexes (Butler and Hodos, 2005). In the pri-
mate brain, the dorsal part is composed by what was initially called corpus striatum, and
includes most parts of the caudate nucleus, putamen and globus pallidus (these last two
structures used to be referred as the lentiform nucleus). A later anatomical classification
proposed the current nomenclature of striatum (caudate and putamen) and pallidum (dorsal
pallidum, composed of the external and internal segments of the globus pallidus, and the
ventral pallidum) (Vogt and Vogt, 1941). Importantly, the separation between the caudate
24 Anatomy, psychology and functional evidence
Fig. 2.5 Connectivity between anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
and frontal pole. Anterior cingulate cortex (area 32) projects through large boutons (dark
green, larger arrowhead) preferentially to spines of excitatory neurons (light green open
circles) of frontal pole (area 10). By contrast, projections to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(area 46) target dendritic shafts of inhibitory neurons. Overall, these projections have larger
boutons than pathways within dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (area 9 to area 46, represented
by the light green open arrows). Line thickness represents prevalence of pathways, and size
of arrowhead represents size of boutons. Adapted from Medalla and Barbas (2010).
2.1 The anatomy of prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia 25
and the putamen is merely a structural one, based solely on the internal capsule separation,
not a functional one. On the other hand, the ventral complex comprises the nucleus ac-
cumbens, medial and ventral parts of the striatum, as well as striatal parts of the olfactory
tubercle (Haber and McFarland, 1999). Due to histochemical and connection differences,
the nucleus accumbens is further subdivided into shell and core. In addition to these two
main complexes, the mesencephalic dopaminergic system and the subthalamic nucleus are
also part of the basal ganglia circuits.
The striatum is the region where most inputs to the basal ganglia converge, receiving
projections from all of cerebral cortex, thalamus and brainstem, in particular from mid-
brain dopaminergic cells. The overall view is that the dorsolateral striatum (in particular
the central and caudal aspects of putamen) receives sensorymotor afferents, the inputs to
central striatum (more the caudate than putamen) arise from associative cortical areas and
the ventromedial striatum receives predominantly limbic projections (Haber and Gdowski,
2004). The present review will focus on both cortical and dopaminergic projections, given
that interconnected thalamic and cortical areas project to the same region of the striatum.
The cortico-striatal projections follow a longitudinal topography as well as a medial
to lateral one, terminating in a more patchy and interdigitated manner than that found in
rodents (Joel and Weiner, 2000). Connections between prefrontal cortex areas and striatum
normally respect a degree of topography and depend on the prefrontal network they belong
to (Ferry et al., 2000; Haber and Gdowski, 2004; Yeterian and Pandya, 1991). Nevertheless,
prefrontal-striatal projections are not fully convergent even within networks (Fig. 2.6).
The targets of prefrontal-striatal projections from medial network areas span both ventral
and dorsal parts of striatum (Wise, 2008; Öngür and Price, 2000). Projections from more
ventromedial areas (area 25 and area 14c) aim primarily the ventral striatum, terminating
in the core and shell of the nucleus accumbens (Ferry et al., 2000; Nakano et al., 1999).
Area 32 also shows projections to the core of the nucleus accumbens and rostral ventral
putamen, but they are predominant in the medial portion of the head, body and tail of the
caudate (Ferry et al., 2000). More anterior areas of the medial network (including areas
10o, 10m and 11m) show projections that are restricted to the medial edge of the caudate
(Ferry et al., 2000). Area 24 has interesting patterns of connectivity as it either targets
different regions within the ventral striatum or both ventral and dorsal striatum. Areas 24a
and 24b target mostly the lateral ventral striatum, but also have some connections to medial
ventral striatum (Ferry et al., 2000; Kunishio and Haber, 1994). Medial regions of area
24c show particularly strong connectivity with the core of the nucleus accumbens, while
more lateral regions exhibits connections with dorsal striatum (Kunishio and Haber, 1994).
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Fig. 2.6 Convergence of the prefrontal-striatal projections. A 3D a) and 2D b) view of
a reconstruction of the striatal inputs from prefrontal regions illustrating regions of conver-
gence of inputs. From Haber and Knutson (2009).
Finally, the motor cingulate cortex also sends an overlapping projection to the dorsal region
of the striatum (i.e., both caudate and putamen) (Kunishio and Haber, 1994; McFarland and
Haber, 2000).
Most areas of the orbital network are connected extensively with ventral and central
parts of the head of the caudate nucleus, the dorsal edge of the nucleus accumbens as well
as more medial areas of putamen (Ferry et al., 2000; Haber et al., 1995; Öngür and Price,
2000). This connectivity shows a slight degree of overlap with the connectivity pattern of
the medial network, although injections into lateral caudate nucleus caused staining almost
exclusively within orbital network areas (Ferry et al., 2000).
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex substantially innervates the striatum but it targets pre-
dominantly the more anterior and central region of the caudate nucleus (Arikuni and Kubota,
1986; Selemon and Goldman-Rakic, 1985). These projections are topographically organ-
ised and interfaces with several other cortical inputs. Injections made into area 46 and 9
show terminations in the lateral portions of the caudate nucleus and in medial putamen
(Calzavara et al., 2007; Yeterian and Pandya, 1991).
Projections from other cortical areas to the striatum have not been studied in such de-
tail as the ones from the prefrontal cortex. The dorsolateral and central parts of posterior
putamen are the targets for the vast majority of motor and premotor projections, with the
latter ones extending more rostrally than the former ones (Kemp and Powell, 1970). The
same region receives somatosensory parietal inputs with a similar somatotopic arrangement
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(Künzle, 1977). In regards to saccadic eye movements, the frontal eye fields and the sup-
plementary eye fields areas project to the central and more lateral part of the head and body
of the caudate nucleus as well as to ipsilateral putamen (Künzle, 1977).
From a pure anatomical perspective, the dorsolateral striatum is considered the sensori-
motor striatum, but it has also been functionally implicated in movement planning, execu-
tion and learning. In regards to temporal lobe projections, despite targeting vast areas of the
striatum they show relevant preferences (Selemon and Goldman-Rakic, 1985; Van Hoesen
et al., 1981; Yeterian and Pandya, 1998; Yeterian and Hoesen, 1978). Superior temporal
gyrus inputs overlap with those from dorsal lateral network in the central half of the caudate
nucleus. In contrast, inferior temporal areas terminals interdigitate more ventrally with those
from the medial and orbital prefrontal networks. Finally, occipital visual fibers terminate in
posterior parts of the body of the caudate nucleus (Saint-Cyr et al., 1990).
The dopamine system interacts closely with the striatum. In fact, the striatum receives
major dopaminergic projections but it also contributes to the major inputs to the dopamine
system. Dopaminergic cells are present in a dorsal tier (the ventral tegmental area, the dor-
sal group of substantia nigra pars compacta and the retrorubral area) and in a ventral tier
(densocellular and ventral group of the substantia nigra pars compacta) of the midbrain.
The way dopamine projects to striatum follows a reversed dorsal-ventral topography, with
the dorsal tier projecting to the ventral striatum and the ventral tier projecting to the dor-
sal striatum (Carpenter and Peter, 1972; Haber et al., 2000; Lynd-Balta and Haber, 1994).
More specifically, the ventral tegmental area projects mainly to the shell of the nucleus ac-
cumbens and the dorsal group of substantia nigra pars compacta to most of the remaining
ventral striatum. Regarding the ventral tier, the densocellular group of substantia nigra pars
compacta projects primarily to the central striatal area (where most dorsal lateral prefrontal
cortex terminals end) and the ventral group of substantia nigra pars compacta primarily to
the dorsolateral striatum. It is also important to note that ventral striatum dopaminergic in-
puts come from a limited midbrain region, whereas projections to the dorsolateral striatum
are derived from a much wider area of the midbrain (Haber et al., 2000).
Both ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra pars compacta also send projections
to various parts of the prefrontal cortex (Porrino and Goldman-Rakic, 1982). Injections
into areas 9 and 46 have shown connections with anterior parts of ventral tegmental area
and antero-medial and antero-dorsal substantia nigra pars compacta (Porrino and Goldman-
Rakic, 1982). Injections into area 10, 11, 12 and 13 all find labelled neurons throughout
the ventral tegmental area but only area 10 appears to connect with substantia nigra pars
compacta (Porrino and Goldman-Rakic, 1982). The area most strongly connected to ven-
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tral tegmental area appears to be area 24 which connects extensively (Gaspar et al., 1989;
Porrino and Goldman-Rakic, 1982). Even within area 24 there appears to be a sharp transi-
tion from higher to lower dopamine innervation between areas 24b and area 24c (Williams
and Goldman-Rakic, 1998). Dopaminergic neurons have also been described in area 32
on the medial wall of the prefrontal cortex (Raghanti et al., 2008). Finally, these midbrain
dopamine projections seem to be topographically organised based upon which part of the
prefrontal the projections terminate. In regards to projections from the prefrontal cortex to
dopamine neurons, they are not very abundant but they arise from regions such as anterior
cingulate, dorsolateral prefrontal and orbital cortices (Frankle et al., 2006).
An overall summary of the prefrontal-basal ganglia connections based on most of the
findings discussed above is shown schematically in Figure 2.7.
Ventral striatum
vmPFC
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lOFC
Frontal 
pole
DLPFC	

(Area 46)
VTA SNpc
ACC
Area 24
Area 32
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Shell Core
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caudate/putamen
Caudate Putamen
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Fig. 2.7 Schematic representation of prefrontal-basal ganglia connections. Line thick-
ness denotes strength of projections relative to the respective region. Abbreviations: ACC:
anterior cingulate cortex; vmPFC: ventromedial prefrontal cortex (areas 14r/c); mOFC:
medial orbitofrontal cortex (areas 13a/b/m/l); lOFC: lateral orbitofrontal cortex (areas
12l/m/o/r); DLPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; VTA: ventral tegmental area; SNpc:
Substantia nigra pars compacta; NAcc: nucleus accumbens.
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2.2 Lesion studies and neurophysiology of prefrontal and
basal ganglia
Dopamine, reward and prediction errors
Dopamine neurons were found to have interesting learning and motivational properties
(Ljungberg et al., 1992; Romo and Schultz, 1990; Schultz et al., 1993; Schultz and Romo,
1990). Theoreticians working on learning models related this pattern of response to the one
predicted by a temporal difference prediction error signal, which drives value updates in
reinforcement learning (Montague et al., 1996, 1995; Schultz et al., 1997). Further studies
corroborated predictions derived from the theory (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005).
When more quantitative predictions of the model were tested, dopaminergic cells encoded
precisely the difference between the current reward and an exponentially weighted average
of previous rewards (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005).
The reward prediction error signal of dopamine phasic activity, highlights a potentially
substantial role in model-free learning. Dopamine firing in monkeys performing a proba-
bilistic decision task with occasional forced choices reflected both a valuation of the current
state as well as the action taken by the animal (Morris et al., 2006). These findings are very
much in agreement with a prediction error signal being used in a SARSA-like algorithm (Niv
et al., 2006), although in rodents the signal seems to be more in line with Q-learning (Roesch
et al., 2007). Despite such role in model-free learning, increased dopamine levels have been
associated with an enhancement of model-based over model-free control (Wunderlich et al.,
2012b). Concomitantly, depleting dopamine can boost model-free control (de Wit et al.,
2012a). A strong possibility for these unexepected findings may be the fact that those ef-
fects could in part depend on dopamine’s actions on functions implemented in prefrontal
cortex. In fact, the disruption of the dopaminergic system has long been associated with
executive cognitive deficits (Brozoski et al., 1979; Sawaguchi and Goldman-Rakic, 1991)
and its neuromodulatory role has also been included on computational views of working
memory (Durstewitz et al., 2000; Vijayraghavan et al., 2007). The details of these effects
in structures such as the prefrontal cortex remain largely unknown (Seamans and Yang,
2004). Nevertheless, such functional findings are consistent with the strong anatomical pro-
jections from midbrain dopamine cells to striatum and prefrontal cortex, where model-free
and model-based computations are mostly undertaken.
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The double-faced striatum
If we now turn our attention to the primate neurophysiology of model-free structures, in one
of the first studies revealing striatal plasticity during behavioural learning a specific neural
pattern emerged as the number of sessions and learning increased (Aosaki et al., 1994b).
This striatal activity did not seem to reflect just a direct consequence of a dopamine in-
put, although the dopaminergic teaching signal is necessary for its formation (Aosaki et al.,
1994a). In monkeys performing a sequential motor task, different striatal cells also increased
their firing rate for either new or well learned sequences (Miyachi et al., 2002). Most im-
portantly, this functional segregation had a clear anatomical match to more anterior and
posterior parts of the striatum, respectively (Miyachi et al., 1997). In a very elegant study
testing directly model-free estimates, cells in dorsal striatum were found to encode state-
action values (Samejima et al., 2005). These values obtained with a Q-learning algorithm
fitted to the animal’s choices. In addition to these neurons, another study reported caudate
cells encoding chosen values following the response (Lau and Glimcher, 2008). Action
values appeared earlier than the chosen value. This temporal profile is in agreement with
reinforcement learning principles. State-action values are useful in guiding the action selec-
tion process as they reflect cached estimates of the available options based on experience.
By contrast, chosen values represent the value of a choice that has already passed through
the selection process, relevant for an evaluative process such as the dopaminergic prediction
error computation. Very similar findings were observed in rodents, but action value neurons
were found in fewer number, and present in both dorsal and ventral parts of the striatum (Ito
and Doya, 2009). This observation in the ventral striatum is slightly surprising given the
fact that activity in this region has been more often associated with expected reward in rela-
tion to pavlovian conditioned associations (Cromwell and Schultz, 2003; Day et al., 2006;
Shidara et al., 1998). This latter predictive function of ventral striatum can also be viewed
as an interest in state value, irrespective of the action choice, often analysed as the summed
value of the various options (Cai et al., 2011).
Indirect evidence for potential model-based computations has also been found in striatal
neurons. Most of this is because of the involvement of more anterior parts of the caudate in
initial phases of learning, which is in line with the more advantageous role of model-based
computations at the start of the learning process. This striatal role was brought to attention
while simultaneously comparing its neural activity with the prefrontal cortex (Pasupathy
and Miller, 2005), where both the rise time and the peak of neuronal activity appropriate
for a correct response emerged earlier in caudate than in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
Moreover, some of these striatal cells can sustain their activity from trial to trial to hold
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information about correct options (Histed et al., 2009). In addition, caudate can play a role
in sequence representations (Seo et al., 2012) and is also capable of comparing integrated
information such as temporally discounted values (Cai et al., 2011). When microstimula-
tion was applied to the head of the caudate during the feedback-reward period of a correct
visuomotor association, the rate of learning increased significantly when compared to non-
stimulated blocks, leading animals to improve the acquisition of new associations and reach
learning criteria in fewer trials (Williams and Eskandar, 2006).
The prefrontal cortex
The areas of the prefrontal cortex most often involved in reward-guided learning and deci-
sion making involve the orbital frontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex and the frontal pole (Kennerley and Walton, 2011; Rushworth et al., 2011).
Orbital network
Lesion studies in the orbitofrontal cortex of monkeys support its involvement in establish-
ing associations between choices and outcomes, particularly in dynamic scenarios (Rude-
beck et al., 2008; Rudebeck and Murray, 2008; Walton et al., 2010). Consistent with a
proposed anatomical division for prefrontal cortex in a visceromotor medial network (me-
dial wall and ventromedial areas of prefrontal cortex) and a sensory orbital system (pos-
terior, central and lateral areas in the orbital surface) (Carmichael and Price, 1996, 1995c;
Öngür and Price, 2000), subtle differences were observed within the orbitofrontal cortex
regions(Noonan et al., 2010). Lesions of the ventromedial part hint towards a more value
comparison function, whereas monkeys with lateral orbitofrontal lesions showed instead a
credit assignment problem due to lack of integration of reward and choice history. Despite
not requiring knowledge of a model of the environment, these findings suggest attention to
the reward structure. In agreement with this interpretation, recent lesion evidence empha-
sise the role of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex in motivational updating valuations given that
such lesions impair reinforcer devaluation (Rudebeck and Murray, 2011; Rudebeck et al.,
2013).
Not many neurophysiology studies addressed this learning function in non-human pri-
mates. Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex modify their responses in order to accommodate
qualitative (Hikosaka and Watanabe, 2000; Thorpe et al., 1983) or quantitative (Kobayashi
et al., 2010; Tremblay and Schultz, 1999) changes in incentive value. In simple value com-
parison scenarios where explicit information about the outcomes is available, OFC neurons
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encode sensory properties of the reward (such as taste) as well as offer and chosen values
(Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006). Their activity also reflects a trial-by-trial evaluation of
the value difference between the current and the previous trial (Kennerley et al., 2011). This
previous choice information can be used to contextualise the current value, with potential
relevance in learning and adaptive behaviour. When directly tested in a reversal learning
task with aversive and appetitive outcomes, the orbitofrontal cortex neurons preferentially
encoded rewarding stimuli and updated this appetitive value more rapidly (Morrison et al.,
2011). Regarding potential differences between a medial and an orbital network, lateral
orbitofrontal cortex activity seems related to external or sensory information processing,
whereas the medial part is more involved in internal motivational representations (Bouret
and Richmond, 2010; Monosov and Hikosaka, 2012).
Medial network
Lesion studies in the anterior cingulate cortex of monkeys revealed its key role in reinforce-
ment learning. Despite not being essential for switching behaviour, lesioned animals show
impairment in continuing with the same rewarding option following several reinforcements
(Kennerley et al., 2006). Inactivation of the anterior cingulate cortex not only make animals
repeat non-valuable choices that were valuable prior to the inactivation (Amiez et al., 2006),
but also interferes with action-outcome associations (Shima and Tanji, 1998). Overall, these
findings suggest a role of this structure in tracking the reward history of choices, in harmony
with representations of outcome volatility found in the anterior cingulate cortex of humans
(Behrens et al., 2007). It also seems to be capable of integrating both context and outcome
values (Buckley et al., 2009). The above features could reflect the use of a cognitive-like
map for model-based learning. If error related activity found in some studies (Debener et al.,
2005; Holroyd et al., 2004) is taken into account, it could be also argued that this area is
involved in monitoring the model structure of which future choices are based (Rushworth
and Behrens, 2008).
Neurophysiology studies do seem to support some of these speculations. Cells in cin-
gulate motor area process reward reductions relevant to an adaptive selection of motor acts
(Shima and Tanji, 1998). In foraging decisions, the neuronal activity correlated with the
value of leaving the current source of reward and reached its maximum just before the an-
imal decided to leave and try a new option (Hayden et al., 2011a). Further studies also
highlighted the integrative role of connecting actions and rewards (Hadland et al., 2003;
Hayden and Platt, 2010; Kennerley et al., 2009, 2006; Matsumoto et al., 2003). This learn-
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ing feature could also be used when stimuli are relevant for optimal performance (Amiez
et al., 2006). Other types of evidence suggest that the reward history modulation found in
this area could be a reward prediction error similar to the dopaminergic prediction error
signal (Amiez et al., 2005; Kennerley et al., 2011; Matsumoto et al., 2007; Seo and Lee,
2007). However, two important shortcomings prompt prudence on this model-free account.
First, the mentioned studies used either simple learning tasks or focused on the action selec-
tion process with values learnt from direct experience. Secondly, the reward-related signals
observed in the anterior cingulate cortex include complex feedback information (Quilodran
et al., 2008), as it encodes multiple decision variable knowledge (Hayden and Platt, 2010;
Kennerley and Wallis, 2009a) and outcomes that have been observed but not directly experi-
enced (Hayden et al., 2009). Such elaborated reward signals are more likely to be computed
by a model-based region.
Lateral network
Classical studies of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex lesions in monkeys were the first evidence
suggesting an involvement of this region in working memory processes (Jacobsen, 1935).
Further lesional studies confirmed its relevance in maintaining behaviourally relevant rep-
resentations as observed by the significant impact in delayed-response performance (Funa-
hashi et al., 1993). In addition to deficits in working memory maintenance, it was also found
that impairment of areas 9 and 46 compromise the learning of a memory task in which the
monitoring requirements within working memory are minimized by having a rule, where
each correct choice is specified by the preceding one (Petrides, 1995). Such role in support-
ing working memory for abstract rule learning seems to be specific of the dorsal prefrontal
cortex region around the principal sulcus and could be important for behaviour control in
dynamic environments (Buckley et al., 2009). Electrophysiological evidence also favours
the involvement of this region in working memory (Levy and Goldman-Rakic, 2000) and
cognitive control (Miller and Cohen, 2001) theories. Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex single
neurons are able to keep a persistent response for behaviourally relevant information, such
as spatial location (Funahashi et al., 1989) or object identity (Ó Scalaidhe et al., 1999).
Furthermore, single-neuron activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is not only capable of
encoding rule information (Wallis et al., 2001) but also represents the competition level
between two potential matching rules for a choice (Mansouri et al., 2007).
Despite the involvement in specific cognitive tasks, only more recently the neurophysi-
ology findings of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex have been interpreted within the framework
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of reinforcement learning theory (Lee and Seo, 2007; Lee et al., 2012). Several studies
have found that expected reward modulates the single-neuron activity involved in working
memory processes (Leon and Shadlen, 1999; Watanabe, 1996). This encoding of working
memory information and reward is stronger in the ventrolateral subdivision than in the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex (Kennerley and Wallis, 2009b). Importantly, such firing rate mod-
ulation may indeed contribute to the animal’s decision-making process. In a study where
the animal was first told about the magnitude of reward and then a stimuli informed the
response to be made, the influence of expected value on neuronal activity was only present
before the instructive cue was shown and not after the specific response was performed
(Amemori and Sawaguchi, 2006). However, most of these value-related signals were ob-
served either in not very complex tasks or in relatively stable situations. In a study with
a more dynamic environment where subjects made binary decisions in a matching pennies
task, the firing rate of neurons around the caudal principal sulcus encoded the difference in
the value functions of both choices as derived by a reinforcement learning model (Barra-
clough et al., 2004). This activity was influenced by the animal’s choice as well as by past
outcomes, and it was often maintained across intertrial intervals. Furthermore, recordings
in the same region in a task where monkeys had to learn a sequence of choices, showed
not only neuronal preference for particular movements within the sequence but also differ-
ent responses to the same movement depending on the specific sequence (Averbeck et al.,
2006). These findings not only highlight an involvement of these signals in a reinforce-
ment learning process but also implicate the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the process
of action-outcome evaluation. Interestingly, the disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
with transcranial magnetic stimulation in humans impaired MB behaviour in favour of a
behaviour driven by MF control (Smittenaar et al., 2013). Furthermore, the role in working
memory, rule learning as well as the context-dependent outcome-related activity suggest a
potential role of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in model-based reinforcement learning.
The frontal pole is the most anterior area of the frontal cortex and relatively larger in
percentage of human brain volume than in great apes (Semendeferi et al., 2001). Its cy-
toarchitectural organization promotes heavy cortico-cortical connections with a consequent
potential role in coordinating different types of information. These properties have led some
authors to place the frontal pole at the pinnacle of a possible rostro-caudal axis processing
gradient (Badre and D’Esposito, 2009). Furthermore, the region’s development starts rel-
atively late with the highest rates of brain growth occurring around the second half of the
first decade of life (Sowell et al., 2004). This is a relevant point given the evidence of ha-
bitual control dominance found in younger ages (Klossek et al., 2008). Frontal pole lesions
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in humans do not seem to have a strong and widespread effect on classic executive tests.
However, rule-break behaviour and problems with planning have been found in complex
multi-task scenarios (Burgess et al., 2000). These deficits seem to be more prominent in
situations requiring maintenance of goals in a complex environment as well as when the
correct way of behaving is underspecified (Burgess et al., 2007). This is consistent with
the neuroimaging evidence reporting engagement in branching processes (Koechlin et al.,
1999), exploratory decisions (Daw et al., 2006) and monitoring of alternative choices values
(Boorman et al., 2011, 2009).
Two very recent studies reported subtle differences compared with controls in the be-
haviour of monkeys with FP lesions. In one of these studies, subjects performed various
tasks and while choosing between new alternatives early stage errors rapidly decreased with
learning in control animals. By contrast, FP lesioned animals, showed no such rapid learning
but were indistinguishable from controls in later phases of learning. The authors proposed
an important role of FP in rapid learning of the relative values of wide-ranging novel alterna-
tives (Boschin et al., 2015). In the other study (Mansouri et al., 2015), FP lesioned animals
were compared against controls on the performance of a variant of the Wisconsin Card Sort-
ing Test (WCST) – where subjects are required to respond by matching a sample to one of
several test items according to uncued rules that vary dynamically across the session. When
compared to controls, damage to FP had an effect on performance but did not impair rule
maintenance or rule switching. Instead, enhancing effects on FP lesioned animals were seen
as subjects were better able to maintain the relevant rule when intervening distractors (such
as free reward and novel tasks between trials of the WCST task) were used. This has lead
the authors to hypothesize that the key contribution of FP to cognition is in supporting the
exploration and evaluation of the relative value of different alternatives, particularly when
novel.
However, the only study to record from single-cells in frontal pole found surprisingly
simple neuronal responses (Tsujimoto et al., 2010). In a task where the monkey was cued
to repeat or switch the choice of the previous trial, the neurons encoded the response made
only when the animal received feedback about the correctness of its choice. The authors
considered that the representation of the selected response at the time when the outcome
is revealed, reflects an important monitoring role in planning self-generated (i.e., not when
experimentally guided but when the subject has to choose based on some memory, rule or
stored representation) responses for future choices. Other authors rather emphasised this
result as a forward implementation of internal models relevant for the task (Koechlin, 2011)
and for model-based reinforcement learning.
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2.3 Animal learning psychology: habitual and goal-directed
behaviour
Animals learn associations between their own actions and consequent changes in the envi-
ronment. This form of acquired behaviour, known as instrumental conditioning, is different
from classical conditioning as it allows them to exert control over their surroundings in or-
der to satisfy their needs and desires. One famous psychologist – who rigorously studied
this type of learning – was Edward Thorndike, who proposed the influential Law of Effect,
where actions closely followed by satisfaction to the animal will, other things being equal,
be more firmly connected with the situation, so that when it recurs, they will be more likely to
recur. This stimulus-response theory views rewards during a trial-and-error learning experi-
ence acting in a retroactive way, meaning that they increment the strength of the connection
between a stimulus and a response that occurred before the reward (Grindley, 1932).
Another prominent animal learning psychologist was Edward Tolman, whose research
challenged some stimulus-response ideas. In a spatial orientation experiment (Figure 2.8)
(Tolman et al., 1946), rats were first trained in a maze composed of a walled alley leading
to a route of some turns before they reached the reinforcement (Figure 2.8a). Then, the
experimental apparatus was changed by blocking the walled alley previously leading to the
reward and various radiating paths were added (Figure 2.8b). Importantly, this test was
performed in extinction. What Tolman and colleagues observed was that the animals had a
strong tendency to choose the radiating path appropriately pointing towards where the food
used to be (Figure 2.8c).
These and other experimental results led him to bring forward the idea of a cognitive-
like map of the environment guiding animal behaviour (Tolman, 1948). According to Tol-
man, stimuli are not processed by a telephone switchboard that simply connects them with
a response. Instead, they are operated by a central control room which uses intervening
variables (Tolman, 1938) and provides routes and paths and environmental relationships
that determine animal’s responses (Tolman, 1948). Motor hesitations and repetitive looking
back and forth at choice points, known as vicarious trial and error, was good evidence that
such mental processes may exist in animals (Muenzinger, 1938). This school of thought be-
came highly influential and generated several concepts of cognitive psychology, including
working memory (Baddeley, 1992).
Later experimental work by Dickinson and Balleine helped in defining an important
fragmentation of instrumental behaviour (Dickinson and Balleine, 1994). They divided
actions into habitual and goal-directed on the basis of their action-outcome contingencies as
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Fig. 2.8 Tolman’s spatial orientation experiment. a) Experimental apparatus used in the
training phase. b) Modified apparatus used in testing. The reward is located at the end of
path number 5. c) Results revealing the number of rats choosing each of the radiating paths.
well as motivational sensitivities. To test the action-outcome criteria they used experimental
assays where the instrumental contingency is either altered (Bolles et al., 1980) or degraded
(Hammond, 1980). In such paradigms, animals are trained under a high probability of
action-outcome association which is then reduced, so that the likelihood of obtaining a
reward is similar whether or not the action is performed. A reduction in response rate
after the change reveals sensitivity to contingency degradation. On the other hand, outcome
devaluation paradigms (Adams and Dickinson, 1981; Balleine and Dickinson, 1991, 1998a;
Colwill and Rescorla, 1985; Dickinson, 1996) reveal sensitivity to changes in outcome’s
motivational value. In these experiments, animals are first trained to perform an action (e.g.,
pressing a lever) for a desired reward. Then, the incentive value of the outcome is changed
by, for example, pairing the outcome with illness or by inducing outcome-specific satiety.
Finally, the learned response is tested in extinction (i.e. with no reward), and the behaviour
of animals for which the outcome has been devalued is compared with that of animals who
have not undergone such devaluation procedure.
Habitual behaviour, according to Dickinson and Balleine, is neither aware of changes in
the value of the consequences previously associated with the action nor sensitive to changes
in the causal relationship between the action and its consequences. Empirically, a habit is an
automatic action that arises from repeated practice and defined by its behaviour inflexibility.
It revives Thorndike’s law as it specifies responses not controlled by the current value of
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the goal, but instead by previously stimulus-response reinforced associations (Dickinson,
1985). When a habit controls behaviour the choice becomes insensitive to motivational ma-
nipulations, as it happens in overtrained animals when faced with an outcome devaluation
paradigm (Adams, 1982) or in certain circumstances such as chronic stress (Dias-Ferreira
et al., 2009). Extended practice also leads to a reduced sensitivity to changes in instrumen-
tal contingency (Dickinson, 1998). Good examples of a maladaptive model-free or habitual
system include superstitious behaviour (Skinner, 1948) and addiction (Dayan, 2009). Com-
putationally, this stamping in of a reinforced choice from direct experience is analogous to
the description of model-free control exposed in the previous chapter.
On the other extreme, a goal-directed action implies not only a representation of the
causal relationship between the action and its consequences, but also a sensitivity to changes
in the value of the goal or outcome with which the action is associated. Therefore, goal-
directed behaviour meets not only the instrumental but also the goal criteria (Dickinson and
Balleine, 1994). The awareness of such associative structures relates this definition with Tol-
man ideas of cognitive maps, at the same time as it also alludes to the learning endeavours
of model-based control in estimating both task and reward structures. Moreover, these re-
quired storage and manipulation of goal-directed representations show similarities with the
requirements for forward search in a decision tree of model-based computations. Although
goal-directed behaviour could better suit animal needs, the challenges of maintaining ac-
tion–outcome relationships are also psychologically acknowledged in the light of a law of
less work (Hull, 1943), where actions more difficult to make are less likely to occur. In a
way, this problem resembles the computational limitations of MB-RL when the decision
tree is complex, as discussed in the previous chapter.
How the two forms of instrumental control interact and determine action choice is re-
garded as a very contemporary psychological issue (Menzel and Fischer, 2011). De Wit and
colleagues (de Wit and Dickinson, 2009) argue that instrumental performance at any given
stage of learning could be a sum of the goal-directed and habitual components and propose
an integrative associative-cybernetic model that mimic the hybrid computational treatments
proposed in chapter 1.
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2.4 Neural substrates of model-free and model-based rein-
forcement learning
Two main approaches have been used to study the neurobiology of model-free and model-
based learning systems. The psychological concepts of habitual and goal-directed behaviour
have been explored in rodents and mostly making use of loss of function experiments,
whereas the theoretical reinforcement learning framework have received more attention by
researchers performing functional neuroimaging studies in humans.
The involvement of prefrontal-basal ganglia loops in model-free and model-based con-
trol has received a lot of attention from these two research communities (Balleine and Dick-
inson, 1998b; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2009; Bornstein and Daw, 2011; Daw and Doya,
2006; Dayan and Niv, 2008; Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Doll et al., 2012; Ito and Doya, 2011).
However, research in non-human primates has rarely tested direct reinforcement learning
propositions and not much effort has been made to integrate lesion work and single-neuron
findings obtained from non-human primate studies. Finally, no functional evidence of in-
teraction between the two learning systems has been described in non-human primates and
more mechanistic details of such implementation are needed.
Although homologies between rodents and humans can be drawn regarding goal-directed
(or MB-RL) and habitual (or MF-RL) (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2009), it is also essential
to acknowledge the anatomical and functional differences between the two species. Most
studies in rodents have been focused on the basal ganglia computations, an evolutionary
conserved structure. Yet primates have more links between motor and associative striatum,
as well as less segregation of the dopamine system (Joel and Weiner, 2000). Nevertheless,
it is at the level of the prefrontal cortex that this problem assumes more relevance (Fig. 2.9).
Clear homologues of primate prefrontal cortex, particularly the granular regions, may not
exist in rodents leading some authors to even question its existence (Preuss, 1995; Wise,
2008).
In addition, monkey prefrontal circuits involved in decision making show strong struc-
tural and functional neuroimaging similarities in the distribution and connectivity when
compared to human brains (Neubert et al., 2014). This is an important issue given the
relationship between prefrontal cortex and goal-directed behaviour, together with the fact
that model-based theories are at an extremely early stage of research, when compared with
model-free ones (Daw and Dayan, 2014; Doll et al., 2012; Doya et al., 2002).
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Fig. 2.9 Medial frontal cortex across species. A diagrammatic representation of the cy-
toarchitecture of human (i), macaque (ii) and rat (ii) prefrontal cortices. Abbreviations: AC,
anterior cingular area; IL, infralimbic cortex; cc, corpus callosum; Fr2, second frontal area;
MO, medial orbital area; PL, prelimbic cortex; VO, ventral orbital area; m, medial; r, rostral;
c, caudal; p, posterior. From Wise (2008).
Following a summary of the current knowledge from rodents and human studies, an at-
tempt will be made to integrate non-human primate prefrontal and basal ganglia experiments
in model-free and model-based reinforcement learning.
Model-free or habitual neural substrates have been found in both cortical and subcorti-
cal brain structures of rodents (Figure 2.10). It is important to remember that in outcome
devaluation tests, the goal-directed performance observed with limited training is lost to
habitual control if this training gets extended. However, rats with lesions in dorsolateral
striatum (posterior caudate and putamen in primates) remain goal-directed after outcome
devaluation even after overtraining (Yin et al., 2004). Inactivation of this region also causes
habitual performance to be sensitive to changes in the action–outcome contingency (Yin
et al., 2006). The infralimbic cortex is a cortical structure involved in habits. Lesions in this
region prevent the expression of habitual behaviour after both limited and extended training
(Killcross and Coutureau, 2003). Moreover, inactivation of the infralimbic prefrontal cor-
tex in rodents not only reinstates goal-directed behaviour in animals that have previously
been habituated (Coutureau and Killcross, 2003), but also impinges on the formation of
new habits (Smith et al., 2012). Another region that seems to be involved in habitual be-
haviour is the amygdala. Disruption of the connection between the anterior portion of the
amygdala central nucleus and the dorsolateral striatum in rats, leads to a lack of habitual
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responding after outcome devaluation (Lingawi and Balleine, 2012). Finally, dopamine also
plays an important role in modulating model-free learning-related plasticity in these cortico-
subcortical networks. Given the well-known role of phasic dopamine in reporting reward
prediction errors in pavlovian learning (Schultz et al., 1997) and the fact that model-free
computations uses similar prediction errors to update values, such involvement is not sur-
prising. Indeed, attenuation of the phasic dopaminergic activity (Wang et al., 2011) as well
as impairment of the nigrostriatal (Faure et al., 2005) or mesocortical (Barker et al., 2013;
Hitchcott et al., 2007) dopaminergic pathways significantly impairs learning tasks related to
habitual behaviour.
Fig. 2.10 Neural substrates of habitual behaviour derived from loss of function exper-
iments in rodents. Anatomical, neuropharmacology and optogenetic manipulations (see
text for further details) have all been used to show involvement of the infralimbic cortex (IL)
and the dorsolateral striatum (DLS) in habitual or model-free mechanisms. They have also
shown an important neuromodulatory role of dopamine (DA) cells in the ventral tegmental
area (VTA) and in the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc). Finally, the central nucleus
of the amygdala (CeA) also seems to play a role through an interaction with the DLS, but
details behind the real mechanism are less clear. From (Smith and Graybiel, 2014).
In humans, the ventral striatum has been the region where most consistently fMRI
BOLD signal correlates with dopaminergic reward prediction errors and is often considered
as part of the model-free system (McClure et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Seymour
et al., 2004). However, more recent imaging studies have often found the VTA/SNc also
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covarying with reward prediction errors (D’Ardenne et al., 2008). However, it is important
to note that these studies used pavlovian learning scenarios and, therefore, have not tested
model-free substrates as defined in instrumental behaviour. In fact, the entire ventral sub-
circuit of the prefrontal-subcortical network (including ventral striatum, orbitofrontal cortex
and amygdala) is particularly involved in pavlovian learning (Daw and O’Doherty, 2014).
Despite some theoretical work attempting to explain how these pavlovian responses can
compete or cooperate with instrumental behaviour (Dayan et al., 2006), the neural basis of
these interactions are not clearly elucidated. Nevertheless, other human studies aimed to
specifically test instrumental model-free substrates. When a classic outcome devaluation
paradigm was applied to humans, the activity of posterior parts of putamen in the training
phase increased significantly when the first sessions were compared to the final ones (Tri-
comi et al., 2009). In another study with planning and overtraining conditions, lateral parts
of putamen also encoded values on extensively trained trials at the time of choice (Wun-
derlich et al., 2012a). Moreover, a shift in neuroimaging activity from anterior caudate to
posterior putamen has equally been found as function of motor sequence learning (Jueptner
et al., 1997; Lehéricy et al., 2005). Finally, the strength of connections between posterolat-
eral striatum and premotor cortex is significantly correlated with the prevalence of habitual
behaviour (de Wit et al., 2012b). All these findings suggest an important role of this re-
gion in model-free control of instrumental behaviour, in line with its homology with the
dorsolateral striatum of rodents.
The neuroscience of model-based RL is less well explored. Rodents prelimbic cor-
tex and dorsomedial striatum (equivalent to anterior caudate nucleus in primates) are the
two main candidates. Lesions in prelimbic cortex interfere with sensitivity to contingency
changes between response and a specific reward (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998b). This
deficit could actually be a consequence of an inability by these animals to retain learning
in working memory (Corbit and Balleine, 2003). Importantly, impairments observed only
occur if this region is silenced during training, instead of at the time of testing. In con-
trast to a role in the expression of goal-directed behaviour, the prelimbic cortex seems to
be genuinely involved in goal-directed learning (Ostlund and Balleine, 2005; Tran-Tu-Yen
et al., 2009). The dorsomedial striatum receives dense projections from the prelimbic cor-
tex and does appear to be critical for both the learning and the expression of goal-directed
behaviour (Yin et al., 2005a,b). Another structure viewed as player of a model-based circuit
is the orbitofrontal cortex. In rodents this region uses inference obtained by state transition
knowledge to flexibly estimate expected value essential for model-based evaluation (Jones
et al., 2012).
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From neuroimaging evidence in humans, model-based evaluation has most often been
associated with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. This region encodes and tracks the ex-
pected reward of chosen actions (Daw et al., 2006; Gläscher et al., 2009; Tanaka et al., 2004).
It does so by taking advantage of a model of the environment (Hampton et al., 2006), be-
ing sensitive to task contingencies (Valentin et al., 2007) and combining different sources
of information (Behrens et al., 2008). Despite this complexity, it can also include values
learned from a model-free learner in MB-RL reasoning (Wunderlich et al., 2012a). On the
other hand, lateral prefrontal and intraparietal cortex showed state prediction error signals
conforming to an update important for state transition learning (Gläscher et al., 2010). An-
other structure similarly implicated in a model representation has been the hippocampus,
in agreement with its known spatial mapping properties (Bornstein and Daw, 2012). Hip-
pocampal neural activity was found to replay previously experienced routes between trials
or during sleep, which could help solving limitations of model-free computations (Johnson
and Redish, 2005).
Very few studies addressed the issue of how the two learning systems interact with each
other. One of the first studies and an inspiration for this project was the one by Daw et al.
(2011) (Figure 2.11). Their design of a sequential decision task with a particular state
transition function, was able to reveal concomitant behavioural and neuronal signatures
of model-based and model-free learning. Contrary to the expectations, the study found
that fMRI BOLD signal in ventral striatum did not reflect a pure model-free signal, but
was rather explained by a mix of both learning strategies in a proportion that could also
explain behaviour. This finding can, nevertheless, be explained by the strong prefrontal pro-
jections to this region (Haber and Knutson, 2009) and suggest model-based influences on
model-free computations, at least in striatum. Recently, a study (Gershman et al., 2012) has
found behavioural evidence supporting a cooperative interaction between the two systems,
in agreement with the Dyna algorithm (Sutton, 1990). With a sophisticated multi-phase de-
sign investigating retrospective revaluation, they were able to show higher order contingency
choices that would imply a model-based system training the model-free system offline. In
line with this, some dependency of dopamine expectancy signals on orbitofrontal cortex has
been described in rodents (Takahashi et al., 2011). The other alternative of interaction are
some model-based algorithms that take in cached model-free quantities in order to reduce
their computational demand (Doll et al., 2012; Wunderlich et al., 2012a). In fact, concur-
rent loading of executive resources with additional information attenuated contributions of
model-based behaviour in favour of a more model-free control strategy (Otto et al., 2013).
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Fig. 2.11 Behavioural influence of parallel model-free and model-based learning ar-
chitecture. (a) The two-stage Markov decision task designed by Daw et al. (2011) aimed
to detect simultaneous signals of both model-free and model-based methods as they learn
concurrently. The task required human subjects to make a first-stage choice between two
stimuli (green background). Each of these first-stage choices was more often (70% of the
time) associated with one of the two second-stage states (pink or blue backgrounds). This
state transition structure was kept fixed throughout the experiment. In the second-stage,
another two-option choice was required and reinforced. The probability of reward in the
second-stage changed over time according to an independent random walk for each of the
four second-stage stimuli. Participants were instructed to maximize their rewards. (b) The
sequential aspect of this task helps detecting computational differences between both learn-
ing methods, particularly in terms of prediction patterns by which reward obtained in the
second-stage should impact the probability of stay in first-stage choices. As mentioned
before, model-free will reinforce any satisfactory action not taking into account the task
structure. Therefore, simulation results with a model-free learner show a main effect of re-
ward, regardless of whether the reward was obtained after a common or a rare transition.
The model-based system will use the learned state transitions to evaluate actions. As result,
the model-based simulations reveal a main effect of the interaction between reward and the
transition type. Finally, the behavioural results obtained from the study participants show
signs of both strategies.
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One the other hand, following the ideas of parallel implementation of both model-free
and model-based systems in the brain, a recent study (Lee et al., 2014) tested the theoretical
proposal (Daw et al., 2005) of using each system’s uncertainty on the value estimates to
resolve the competition between the two systems. In fact, the study also uses a two-step
decision task but with specific adjustments that allow independent manipulations of values
and uncertainties in both model-free and model-based learning systems. Their proposed
process of arbitration relies on whether the prediction error signals derived from each learn-
ing system were high or low. The model-free learner uses its reward prediction error signal,
whereas the model-based system uses a state prediction error that is relevant for the learning
of the transition function. A reliability signal is then computed for each learning strategy
based on the variance-to-mean ratio of the probability that the respective error signal is zero.
Thus, control by the model-based or model-free systems over behaviour is implemented ac-
cording to the reliability level of each error signal. However, when the reliabilities are the
same, and because model-based computations are demanding, model-free is favoured. Neu-
ral correlates for this arbitration process were found in the lateral inferior prefrontal cortex
as well as in medial frontal pole cortex. Moreover, they also found a signal reflecting the
difference in reliability between the model-based and model-free signals in a region of the
cingulate cortex.

Chapter 3
Combined model-free and model-based
reinforcement learning behaviour
3.1 Abstract
Animals can learn to influence their environment either by exploiting stimulus-response as-
sociations that have been productive in the past, or by predicting the likely worth of actions
in the future based on their causal relationships with outcomes. These respectively model-
free (MF) and model-based (MB) strategies are used to solve the reinforcement learning
(RL) problem of interaction with the world to optimise future benefits. Computational
constraints and a speed accuracy trade-off imply an advantage in combining both learn-
ing strategies, but this has only been demonstrated in humans. We trained rhesus monkeys
to perform a two-stage decision task that was designed to elicit and discriminate the use
of both MF-RL and MB-RL. A descriptive and logistic analysis of choice behaviour found
that the structure of the task (of MB importance) and the reward history (of MF and MB
importance) significantly influenced choice as well as response vigour. In addition, when
we performed a trial-by-trial computational analysis on our data using different RL algo-
rithms, we found that in the model that best fitted the data, choices were made according
to a weighted combination of MF and MB action values (with a weight for MB-RL close
to 90%). Generative modelling procedures prompted refinements to commonly used RL
models, suggesting additional high-level processing in credit assignment. In conclusion,
our data replicate, in non-human primates, results similar to those found in human subjects
performing an equivalent decision-making task. These findings support the idea of more
integrated views of combined MF and MB strategies in animal learning.
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3.2 Introduction
In chapter 1 the theoretical framework of reinforcement learning theory (RL) for studying
how agents interact with the environment to optimise future benefits was exposed. Further-
more, we also formally defined both model-free (MF) and model-based (MB) approaches
to solve the RL problem. In brief, both methods rely on previous experience but they differ
as to how this information is used to infer the values of choices in a sequential decision
problem. MB-RL valuation integrates information about reward with knowledge about the
state-transition function, which specifies how the state of the world evolves probabilistically
given particular actions. Having such a model of the environment allows it to plan or simu-
late experience, reducing the need to take actions to estimate values, and making it readily
adaptive in situations where the transitions or rewards change. However, the prospective
nature of this approach is computationally demanding if several decisions are required, be-
cause choices are evaluated by searching along paths in an ever-expanding decision tree to
calculate the cumulative expected rewards. By contrast, MF-RL is computationally simple
and faster. It is blind to the state-transition function and it learns by bootstrapping sam-
pled experience taking changes in expectations as signs of errors in its value predictions.
With this approach, MF-RL typically requires more sampling from the world to achieve
good performance and is therefore less sensitive to changes in goal values. Either because
of limitations in the computational resources or due to a speed-accuracy trade-off, it seems
advantageous for a learning agent to have both strategies and take advantage of each ac-
cording to the required task. In chapter 2 the focus was the analogies to MF and MB-RL
approaches that have been drawn with the psychological concepts of Thorndike’s law of
effect or habits versus Tolman’s cognitive maps or goal-directed behaviour, respectively
(Daw et al., 2005; Dickinson, 1985; Dickinson and Balleine, 1994; Dolan and Dayan, 2013;
Thorndike, 1911; Tolman, 1948). In the same chapter, we reviewed the wealth of experi-
mental evidence suggesting the existence in the brain of complex prefrontal-striatal circuits
that may support each of these distinct learning systems in value-guided decision making
(Balleine, 2005; Daw and Dayan, 2014; Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Doya et al., 2002). How-
ever, very few studies have focused on detecting simultaneous behavioural signatures of
both learning strategies, and those have so far focused only on human subjects (Daw et al.,
2011; Gershman et al., 2012; Otto et al., 2013; Wunderlich et al., 2012a).
Here, two rhesus monkeys were trained to perform a two-stage Markov decision task
(Fig. 3.1) designed to induce trial-by-trial adjustments in choice that combine both MF and
MB learning control. By performing a quantitative behavioural analysis with computational
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and generative RL modelling, we found that non-human primates solve this task through
the use of reward history (of MF and MB importance) as well as information about the
state-transition structure (of MB relevance). Furthermore, both strategies also influenced
the alacrity of responding, in agreement with the speed-accuracy trade-off associated with
their computations. Overall, the following results support modern views that optimal learn-
ing may require parallel integration of both MF and MB-RL computations (Balleine and
O’Doherty, 2009; Daw and Dayan, 2014; Daw et al., 2005).
3.3 Experimental procedures
Subjects and experimental apparatus
Two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mullata) were used as subjects: subject C was 8 Kg;
and subject J was 11 Kg. Daily fluid intake was regulated to maintain motivation on the task.
During the experiment, subjects were seated in a primate chair inside a darkened room with
their heads fixed and facing a 19-inch computer screen (60Hz video refresh rate) positioned
62 cm from the subject’ eyes. Each subject’s eye position and pupil dilation was monitored
with an infrared eye tracking system having a sampling rate of 240 Hz (ISCAN ETL-200).
Both subjects indicated their choice by moving a joystick with a left arm movement towards
one of three possible locations (C: left, right and down; J: left, right and up). The reward
(C: cranberry juice diluted to one-fourth with water; J: apple juice diluted to one half with
water) was provided by a spout positioned in front of the subject’s mouth and delivered at a
constant flow-rate using a peristaltic pump (Ismatec IPC). We used Monkeylogic software
(http://www.monkeylogic.net/) to control the presentation of stimuli and task contingencies,
to generate timestamps of behaviourally-relevant events, and to acquire joystick as well
as eye data (1000 Hz of analog data acquisition). All visual stimuli used were the same
across sessions for both subjects, and were presented at pre-determined degrees of visual
angle. The six stimuli were modified to be of equal size and luminance using a custom-
made image processing algorithm. Similarly, the background colours used (grey, violet and
brown) were luminance adjusted for equality and verified with a luminance meter. Finally,
three pictures used as secondary reinforcers were generated as different spatial combinations
of the same number of black pixels in a white background, also to assure luminance equality.
All experimental procedures were approved by the UK Home Office and were in compliance
with the guidelines of the European Community for the care and use of laboratory animals
(EUVD, European Union directive 2010/63/EEC).
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Fig. 3.1 Two-stage decision task. (A) Timeline of events. Eye fixation was required while
a red fixation cue was shown, otherwise subjects could saccade freely and indicate their
decision (arrow as an example) with a manual joystick movement. Once the second-stage
choice had been made, the nature of the outcome was revealed by a secondary reinforcer cue
(here, the pause symbol represents high outcome). Once the latter cue was off the screen,
there was a fixed 500 ms delay and the possibility of a further delay (for both medium
and low outcomes) before juice was provided (for both high and medium outcomes). The
inter-trial interval (ITI) was 1.5 s. (B) The state-transition matrix (kept fixed throughout
the experiment). Each second-stage stimuli had an independent reward structure (with out-
comes being defined by the magnitude of the reward and the delay to its delivery) according
to a form of random walk sampled afresh on each session. Task design influenced by Daw
et al. (2011).
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Task: design and timeline
Subjects performed a two-stage Markov decision task (see Fig. 3.1), similar to the one
used in a previous human study (Daw et al., 2011) that was designed to detect simultaneous
signatures of MF and MB systems as they concurrently learn. In brief, two decisions had to
be made before the subject received a reward. The first-stage state was represented by a grey
background and the choice was between two options presented as pictures (the same fixed
set of pictures was used throughout the entire task). Each of these first-stage choices could
lead to either a common (70% transition probability) or rare (30% transition probability)
second-stage state, represented by different background colours (brown and violet). This
state-transition structure was kept fixed throughout the experiment. In the second-stage,
another two-option choice between pictures was required and it was reinforced according to
different levels of reward. Importantly, to encourage learning, each of the four second-stage
options had independent reward structures according to a form of random walk (see below)
that was sampled afresh on each session. In both decision stages, the choice options (or
presented stimuli) were randomized to one of three possible locations. Fifteen percent of
the trials were forced (i.e., without allowing a choice as only one option was presented),
which could be at either the first or second-stage. Unless stated otherwise, such forced trials
were not included in the data analysis. The trial type sequence was randomly generated at
the start of the session and was followed even after error trials. Errors could take the form
of trials with no choice, no eye fixation, eye fixation break, early joystick response, joystick
not centred before choice, or movement towards a location not available; these error trials
were all followed by a time-out of 7000 ms. Unless otherwise specified, we excluded error
trials from the data analysis (C: M = 5%; J: M = 8%).
The value of a choice option could assume one of three categorical outcome levels,
defined according to the amount of juice delivered (determined by the time the juice pump
was on) and a specific delay (in addition to a fixed 500ms delay common to all outcome
levels) before juice delivery. Therefore, the outcome could be: high (big reward and no
delay), medium (small reward and small delay) or low (no reward and big delay). The
precise reward amounts for big and small rewards were tailored for each subject to ensure
that they received their daily fluid allotment over the course of the experimental sessions.
Consequently, the duration for which the reward pump was active (and hence the magnitude
of delivered rewards) differed slightly between the two subjects. Furthermore, instead of a
fixed reward amount, big and small rewards corresponded to non-overlapping time intervals
(C: high reward ranged on average from 682 to 962 ms and medium reward ranged on
average from 117 to 390 ms; J: high reward ranged on average from 976 to 1257 ms and
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medium reward level ranged on average from 507 to 826 ms) of juice delivery where a
small Gaussian drift (mean/standard deviation of 0/200 ms for high reward and 0/100 ms
for medium reward) was added. The variance in the reward amount within an outcome level
was used not only to promote constant valuation of the outcome value, but also to help the
computational model fitting procedure. The additional specific delay periods were fixed
throughout the experiment but varied across subjects (C: 750 ms for small delay and 2500
ms for big delay; J: 1500 ms for small delay and 4000 ms for big delay).
Importantly, for each of the second-stage pictures the outcome level remained the same
for a minimum number of trials (a uniformly distributed pseudorandom integer between 5
and 9) and then, either stayed in the same level (with one-third probability) or changed ran-
domly to one of the other two possible outcome levels. Three different abstract stimuli were
used as secondary reinforcers, providing feedback for each of the three outcome levels. We
adopted this strategy so that feedback-related neuronal activity could be analysed in a fixed
duration epoch independent of licking movements, and also because of the different delays
employed across outcome levels and during reward delivery. Both subjects had prior clas-
sical conditioning training with these stimuli, with the above mentioned reward magnitude
ranges and delays for each outcome level used in the experiment being respected.
The sequence of events in the behavioural task are shown in Fig. 3.1A. Each trial started
with the presentation of a grey background (start epoch). A central square fixation cue 0.4◦
in width then appeared after a random interval of 200-500ms. After this, subjects were
required to keep the joystick in the centre position as well as maintain eye fixation within
3.4◦ (C) or 2.8◦ (J) of the fixation cue for a 500ms (C) or 750ms (J) period (fixation epoch).
Then, the fixation cue was removed and two pictures (5◦ in size) appeared at 7◦ in two of
the four available locations (choice epoch). During the task, in the absence of a fixation
cue, the animal was free to look around. The maximum time allowed for acquiring eye
fixation as well as making a response with the joystick was 5000ms for both choice stages.
After a choice was made, the non-selected image was removed and the background color
changed according to the second-stage state to which the transition had occurred (transition
epoch). The image selected in the first-stage remained on the screen for 500ms before it
was removed. Similar fixation and choice epochs were used for the second-stage. Once
the choice had been made in the second-stage, the non-selected cue was removed and the
selected remained on the screen for 750 ms before the secondary reinforcer stimulus (5◦
square) appeared at the center of the screen for 750ms (pre-feedback epoch). After the sec-
ondary reinforcer stimulus was removed, a fixed 500ms delay period occurred before either
the reward delivery (for high outcome) or both small and big additional delays started (for
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both medium and low outcomes, respectively). Therefore, a total of 1250ms was the mini-
mum time from the secondary reinforcer presentation to the delivery of any juice (feedback
epoch). The inter-trial interval period duration was 1500ms (ITI epoch).
Full behavioural training took six to nine months for each animal (subject J was the first
being trained and required more piloting and refinement before the final version of the task;
subject C was faster in initial phases of learning but took longer in the last two steps of the
protocol) and a similar protocol was applied for both. After acquaintance with basic skills
(adaptation to the experiment room, presentation of visual stimuli and joystick movements),
a multi-step task-specific training protocol was employed. It consisted of: 1) one-stage
choice trials; 2) two-stage choice trials with fixed reward structures; 3) transition training
without choice (very brief); 4) two-stage choice trials with transitions but no random walk
reward structure; 5) final task without secondary reinforcer; 6) secondary reinforcer classical
conditioning; 7) the full version of the task.
Choice behaviour and reaction time analysis
All statistical and computational modelling analyses were conducted using MATLAB®
version R2014b (MathWorks). Unless otherwise stated, statistical significance was set at
α = 0.05. In addition to central tendencies and dispersion measures of the relevant be-
havioural variables (mean M, median Mdn, standard deviation SD, and standard error of
the mean SEM), one sample or two-sample t-tests (Hedge’s g effect size bootstrapped) and
one-way ANOVA (η2 effect size bootstrapped) were used. Whenever multiple comparison
tests were required, a Bonferroni correction was applied.
Relevant behavioural variables were defined as: C is first-stage choice (1=car picture or
picture A, 0=watering can picture or picture B); R is outcome level (assumed as continuous,
with low=1, medium=2, high=3); and T is transition (rare=1, common=0). These variables,
when used as predictors in regression analysis, were mean centred, and continuous variables
were also scaled by dividing them by twice their standard deviations so that the magnitudes
of regression coefficients could be directly compared (Gelman, 2008). Such adjustments in
the variables were performed before the computation of the interaction terms.
In order to quantify the various factors predicting first-stage choice (i.e., stimulus A or
stimulus B) on the current trial t, a first multiple logistic regression analysis was given by:
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log
[
p(Ct = 1)
p(Ct = 0)
]
= β0 + βCt−1Ct−1 + βRt−1Rt−1 + βTt−1Tt−1 + βRt−1×Tt−1Rt−1 × Tt−1+
βRt−1×Ct−1Rt−1 ×Ct−1 + βTt−1×Ct−1Tt−1 ×Ct−1+
βRt−1×Tt−1×Ct−1Rt−1 × Tt−1 ×Ct−1
(3.1)
where β corresponds to the estimated regression coefficient for each respective predictor.
The β0 is the constant term. The regression coefficient βCt−1 modelled a potential indepen-
dent tendency to stick with the same option from trial to trial (preseveration effect); βRt−1 ,
βTt−1 and βRt−1×Tt−1 measured any potential preference in first-stage picture choice given the
previous outcome level, the previous transition and the interaction effect of both, respec-
tively; βRt−1×Ct−1 , βTt−1×Ct−1 and βRt−1×Tt−1×Ct−1 were the regression coefficients of interest
which quantified the main effect of reward (i.e., the effect of choosing the same first-stage
choice given the previous reward), the main effect of transition (i.e., the effect of choos-
ing the same first-stage choice given the previous transition) and the reward × transition
interaction effect (i.e., the effect of choosing the same first-stage choice given the previous
reward as well as previous transition) on first-stage choice, respectively.
To evaluate how reward and transition history from more than just the previous trial
influenced first-stage choice behaviour, a second logistic regression model was created using
the same predictor variables as in equation 3.1 but including information from up to five
previous trials:
log
[
p(Ct = 1)
p(Ct = 0)
]
= β0 +
5∑
i=1
[
βCt−iCt−i + βRt−iRt−i + βTt−iTt−i+
βRt−i×Tt−iRt−i × Tt−i + βRt−i×Ct−iRt−i ×Ct−i+
βTt−i×Ct−iTt−i ×Ct−i + βRt−i×Tt−i×Ct−iRt−i × Tt−i ×Ct−i
] (3.2)
Reaction times were defined as the intervals from the moments when the first or second-
stage options were presented until the conclusions of the joystick movements towards the
specified location (all side locations with the same radius from the centre). For each sub-
ject and session, first and second-stage reaction times for each of the three possible side
responses were independently log transformed and z-scored. This standardization was man-
dated by variations in reaction times between side locations as well as biases found in
behaviour. Data points greater than three times the SDs from the individual means were
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removed from regression analysis and also did not contributed to the z-scoring.
To determine the effect of behavioural variables on reaction time at first-stage choice, a
multiple linear regression analysis was implemented:
RTt = γ0 + γFt Ft + γRt−1Rt−1 + γTt−1Tt−1 + γRt−1×Tt−1Rt−1 × Tt−1 + εt (3.3)
where γ corresponds to the estimated regression coefficient for each respective predic-
tor and ε the residual value. The RTt is the z-scored log-transformed first-stage reaction
time for each trial t. The γ0 is the constant term and the predictor variable Ft was used
to model (linearly-increasing) fatigue by counting the trials in the session. The γRt−1 , γTt−1
and γRt−1×Tt−1 were the regression coefficients of interest as they quantify the main effect
of reward (i.e., the effect on latency of first-stage response given the previous reward), the
main effect of transition (i.e., the effect on latency of first-stage response given the previ-
ous transition) and the reward × transition interaction effect (i.e., the effect on latency of
first-stage response given the previous reward as well as previous transition) on first-stage
reaction time, respectively.
As for first-stage choice behaviour, the influence on RT of more than just the last trial’s
variables was also investigated with another linear regression model:
RTt = γ0 + γFt Ft +
5∑
i=1
[
γRt−iRt−i + γTt−iTt−i + γRt−i×Tt−iRt−i × Tt−i
]
+ εt (3.4)
The time of first-stage eye fixation was defined as the time from the moment when the
first-stage central fixation cue was presented until the time when the subject’s x and y eye
position was within the required fixation radius. The raw data was then log transformed and
z-scores were calculated. The regression analysis used the same predictors as described in
equation 3.4.
Fixed-effects (fitting the regression models individually to each session) and mixed-
effects (assuming regression coefficients to be random effects across sessions) analyses were
performed for each subject. Fixed-effects fitting was performed using a generalized linear
model regression package (glmfit in MATLAB with: a binomial distribution and the logit
link function for logistic regressions, a normal distribution and the identity link function
for linear regressions), and the statistical importance of each predictor’s estimates was as-
sessed by both the p-values obtained from each session as well as their distribution across
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sessions (two-tailed one-sample t-test for a mean of 0 and unknown variance). Mixed-
effects fitting was achieved with either a non-linear model with a stochastic approximation
expectation-maximization method for logistic regression (nlmefitsa in MATLAB with
importance sampling for approximating the loglikelihood) or a linear model method for the
RTs (filme in MATLAB). The standard errors for the coefficient estimates as well as their
95% confidence intervals (CI) were reported. For all analyses, linear hypothesis testing
on the vector of estimated regression coefficients (performed for each individual session in
the fixed-effects, and using the estimated random effects for each predictor) was performed
to test either if more than one coefficient or a difference between coefficients was signifi-
cantly different from zero (linhyptest in MATLAB), with F statistic and p-values being
reported. As noted, forced first-stage choice trials were excluded from regression fits.
Computational modelling
We fitted choice behaviour in the task in a similar manner to previous human studies (Huys
et al., 2011) and assessing three different reinforcement learning approaches: MF learning,
MB learning and a hybrid strategy combining the decision values of both (Daw et al., 2011;
Gläscher et al., 2010). The task consists of three states (first stage: sA; second stage: sB and
sC), each with two actions (aX and aY). Importantly, the action corresponds to the choice
of a picture belonging to the respective state; thus when we refer to “action value”, we are
referring to the value assigned to the stimulus of the chosen action. The main goal is to
learn a state-action value function Q(s, a) mapping each state-action pair to its expected
future value. On trial t, the first-stage state (always sA) is denoted by s1,t, the second-stage
state by s2,t, the first and second-stage actions by a1,t and a2,t and the first and second-stage
rewards as r1,t (always zero) and r2,t. For the model fitting r2,t corresponded to the amount
of juice delivered at trial t divided by the maximum amount of juice obtained by the subject
within the entire respective session.
In MF-RL the value for the visited state-action pair at each stage i and trial t, Q(si,t, ai,t),
is updated based on the difference between predictions at successive states, δi,t, also known
as the reward prediction error. For the first-stage choice, r1,t = 0 and δ1,t is driven by the
second-stage value Q(s2,t, a2,t). On the other hand, at second-stage there is no further value
apart from the immediate reward, r2,t, since the following state (s3,t) is an absorbing state
that corresponds to the end of the current trial and the start of a new one (Q(s3,t, a3,t) = 0).
Two different MF-RL algorithms were used to fit behaviour: the S ARS A variant of temporal
difference learning (Rummery and Niranjan, 1994), which has previously been observed in
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non-human primates (Morris et al., 2006); and the Q-learning algorithm, as described in
rodents (Roesch et al., 2007).
In S ARS A, the reward prediction error computation takes into account the state-action
value of the actual action being selected:
δi,t = ri,t + Q(si+1,t, ai+1,t)− Q(si,t, ai,t) (3.5)
By contrast, the Q-learning prediction error is based on the estimated best next action in
the sequence, independent of the policy being followed:
δi,t = ri,t + max
a∈{aA,aB}
Q(si+1,t, a)− Q(si,t, ai,t) (3.6)
Either of these errors in the estimate drives learning by correcting the respective MF
prediction through the following update rule:
QMF(si,t, ai,t) ← QMF(si,t, ai,t) + αiδi,t (3.7)
where αi is the learning rate at stage i, and can be fit to the observed behaviour. Differ-
ent learning rates for first-stage (α1) and second-stage (α2) were allowed based on previous
work (Daw et al., 2011). Given the two-stage design of the task, the model also permits
an additional stage-skipping update of first-stage values by having an eligibility trace (Sut-
ton and Barto, 1998), λ parameter, which connects the two stages and allows the reward
prediction error at the second-stage to influence first-stage values:
QMF(s1,t, a1,t) ← QMF(si,t, ai,t) + α1λδ2,t (3.8)
The parameter λ is also fit to the observed behaviour. Consistent with the episodic
structure of the task (with an explicit inter-trial epoch), it is assumed that eligibility does not
carry over from trial to trial.
In MB reinforcement learning, the agent not only maps state-action pairs to a proba-
bility distribution over the subsequent state but it also learns the immediate reward values
for each state. More specifically, it requires knowledge of the probabilities with which
each first-stage action leads to each second-stage state, as well as learning the expected out-
come associated with each second-stage actions. The MB second-stage state-action values
QMB(s2,t, at) are just estimates of the immediate reward r2,t. For this reason both MF and MB
approaches coincide at the second-stage, and we define QMB = QMF at those states. On the
other hand, the first-stage action values QMB(s1,t, a1,t) differ and are computed by weighting
58 Behavioural results
their outcomes by the appropriate probabilities:
QMB(sA,t, a1,t) = P(sB,t|s1,t, a1,t) max
a∈{aA,aB}
QMB(sB,t, a) + P(sC,t|s1,t, a1,t) max
a∈{aA,aB}
QMB(sC,t, a)
(3.9)
Various approaches to solve the state-transition probability distribution gave rise to three
different MB algorithms, designated here as Forward1, Forward2 and Forward3. In the first
model, we assume the agent had explicit knowledge of the correct state-transition probabil-
ities, P = {0.3, 0.7}. Given the extensive training of both subjects prior to this experiment,
it is possible that subjects had explicit knowledge that matched the actual state-transition
probabilities. The second model, assumed agents learned to map action-state pairs a1, s2
to transition probabilities, P = {0.3, 0.7}, by counting whether they had more often en-
countered transitions a1 = 1, sB and a1 = 2, sB or transitions a1 = 1, sC and a1 = 2, sB and
concluding that the more frequent category corresponds to p = 0.7. This latter model cor-
responds to the one used in the modelling of the original two-step task study (Daw et al.,
2011). Finally, in the Forward3 model the agent incrementally learns the transition struc-
ture by performing a hypothesis test between p = {0.3, 0.7} versus p = {0.5, 0.5} with an
additional parameter (ζ) modelling the weight given to each of these models.
Finally, a so-called Hybrid model assumes that first-stage choices are computed as a
weighted sum of the state-action values from MF and MB learning systems:
QHYB(s1,t, a1,t) = (1− ω)QMF(s1,t, a1,t) + ωQMB(s1,t, a1,t) (3.10)
where ω is a weighting parameter that determines the relative contribution of MB and
MF values. When ω = 0 the model reflects pure MF control; when ω = 1, it reflects pure
MB control. For convenience the hybrid model was constructed using the best fitting MF
(S ARS A algorithm) and MB (Forward1) algorithms, given the computational burden of
fitting all possible combinations simultaneously.
A careful examination of the data revealed that the original hybrid model required further
refinement in order to reproduce more accurately the strong influence of the previous trial
on the present one. In this new Hybrid+ model, the value of the chosen (a1,t) or unchosen
(a ̸= a1,t) first-stage action was boosted or suppressed as a function of whether the state-
transition (Trans) observed at trial t was common or rare and the level of the outcome
achieved. Algorithmically, after the previously described QHYB value update step (Eq. 3.10)
an additional boost (or decrease) occurred according to:
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QHYB(s1,t, a1,t) ←

QHYB(s1,t, a1,t) + L1, if Transt = common, Outcomet = high
QHYB(s1,t, a1,t) + L2, if Transt = common, Outcomet = medium
QHYB(s1,t, a1,t) + L3, if Transt = common, Outcomet = low
and
QHYB(s1,t, a ̸= a1,t) ←

QHYB(s1,t, a ̸= a1,t) + L1, if Transt = rare, Outcomet = high
QHYB(s1,t, a ̸= a1,t) + L2, if Transt = rare, Outcomet = medium
QHYB(s1,t, a ̸= a1,t) + L3, if Transt = rare, Outcomet = low
where there are separate parameters L j for each outcome level which can be positive
or negative, expressing support or opposition for that particular outcome level. This extra
factor can be seen as a MF implementation of a MB effect (Akam et al., 2015) – MF, since
it depends on an effect of the past trial rather than an assessment of a future one; MB, since
it includes a one-step version of the interaction to which MB reasoning leads.
For any of the above reinforcement learning strategies, actions were assumed to be
stochastic and chosen for each stage according to action probabilities determined by the
respective Q-action values:
P(ai,t = a|si,t) = exp(βi[Q(si,t, a) + κi × rep(a)]∑
a′ exp(β[Q(si,t, a) + κi × rep(a′)])
(3.11)
where βi is the inverse temperature parameter (distinct inverse temperatures are allowed
for each stage) controlling the determinism of the choices, and so capturing noise and explo-
ration (for βi = 0 choices are fully random and for βi = in f , choices are fully deterministic
in the sense that higher-valued options are always preferred). rep(a) is an indicator variable
coding whether the current choice is the same as the one chosen on the previous visit to the
same state, with κi being a further parameter that captures choice perseverance (κi > 0) or
switching (κi < 0) (Lau and Glimcher, 2005), again with the possibility of distinct values
for first (κ1) and second-stage (κ2) choices.
In the most general form, the conventional Hybrid algorithm involved a total of eight
free parameters (θ = {α1, α2, β1, β2, κ1, κ2, λ, ω}), nesting pure MB (ω = 1, with arbitrary
α1 and λ) and MF (ω = 0) learning as special cases. The Hybrid+ algorithm involved three
additional parameters L1, L2, L3. We also generated several simpler variants of these models
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by allowing α1 = α2, β1 = β2, κ1 = κ2, κ1 = 0, κ2 = 0 and λ = 0. All parameters were fixed
within a session, but could vary across sessions.
Model fitting procedures
Two forms of log-likelihood maximisation were used to fit the computational models to
each subject’s choice behaviour and estimate their free parameters. The first approach was
a so-called fixed-effects analysis, maximizing the likelihood with respect to the parameters
separately for each session. The second approach was a mixed-effects analysis, assuming,
for each subject, parameters to be random effects across sessions. This implied maximiz-
ing the likelihood with respect to a characterization of empirical priors over the parameters
(based on Gaussian distributions N (µ,σ) for the vector of parameters h; enforcing con-
straints on the parameters: 0 < αi < 1; βi > 0; 0 < λ < 1; and 0 < ω < 1 by transforming
samples from the Gaussian distributions using log and sigmoid transforms). In this scheme,
one calculates approximate posterior distributions over the parameters for each session by
combining these priors with the likelihoods. The effect of the prior is to regularize and sta-
bilize estimates, particularly when the parameters are not well constrained by the data in
particular sessions. The mixed-effects procedures used are identical to those described by
Huys et al. (2011), but for completeness are detailed here.
The hyperparameters of the prior distribution θ, which consist of a prior mean µ and a
prior standard deviation σ, were set to the maximum likelihood estimates (ML) for all N
sessions, using empirical Bayes:
θˆ
ML
= argmax
θ
P(A|θ)
= argmax
θ
( N∏
i=1
∫
dNhiP(Ai|hi)P(hi|θ)
) (3.12)
whereA = {Ai}Ni=1 comprised all the actions (including first-stage and second-stage) by
all the N sessions. For first and second-stage actions taken in all the T trials of the session
it was assumed that P(Ai|hi) =∏Ti=1 P(Ai,t|hi).
The above maximization was achieved by Expectation–Maximization (EM) (Dempster
et al., 1977). At the kth iteration of the E-step of the algorithm, a Laplacian approximation
to the individual posterior distributions of model parameters was used and the maximum a
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posteriori estimate mi of the parameters for each session i was found:
P(h|Ai) ≈ N (m(k)i ,Σ(k)i ) (3.13)
m(k)i = argmax
h
P(Ai|h)P(h|θ(k−1)) (3.14)
where N (m(k)i ,Σ(k)i ) denotes a normal distribution over h with mean m(k)i and standard
deviation Σ(k)i derived from the diagonals of the inverse Hessian matrix of the posterior at
its maximum m(k). In order to increase the chance of finding a good maximum a posteriori
value, the largest value out of 101 separate optimizations was used, one starting from the
best value on the previous iteration (or the output of the fixed effects analysis for the first
iteration), and 100 more using random starting points. Optimization was performed using
MATLAB ’s parallel processing toolbox and fminunc function.
In the M-step, the hyperparameters θ were estimated by setting the prior distribution
mean µ and standard deviation σ to:
µ(k) =
1
N
∑
i
m(k)i (3.15)
σ(k) =
1
N
∑
i
[
(m(k)i )
2 + Σ
(k)
i
]
− (µ(k))2 (3.16)
To help convergence, the algorithm was initialised with a prior mean and variance that
corresponded to the 25% trimmed mean and variance of the parameters initially obtained
with the maximum likelihood fixed-effects fit. The E and M steps were then repeated un-
til the changes in the estimates between two E-steps were 0.005, signifying convergence.
Once the subject’s maximum likelihood prior parameters had converged, a final E-step was
performed to determine the maximum a posteriori parameters for each session. All model
fitting procedures were verified on surrogate generated data.
Model comparison and validation procedures
We fit the two pure MF (ω = 0), the three pure MB (ω = 1), the Hybrid (with ω a free
parameter) and the Hybrid+ models, and then sought to determine the model that was best
supported by the behavioural data. To note that rather than fitting all possible algorithmic
combinations, the Hybrid model variants tested just combined the best MF, the S ARS A, and
the best MB, the f orward1 algorithms. Regarding the Hybrid+ model fit, it used the already
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best fitting Hybrid model variant for each subject but with all free parameters, including the
extra three parameters, estimated afresh.
For the fixed-effects analyses, the Bayesian information criterion, BIC, (Schwarz, 1978)
based on the negative log-likelihood, was determined for each algorithm tested. Since the
Hybrid algorithm nested MF and MB algorithms, likelihood-ratio tests (LRT s) were also
used to compare it against the other learning approaches.
For the mixed-effects analyses, model comparison was achieved by computing, for each
model M and given all the observed first and second-stage choices A, the posterior log
likelihood logP(M|A). Because each of the models tested are equally likely a priori, the
model log likelihood logP(A|M) is the measure to examine. To approximate this quantity
at the subject-level and at the individual session-level, we followed a similar approach as the
one described in Huys et al. (2011). The approximation at the subject-level was obtained
via Kass and Raftery (1995):
logP(A|M) =
∫
dθP(A|θ)P(θ|M)
≈ −1
2
BICint = logP(A|θˆML)− 12 |M|log(|A|)
(3.17)
where |A| is the total number of trials performed by the subject in all sessions, and
|M| is the number of prior parameters fitted (mean and variance for each parameter). The
subscript "int" to the BIC was added because the log likelihood logP(A|θˆML) is not the sum
of individual likelihoods, but the sum of integrals over the individual session’s parameters
approximated via sampling:
logP(A|θˆML) =
∑
i
log
∫
dhP(Ai|h)P(h|θˆML)
≈
∑
i
log
1
K
K∑
k=1
P(Ai|hk)
(3.18)
where K = 1000 indicates the number of samples drawn from the empirical prior dis-
tribution hk ∼ P(h|θˆML). This ensures comparison of not how well a particular model fits
the data when its parameters are optimised, but rather how well it fits on average under the
random effects empirical prior over the parameters.
In addition to comparing the BICint, which is akin to a likelihood ratio test, the mixed-
effects model comparison also included the exceedance probability (Stephan et al., 2009)
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of each model being more likely than any of the other models tested. The computation of
this latter measure involved the model likelihood obtained in the fitting of the maximum a
posteriori estimates for each session of a given subject and the calculations were performed
using the spm_BMS function contained in SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). To as-
sess how well each model performed on subject’s data, the overall predictive probability for
all choices in all trials and sessions, P(A|θˆML) = T N
√
P(A|θˆML), was calculated and tested,
according to a binomial test, whether this was greater than chance.
We further tested the best-fitting models and their respective distribution of parameter
priors,N (µˆML, σˆML), by using them to simulate choice data for each subject (100 simulation
runs for each session) on the task respecting the exact same reward structures as present
in the behavioural data. We then performed the same descriptive and logistic analysis as
used for choice behaviour. Finally, Pearson’s linear correlation coefficients were used to
assess the relation between the behavioural computational modelling estimates (observed or
simulated) and other variables, such as the logistic regression coefficients.
3.4 Results
Both subjects engaged well with the task: subject C performed 15585 trials over 30 sessions
(M = 520; SD = 66); and subject J performed 14664 trials over 27 sessions (M = 543;
SD = 101). There was no significant overall preference for any first-stage choice picture
across sessions (C: t(29) = −0.88, p = 0.387, g = −0.16; J: t(26) = 0.06, p = 0.950,
g = 0.01). Given the three physically possible actions, potential side biases in first-stage
choice were analysed and there were small but significant differences in both subjects (C:
F(2, 87) = 53.42, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.55, with relative preferences of left < right < down
surviving tests for multiple comparisons; J: F(2, 78) = 37.21, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.49, with
relative preferences of right < up < left surviving tests for multiple comparisons).
We first assessed MF and MB-RL without using the trial-by-trial computational mod-
elling, taking advantage of the task design and the different expected patterns by which
reward as well as transition type (common or rare) impact future first-stage choices. MF-
RL does not exploit information about the task’s structure, and so it predicts there should be
no difference in the probability of repeating a first-stage choice dependent on the outcome
following a common versus a rare trial (simulations in Fig. 3.2A). By contrast, MB-RL pre-
dicts that such a difference will exist (simulations in Fig. 3.2B). Additionally, we considered
a hybrid approach which assumes that first-stage choices are computed as a weighted sum
of the state-action values from MF and MB learning systems and predicts an intermedi-
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ate choice behaviour pattern (simulations in Fig. 3.2C; to note that these results are much
closer to the MB-RL simulations because our simulations used the parameters best fit to the
subjects’ data and the MB weight estimated was close to 90%).
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Fig. 3.2 Comparison of the impact of both reward and transition information on first-
stage simulated behaviour from each learning strategy. Likelihood of repeating first-
stage simulated choice as a function of outcome level and transition type (common transition
in blue and rare transition in red) for the best pure model-free S ARS A algorithm (A), the
best pure model-based Forward1 algorithm (B) and the best Hybrid model (C). Values
were averaged across all sessions, and across 100 simulation runs for each session of the
respective subject (respecting the exact same reward structure and using the parameters best
fit to the subjects’ data within each class of algorithm). Error bars depict standard errors of
the mean.
As presented in Fig. 3.3, both experimental subjects were much more likely to repeat
the same first-stage choice if a high outcome was achieved through a common transition
than when the same reward was obtained following a rare path. The opposite pattern was
seen following the worse outcome. This behaviour implies knowledge of the state-transition
structure of the task and, therefore, could be seen as a signature of MB-RL. Interestingly,
the medium outcome in both subjects elicited a response profile more comparable to the
worst (negative) outcome scenario. This suggests that this outcome did not quite have a
neutral subjective value, likely because the utility of the reward magnitude was insufficient
to overcome the opportunity cost of the imposed delay to juice delivery.
To better quantify the contributions in behaviour of both learning systems, we performed
logistic regression analyses on the first-stage choices (i.e. aiming to predict the chosen
picture at first-stage). In this case, the predictions from the theory are that a pure MF
learner will have the main effect of reward (i.e. the interaction between previous outcome
level, R, and previous first-stage choice, C) as the dominant predictor influencing future
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Fig. 3.3 The impact of both reward and transition information on observed first-stage
choice behaviour. The probability of repeating the same first-stage choice, averaged across
sessions for each subject, as a function of outcome level and transition type (common tran-
sition in blue; rare transition in red) of the previous trial. Error bars depict standard errors
of the mean.
first-stage choices (MF simulated first-stage choice in Fig. 3.4A). On the other hand, MB
behaviour will reveal a rather prominent reward × transition effect (i.e. the interaction
between previous outcome level, R, previous transition, T , and previous first-stage choice,
C; MB simulated first-stage choice in Fig. 3.4B). However, choices derived from an agent
with concurrent use of both learning systems (simulations in Fig. 3.4C) will show not only
a significant main effect of reward (which is of MF importance) but also the influence of the
reward × transition effect (which is of MB importance).
We assessed how our subjects weighed the previous trial’s information in their first-
stage decision (Equation 3.1; see Fig. 3.5 and Table 3.1). We found a significant main
effect of reward in favour of first-stage choice repetition following higher outcome levels
(C: fixed-effect estimates M = 1.79, SEM = 0.09, t(29) = 20.75, p < 0.001, g = 3.79,
random-effect estimate = 1.61, 95% CI [1.44,1.77]; J: fixed-effect estimates M = 3.16, SEM
= 0.18, t(26) = 16.47, p < 0.001, g = 3.17, random-effect estimate = 2.60, 95% CI
[2.20,3.00]; see R × C predictor in Fig. 3.5). In addition, a significant reward × transition
effect was also present, and reflected the adaptive switch in first-stage choice following
a high outcome obtained through a rare transition (C: fixed-effect estimates M = -7.86,
SEM = 0.39, t(29) = −19.91, p < 0.001, g = −3.63, random-effect estimate = -7.66,
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Fig. 3.4 Logistic regression on simulated first-stage chosen picture from each learning
strategy, using the results from the previous trial’s predictor variables. The variables
used as predictors of the dependent variable first-stage choice (1=car picture, 0=watering
can picture) were: C is previous first-stage choice (1=car picture, 0=watering can picture);
R is previous outcome level (assumed as continuous and with low=1, medium=2, high=3);
and T is previous transition (rare=1, common=0). Const is the constant term. Predictors
were mean centred and continuous variables were also scaled by dividing them by two stan-
dard deviations (adjustments made before the computation of the interaction terms). Results
for simulated choice behaviour (100 simulations per session for each subject and respecting
the exact same reward structure) generated using the best-fitted mixed-effects parameters of
the pure model-free S ARS A algorithm (A), pure model-based Forward1 algorithm (B) and
Hybrid model (C). Bar and error bar values correspond, respectively, to the mean and SE of
the fixed-effects coefficients. ** for α = 0.01 and * for α = 0.05 in two-tailed one sample
t-test with null-hypothesis mean equal to zero for the fixed-effects coefficients.
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95% CI [-8.40,-6.93]; J: fixed-effect estimates M = -12.68, SEM = 0.09, t(26) = −20.21,
p < 0.001, g = −3.89, random-effect estimate = -15.98, 95% CI [-18.36,-13.60]; see
R × T × C predictor in Fig. 3.5). Moreover, these two logistic predictors were not only
both significantly different from zero (C: all fixed-effects F-tests with p < 0.001, random-
effects F(2) = 386.07, p < 0.001; J: all fixed-effects F-tests with p < 0.001, random-effects
F(2) = 173.68, p < 0.001), but the reward × transition effect was significantly greater
than the main effect of reward (C: all fixed-effects F-tests with p < 0.001, random-effects
F(2) = 577.68, p < 0.001; J: all fixed-effects F-tests with p < 0.001, random-effects
F(2) = 231.14, p < 0.001).
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Fig. 3.5 Logistic regression on observed first-stage chosen picture using predictor vari-
ables from the previous trial. The variables from the previous trial t used as predictors
of the dependent variable first-stage choice (1=car picture, 0=watering can picture) were:
C is previous first-stage choice (1=car picture, 0=watering can picture); R is previous out-
come level (assumed as continuous and with low=1, medium=2, high=3); and T is previous
transition (rare=1, common=0). Const is the constant term. Predictors were mean centred
and continuous variables were also scaled by dividing them by two standard deviations (ad-
justments made before the computation of the interaction terms). Each dot represents the
fixed-effects regression estimate for a given session (coloured red when p < 0.05 and grey
otherwise). Bar and error bar values correspond, respectively, to the mixed-effect regression
estimate and its standard error. ** for α = 0.01 and * for α = 0.05 in two-tailed one sample
t-test with null-hypothesis mean equal to zero for the fixed-effects estimates.
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Table 3.1 Fixed and mixed-effects logistic regression results for the previous trial pre-
dictors of observed first-stage chosen picture
Fixed-effects analysis Mixed-effects analysis
Subject C Subject J Subject C Subject J
Const -0.10 (0.05) -0.06 (0.07) -0.06 (0.05) -0.05 (0.08)
Ct−1 1.13 (0.06)** 1.20 (0.06)** 0.98 (0.06)** 0.85 (0.07)**
Rt−1 -0.26 (0.06)** -0.28 (0.09)** -0.19 (0.06)** -0.11 (0.20)
Tt−1 0.07 (0.05) 0.03 (0.07) 0.02 (0.04) 0.03 (0.09)
Rt−1 × Tt−1 0.29 (0.10)** -0.20 (0.17) 0.22 (0.09)* -0.53 (0.17)**
Rt−1 × Ct−1 1.79 (0.08)** 3.07 (0.19)** 1.61 (0.08)** 2.60 (0.20)**
Tt−1 × Ct−1 -1.54 (0.09)** -2.10 (0.18)** -1.27 (0.08)** -1.09 (0.25)**
Rt−1 × Tt−1 × Ct−1 -7.86 (0.39)** -12.19 (0.68)** -7.66 (0.38)** -15.98 (1.21)**
The variables from the previous trial t used as predictors of the dependent variable first-stage choice (1=car
picture, 0=watering can picture) were: C is first-stage choice (1=car picture, 0=watering can picture); R is
outcome level (assumed as continuous and with low=1, medium=2, high=3); and T is transition (rare=1,
common=0). Const is the constant term. Predictors were mean centred and continuous variables were also
scaled by dividing them by two SD (adjustments made before the computation of the interaction terms). In
italic are the predictors of interest, such as the reward main effect (Rt−1 × Ct−1) and the reward × transition
effect (Rt−1 × Tt−1 × Ct−1). Values of fixed-effects results are the mean and in between brackets the SEM
of the regression coefficients across sessions; mixed-effects results are the estimated regression coefficients
and in between brackets their SE. ** for α = 0.01 and * for α = 0.05 in either two-tailed one sample t-test
with null-hypothesis mean equal to zero for the fixed-effects results or confidence interval estimation for the
mixed-effects results.
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It is important to note that both subjects presented a small but significant main effect
of transition (i.e. the interaction term between the previous transition, T , and the previous
first-stage choice, C) on first-stage choice (C: fixed-effect estimates M = -1.54, SEM =
0.09, t(29) = −16.20, p < 0.001, g = −2.96, random-effect estimate = -1.27, 95% CI
[-1.42,-1.11]; J: fixed-effect estimates M = -2.16, SEM = 0.18, t(26) = −11.92, p < 0.001,
g = −2.30, random-effect estimate = -1.09, 95% CI [-1.58,-0.61]; see T×C predictor in Fig.
3.5), a result that we had not expected. However, a similar transition main effect was present
in the analysis of simulated data derived from the best RL model (see T×C predictor in Fig.
3.4C). Hence, specific correlations within the task design and the reward structure are likely
the cause of this effect. Finally, both subjects tended to perseverate on the same choice
from trial to trial irrespective of any other variable (C: fixed-effect estimates M = 1.13,
SEM = 0.06, t(29) = 17.87, p < 0.001, g = −3.26, random-effect estimate = 0.98, 95% CI
[0.86,1.11]; J: fixed-effect mean estimates M = 1.25, SEM = 0.06, t(26) = 21.90, p < 0.001,
g = 4.21, random-effect estimate = 0.85, 95% CI [0.71,0.98], see C predictor in Fig. 3.5). A
similar choice stickiness has been previously described in non-human primates, as well as
in humans performing a similar two-step task (Daw et al., 2011; Lau and Glimcher, 2005).
Finally, according to both MF and MB-RL, events in recent trials are expected to ex-
ert a greater influence than those in more distant trials – indeed, the influence typically
decays exponentially. In order to test this hypothesis, a further logistic regression analy-
sis on first-stage choice was performed taking into account more than just the last trial’s
reward and transition information (Equation 3.1; Figs. 3.6 and 3.7; and Table 3.2). We
found that first-stage choice contribution from both reward history (see R × C predictors
in Fig. 3.7) and combined reward and transition information (see R × T × C predictors in
Fig. 3.7) obtained up to five trials back reduced exponentially with trials into the past (de-
cay constants of reward main effect / reward × transition interaction for C: -0.78, 95% CI
[-0.98,-0.56] / -0.94, 95% CI [-1.1,-0.78] and for J: of -1.62, 95% CI [-2.08,-1.17] / -1.50,
95% CI [-1.77,-1.22]). Overall, the results of our behavioural analysis are consistent with a
first-stage choice behaviour where both MF and MB-RL strategies coexist but, despite this
hybrid learning feature, MB control significantly dominated the behaviour of both subjects
(compare coefficient weights of the predictors R×C versus R× T ×C in Fig. 3.5 and 3.7).
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Fig. 3.6 The impact of both reward and transition information from the five previous
trials on simulated first-stage chosen picture according to each learning strategy. Mul-
tiple logistic regression results on simulated first-stage chosen picture data (100 simulations
per session for each subject and respecting the exact same reward structure) generated using
the best-fitted mixed-effects parameters of the pure model-free S ARS A algorithm (A), pure
model-based Forward1 algorithm (B) and Hybrid model (C) for the main effect of reward
(left column) and reward× transition interaction term (right column) from the five previous
trials. Bar and error bar values correspond, respectively, to the mean and SE of the fixed-
effects coefficients. Dashed lines illustrate the exponential best fit on the mean fixed-effects
coefficients of each trial into the past. ** for α = 0.01 and * for α = 0.05 in two-tailed one
sample t-test with null-hypothesis mean equal to zero for the fixed-effects estimates.
3.4 Results 71
** ** ** ** *** ** ** **
Reward x Transition effect
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 
co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
fo
r
fir
st
−s
ta
ge
 
ch
o
ic
e 
(a.
u
.
)
 
 
t−1 t−2 t−3 t−4 t−5
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
 Subject C
 Subject J
** ** ** *** **
Reward effect
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 
co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
fo
r
fir
st
−s
ta
ge
 
ch
o
ic
e 
(a.
u
.
)
 
 
t−1 t−2 t−3 t−4 t−5
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
 Subject C
 Subject J
A B
Fig. 3.7 Logistic regression on observed first-stage chosen picture using predictor vari-
ables from the five previous trials. For the given trial t, the variables used as predictors of
the dependent variable first-stage choice (1=car picture, 0=watering can picture) were: C is
first-stage choice (1=car picture, 0=watering can picture); R is outcome level (assumed as
continuous and with low=1, medium=2, high=3); and T is transition (rare=1, common=0).
Const is the constant term. Predictors were mean centred and continuous variables were also
scaled by dividing them by two standard deviations (adjustments made before the compu-
tation of the interaction terms). Each dot represents the fixed-effects regression estimate for
a given session (coloured red when p < 0.05 and grey otherwise). Bar and error bar values
correspond, respectively, to the mixed-effect regression estimate and its standard error. **
for α = 0.01 and * for α = 0.05 in two-tailed one sample t-test with null-hypothesis mean
equal to zero for the fixed-effects estimates.
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Table 3.2 Fixed and mixed-effects logistic regression results for predictors of first-stage
chosen picture up to five trials back
Fixed-effects analysis Mixed-effects analysis
justifyn Predictors Subject C Subject J Subject C Subject J
Const -0.11 (0.06) -0.08 (0.08) -0.06 (0.05) -0.07 (0.08)
Ct−1 0.71 (0.06) 0.91 (0.07)** 0.56 (0.05)** 0.57 (0.07)**
Rt−1 -0.35 (0.06)** -0.32 (0.11)** -0.22 (0.06)** -0.12 (0.22)
Tt−1 0.07 (0.05) 0.07 (0.08) 0.01 (0.05) 0.05 (0.09)
Rt−1 × Tt−1 0.27 (0.12)* -0.18 (0.18) 0.21 (0.11) -0.45 (0.18)*
Rt−1 × Ct−1 1.54 (0.10)** 3.26 (0.22)** 1.36 (0.09)** 2.82 (0.26)**
Tt−1 × Ct−1 -1.92 (0.11)** -2.53 (0.21)** -1.43 (0.08)** -1.39 (0.29)**
Rt−1 × Tt−1 × Ct−1 -7.85 (0.50)** -13.76 (0.70)** -7.06 (0.39)** -16.37 (1.22)**
Ct−2 0.37 (0.05)** 0.17 (0.08) 0.32 (0.04)** 0.11 (0.07)
Rt−2 -0.05 (0.05) 0.03 (0.08) -0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.08)
Tt−2 0.11 (0.06) 0.07 (0.07) 0.06 (0.04) 0.08 (0.05)
Rt−2 × Tt−2 0.28 (0.11)* 0.17 (0.14) 0.14 (0.09) 0.14 (0.14)
Rt−2 × Ct−2 0.70 (0.10)** 0.57 (0.12)** 0.62 (0.08)** 0.63 (0.13)**
Tt−2 × Ct−2 -0.72 (0.13)** -0.13 (0.15) -0.67 (0.09)** -0.09 (0.16)
Rt−2 × Tt−2 × Ct−2 -2.75 (0.31)** -2.68 (0.33)** -2.43 (0.26)** -2.11 (0.32)**
Ct−3 0.17 (0.06)** 0.07 (0.09) 0.17 (0.05)** 0.06 (0.08)
Rt−3 0.12 (0.06) -0.02 (0.08) 0.07 (0.04) -0.03 (0.08)
Tt−3 0.15 (0.06)* 0.07 (0.06) 0.12 (0.04)** 0.09 (0.05)
Rt−3 × Tt−3 0.09 (0.11) -0.19 (0.15) 0.11 (0.10) -0.14 (0.15)
Rt−3 × Ct−3 0.31 (0.11)** 0.30 (0.17) 0.33 (0.08)** 0.28 (0.13)*
Tt−3 × Ct−3 -0.26 (0.11)* 0.19 (0.15) -0.21 (0.09)* 0.25 (0.11)*
Rt−3 × Tt−3 × Ct−3 -1.33 (0.22)** -1.31 (0.40)** -1.26 (0.19)** -1.48 (0.32)**
Ct−4 0.05 (0.06) -0.07 (0.07) 0.04 (0.04) -0.05 (0.06)
Rt−4 0.03 (0.06) -0.04 (0.06) -0.19 (0.06) -0.04 (0.05)
Tt−4 0.02 (0.06) 0.04 (0.06) 0.02 (0.06) 0.03 (0.05)
Rt−4 × Tt−4 0.04 (0.10) -0.11 (0.15) 0.06 (0.09) -0.17 (0.17)
Rt−4 × Ct−4 0.23 (0.10)* 0.07 (0.11) 0.20 (0.08)* 0.17 (0.11)
Tt−4 × Ct−4 0.06 (0.12) 0.23 (0.14) 0.06 (0.09) 0.31 (0.15)*
Rt−4 × Tt−4 × Ct−4 -0.70 (0.25)** -0.89 (0.29)** -0.66 (0.19)** -1.02 (0.32)**
Ct−5 0.06 (0.05) 0.15 (0.05)* 0.06 (0.04) 0.11 (0.05)*
Rt−5 0.10 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) 0.11 (0.04)** -0.04 (0.06)
Tt−5 0.07 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) 0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.05)
Rt−5 × Tt−5 0.05 (0.10) -0.05 (0.16) 0.08 (0.09) 0.12 (0.15)
Rt−5 × Ct−5 0.01 (0.12) 0.10 (0.10) -0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.10)
Tt−5 × Ct−5 -0.02 (0.15) 0.22 (0.11) -0.04 (0.12) 0.17 (0.11)
Rt−5 × Tt−5 × Ct−5 -0.50 (0.24)* 0.22 (0.26) -0.35 (0.22) -0.34 (0.29)
Results are mean (SE) of the regression coefficients across sessions. For the given trial t, the variables used
as predictors of the dependent variable first-stage choice (1=car picture, 0=watering can picture) were: C is
first-stage choice (1=car picture, 0=watering can picture); R is outcome level (assumed as continuous and with
low=1, medium=2, high=3); and T is transition (rare=1, common=0). Const is the constant term. Predictors
were mean centred and continuous variables were also scaled by dividing them by two standard deviations
(adjustments made before the computation of the interaction terms). In italic are the predictors of interest. **
for α = 0.01 and * for α = 0.05 in either two-tailed one sample t-test with null-hypothesis mean equal to zero
for the fixed-effects results or confidence interval estimation for the mixed-effects results.
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Computational modelling results
A variety of full MF as well as full MB-RL algorithms were first fitted to each subject’s trial-
by-trial choices using both fixed-effects (individual fits for each session) and mixed-effects
(taking parameters of each subject to be random effects across sessions) fitting procedures.
The complexity-adjusted likelihoods of the models were then compared to determine which
best fit behaviour (Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5). In line with previous studies (Daw et al., 2011;
Gläscher et al., 2010), we also considered a Hybrid model in which the best MF and MB
algorithms operated in parallel, and with their decision values being combined to determine
the choice probabilities (Table 3.6). The relative weight of MB versus MF control was
considered as a further free parameter, ω (high ω indicating a bias towards MB-RL choice)
on each session. All procedures not only aimed to validate the regression findings showing
contributions of both systems to behavioural choice, but also attempted to find the optimal
combination of parameters within each RL strategy.
Table 3.7 summarises the model comparison measures for the best fitting algorithms
within each learning strategy and for each subject. The results indicate that choice be-
haviour from both subjects was best explained by a combined MF and MB strategy, corrob-
orating the dual-control findings obtained with the initial behavioural analysis. The fitting
to the data of the best Hybrid model (among its different possible variants as shown by Ta-
ble 3.6) was significantly better than chance (predictive probabilities significantly exceeded
chance level for both subjects, p < 0.05), and had lower BIC scores as well as better ex-
ceedance probability when compared to pure MF and pure MB models (being only beaten
by the Hybrid+ model, which we discuss below). This winning Hybrid model combined
the S ARS A algorithm (the best approach within pure MF approaches as shown by Tables
3.3 and 3.4) without an eligibility trace parameter, and the Forward1 algorithm (the best
pure MB approach as in Table 3.5) where the state-transition probabilities are assumed to
be known from the beginning of the task. Furthermore, this model also incorporated the
previously mentioned choice perserverance tendency in both first- and second-stage choices
(C: κ parameter value is the same for first- and second-stage choices; J: two separate κ
parameter values for each stage choice) and a common learning rate at both decision stages.
Table 3.8 displays the empirical prior distributions over the parameters for each of the
best algorithms. The mixed-effects analysis led to a significantly better fit than the fixed-
effects analysis (with the exceptions of pure MF and pure MB algorithms in subject J; all
remaining t-tests on BIC versus BICint with p < 0.05), and indeed the fixed-effects parame-
ter estimates mostly conformed to a normal distribution with relatively similar values to the
mixed-effects results (on probability plots inspection). With regard to the balance between
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Table 3.3 Model comparison results for the model-free S ARS A models
S ARS A Fixed-effects BIC sum Mixed-effects BICint
parameters Subject C Subject J Subject C Subject J
α, β, κ1 35873 34670 35717 34538
α, β, κ2 36581 35191 36444 35170
α, β, κ 35814 34133 35679 34043
α, β, λ 36330 35157 36149 35171
α1, α2, β 36511 35671 36494 35700
α, β1, β2 36532 35682 36393 35596
α1, α2, β1, β2 36615 35770 36464 35775
α1, α2, β, κ1 35822 34759 35689 34588
α1, α2, β, κ2 36584 35295 36430 35274
α1, α2, β, κ 35821 34252 35687 34087
α1, α2, β, λ 36335 35267 36116 35231
α, β1, β2, κ1 35785 34742 35455 34458
α, β1, β2, κ2 36619 35306 36348 35175
α, β1, β2, κ 35934 34267 35637 34022
α, β1, β2, λ 36447 35260 36163 35176
α, β, κ1, κ2 35908 34256 35624 34069
α, β, κ1, λ 35723 34415 35424 34185
α, β, κ2, λ 36403 34825 36095 34791
α, β, κ, λ 35697† 33931† 35420 33750†
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ1 35895 34859 35494 34509
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ2 37797 35690 36765 35698
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ 35949 34388 35723 34088
α1, α2, β1, β2, λ 36478 35360 36142 35272
α, β1, β2, κ1, κ2 35873 34370 35408 34049
α, β1, β2, κ1, λ 35794 34553 35319 34183
α, β1, β2, κ2, λ 36531 34888 36117 34774
α, β1, β2, κ, λ 35856 34058 35385 33754
α1, α2, β, κ1, κ2 35891 34373 36074 34133
α1, α2, β, κ1, λ 35707 34539 35356 34240
α1, α2, β, κ2, λ 36426 34936 36074 34856
α1, α2, β, κ, λ 35725 34061 35382 33788
α, β, κ1, κ2, λ 35784 34055 35348 33780
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ1, κ2 35983 34494 35439 34087
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ1, λ 35858 34677 35311 34233
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ2, λ 36566 34994 36090 34865
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ, λ 35858 34188 35331 33796
α, β1, β2, κ1, κ2, λ 35880 34186 35266 33766
α1, α2, β, κ1, κ2, λ 35791 34186 35287 33824
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ1, κ2, λ 35946 34312 35260† 33825
† Best fitting S ARS A model-free learning model for the respective analysis type. Ab-
breviations: Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC); integrated BIC (BICint); learning rate
for first-stage (α1) and second-stage (α2) choice; α is when α1 = α2; inverse temperature
for first-stage (β1) and second-stage (β2) choice; β is when β1 = β2; perseveration for
first-stage (κ1) and second-stage (κ2) choice; κ is when κ1 = κ2; eligibility trace (λ).
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Table 3.4 Model comparison results for the model-free Q-learning models
Q-learning Fixed-effects BIC sum Mixed-effects BICint
parameters Subject C Subject J Subject C Subject J
α, β 36445 35620 36415 35706
α, β, κ1 35767 34668 35633 34574
α, β, κ2 36508 35252 36354 35283
α, β, κ 35736 34162 35620 34101
α, β, λ 36357 35399 36245 35525
α1, α2, β 36484 35729 36428 35749
α, β1, β2 36501 35731 36408 35764
α1, α2, β1, β2 36609 35836 36431 35878
α1, α2, β, κ1 35778 34788 35614 34607
α1, α2, β, κ2 36566 35372 36373 35427
α1, α2, β, κ 35792 34297 35615 34088
α1, α2, β, λ 36420 35502 36265 35556
α, β1, β2, κ1 35761 34780 35483 34589
α, β1, β2, κ2 36587 35357 36370 35383
α, β1, β2, κ 35878 34300 35609 34084
α, β1, β2, λ 36458 35494 36367 35528
α, β, κ1, κ2 35819 34281 35560 34127
α, β, κ1, λ 35721 34571 35486 34470
α, β, κ2, λ 36434 35068 36206 35160
α, β, κ, λ 35709‡ 34095‡ 35502 33942
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ1 35891 34909 35559 34545
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ2 37797 35773 36742 35552
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ 35925 34426 35829 34119
α1, α2, β1, β2, λ 36543 35590 36312 35612
α, β1, β2, κ1, κ2 35849 34409 35451 34140
α, β1, β2, κ1, λ 35799 34713 35411 34352
α, β1, β2, κ2, λ 36540 35121 36301 35121
α, β1, β2, κ, λ 35856 34220 35467 33935‡
α1, α2, β, κ1, κ2 35856 34413 35537 34169
α1, α2, β, κ1, λ 35762 34704 35445 34423
α1, α2, β, κ2, λ 36510 35143 36227 35169
α1, α2, β, κ, λ 35786 34224 35492 33969
α, β, κ1, κ2, λ 35788 34217 35437 34006
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ1, κ2 35979 34546 36026 34133
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ1, λ 35904 34844 35399 34432
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ2, λ 36566 34994 36084 34888
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ, λ 35907 34350 35524 33990
α, β1, β2, κ1, κ2, λ 35884 34347 35429 34010
α1, α2, β, κ1, κ2, λ 35847 34346 35404 34038
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ1, κ2, λ 35992 34473 35376‡ 34008
‡ Best fitting Q-learning model-free learning model for the respective analysis type. Ab-
breviations: Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC); integrated BIC (BICint); learning rate
for first-stage (α1) and second-stage (α2) choice; α is when α1 = α2; inverse temperature
for first-stage (β1) and second-stage (β2) choice; β is when β1 = β2; perseveration for
first-stage (κ1) and second-stage (κ2) choice; κ is when κ1 = κ2; eligibility trace (λ).
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Table 3.5 Model comparison results for the three algorithms of model-based models
Forward Fixed-effects BIC sum Mixed-effects BICint
parameters Subject C Subject J Subject C Subject J
Forward1
α2, β 35298 34824 35275 34868
α2, β1, β2 34630 33708 34548 33743
α2, β, κ1 34737 34038 34610 33965
α2, β, κ2 35425 34572 35271 34619
α2, β, κ 34818 33634 34701 33616
α2, β, κ1, κ2 34856 33753 34595 33658
α2, β1, β2, κ1 34418 33437 34176 33345
α2, β1, β2, κ2 34715 33342 34499 33309
α2, β1, β2, κ 34360§ 33182 34122§ 33248
α2, β1, β2, κ1,κ2 34505 33071§ 34143 32837§
Forward2
α2, β 35304 34831 35279 34872
α2, β1, β2 34642 33732 34556 33758
α2, β, κ1 34743 34046 34610 33959
α2, β, κ2 35432 34579 35274 34612
α2, β, κ 34824 33641 34702 33619
α2, β, κ1,κ2 34862 33761 34594 33661
α2, β1, β2, κ1 34430 33462 34181 33359
α2, β1, β2, κ2 34727 33366 34508 33324
α2, β1, β2, κ 34372 33205 34129 33256
α2, β1, β2, κ1,κ2 34517 33095 34152 32851
Forward3
α2, β, ζ 35484 34993 35297 34883
α2, β1, β2, ζ 34797 33841 34570 33748
α2, β, κ1, ζ 34923 34206 34630 33965
α2, β, κ2, ζ 35611 34742 35288 34633
α2, β, κ, ζ 35004 33803 34717 33629
α2, β, κ1, κ2, ζ 35042 33922 34624 33656
α2, β1, β2, κ1, ζ 34590 33579 34192 33346
α2, β1, β2, κ2, ζ 34882 33475 34516 33313
α2, β1, β2, κ, ζ 34533 33335 34140 33255
α2, β1, β2, κ1, κ2, ζ 35229 34091 34145 32841
§ Best fitting model-based algorithm for the respective analysis type (see text for
details about each algorithm). Abbreviations: Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC);
integrated BIC (BICint); learning rate for second-stage (α2) choice; inverse temper-
ature for first-stage (β1) and second-stage (β2) choice; β is when β1 = β2; persever-
ation for first-stage (κ1) and second-stage (κ2) choice; κ is when κ1 = κ2; eligibility
trace (λ); ζ is a weight given to state-transition model testing.
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Table 3.6 Model comparison results for the Hybrid models
HYBRID Fixed-effects BIC sum Mixed-effects BICint
parameters Subject C Subject J Subject C Subject J
α, β, κ1, ω 34807 34144 34522 33930
α, β, κ2, ω 35435 34642 35148 34592
α, β, κ, ω 34880 33742 34616 33600
α, β, λ, ω 35451 34900 35171 34775
α1, α2, β, ω 35464 35028 35168 34814
α, β1, β2, ω 34515 33638 34246 33548
α1, α2, β1, β2, ω 34577 33735 34313 33585
α1, α2, β, κ1, ω 34973 34292 34561 33923
α1, α2, β, κ2, ω 35593 34779 35195 34582
α1, α2, β, κ, ω 35045 33891 34644 33617
α1, α2, β, λ, ω 35602 35023 35191 34733
α, β1, β2, κ1, ω 34380 33432 33948 33215
α, β1, β2, κ2, ω 34602 33269 34194 33217
α, β1, β2, κ, ω 34326¶ 33199 33898¶ 33189
α, β1, β2, λ, ω 34652 33640 34244 33499
α, β, κ1, κ2, ω 34928 33861 34508 33673
α, β, κ1, λ, ω 34966 34216 34542 33913
α, β, κ2, λ, ω 35580 34650 35167 34542
α, β, κ, λ, ω 35036 33813 34640 33566
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ1, ω 34468 33553 33986 33252
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ2, ω 34663 33367 34265 33167
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ, ω 34422 33346 33948 33239
α1, α2, β1, β2, λ, ω 34709 33748 34302 33541
α, β1, β2, κ1, κ2, ω 34468 33063¶ 33904 32807¶
α, β1, β2, κ1, λ, ω 34528 33473 33952 33182
α, β1, β2, κ2, λ, ω 34739 33272 34202 33075
α, β1, β2, κ, λ, ω 34475 33249 33906 33197
α1, α2, β, κ1, κ2, ω 35095 34010 34558 33642
α1, α2, β, κ1, λ, ω 35125 34355 34576 33889
α1, α2, β, κ2, λ, ω 35731 34769 35200 34552
α1, α2, β, κ, λ, ω 35194 33951 34668 33566
α, β, κ1, κ2, λ, ω 35087 33935 34524 33612
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ1, κ2, ω 34556 33186 33950 32843
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ1, λ, ω 34612 33599 33986 33234
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ2, λ, ω 34795 33380 34255 33180
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ, λ, ω 34568 33392 33940 33235
α, β1, β2, κ1, κ2, λ, ω 34616 33105 33903 32917
α1, α2, β, κ1, κ2, λ, ω 35246 34071 34563 33606
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ1, κ2, λ, ω 34699 33231 33931 32821
All Hybrid models tested included the S ARS A algorithm as model-free strategy and the
Forward1 model-based algorithm (for more details see text). ¶ Best fitting Hybrid model for
the respective analysis type. Abbreviations: Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC); integrated
BIC (BICint); learning rate for first-stage (α1) and second-stage (α2) choice; α is when α1 =
α2; inverse temperature for first-stage (β1) and second-stage (β2) choice; β is when β1 = β2;
perseveration for first-stage (κ1) and second-stage (κ2) choice; κ is when κ1 = κ2; eligibility
trace (λ); ω is the model-based weight.
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Table 3.7 Model comparison results for fixed-effects and mixed-effects best-fitting mod-
els from each reinforcement learning approach
Fixed-effects analysis Mixed-effects analysis
BIC sum % BIC % LRT BICint Exc Prob Predictive choice
Model Parameters Subject Hybrid better Hybrid better vs. Hybrid probability
S ARS A
α1, α2, β1, β2, κ1, κ2, λ C 35697 100 100 35260 < 0.001 0.569
α, β, κ, λ J 33931 93 100 33750 < 0.001 0.563
Forward1
α2, β1, β2, κ C 34360 43 70 34122 0.38 0.579
α2, β1, β2, κ J 33182 63 93 33248 < 0.001 0.568
Hybrid
α, β1, β2, κ, ω C 34326 - - 33898 - 0.581
α, β1, β2, κ1, κ2, ω J 33063 - - 32807 - 0.572
Hybrid+
α, β1, β2, κ, L1, L2, L3, ω C 33247 7 7 32441 > 0.999 0.595
α, β1, β2, κ1, κ2, L1, L2, L3, ω J 28888 0 0 28659 > 0.999 0.614
BIC, Bayesian Information Criterion (lower values correspond to better models) sum and % of sessions where the Hybrid model was better; % of sessions with LRT ,
likelihood-ratio test favouring the Hybrid model; BICint, is the integrated BIC (see text); Exc Prob, is the Bayesian exceedance probability (Stephan et al., 2009)
measuring the likelihood that each model is the most common when tested against the Hybrid model. Both Hybrid and Hybrid+ models (in bold as it was the overall
best model) included the S ARS A algorithm (as model-free) and the Forward1 (as model-based). Abbreviations: learning rate for first-stage (α1) and second-stage (α2);
α is when α1 = α2; inverse temperature for first-stage (β1) and second-stage (β2); β is when β1 = β2; perseveration for first-stage (κ1) and second-stage (κ2); κ is when
κ1 = κ2; eligibility trace (λ); L11, L22 and L3 are the reinforcement strength (or aversion) for high, medium and low outcome, respectively (see text for full details); ω is
the model-based weight.
MF and MB control, the maximum a posteriori (MAP) ω hyperparameter was 86% for sub-
ject C and 88% for subject J (MAP estimates for the individual sessions different from 0
and 100% with p < 0.001 in all sign test for both subjects), very much in line with the
dominance found in the logistic regression analysis. Both decision stages shared the same
learning rate and the hyperparameter value was relatively high (C: α = 0.82; J: α = 0.77),
probably due to the non-stationary and deterministic reward structure. On the other hand,
differences in choice reliability were found for both decision stages with first-stage choices
being more deterministic than second-stage ones (C: β1 = 6.39 and β2 = 2.50; J: β1 = 6.97
and β2 = 1.68). Finally, the perseverance parameter was small and positive (C: κ = 0.05; J:
κ1 = 0.05 and κ2 = 0.34), reflecting the tendency to repeat recently chosen options that we
mentioned above.
Model validation and simulation results
Logistic regression and computational results both matched the data relatively well, there-
fore more explicit analyses were performed to establish the relationship between the two.
Such validation procedures also helped to confirm whether the models, together with their
best-fitting parameters, could generate as well as fit observed choice behaviour. We there-
fore used the best RL models for each strategy to simulate choice data on the same two-step
decision task and then analysed the simulated choices similarly (Figs. 3.2, 3.4 and 3.6).
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Table 3.8 Best fitting hyperparameter mixed-effects estimates from the best models of
each reinforcement learning approach
Model Subject α1 α2 β1 β2 κ1 κ2 λ ω L1 L2 L3
S ARS A
C 0.48 (0.32) 0.84 (0.46) 2.62 (0.04) 2.45 (0.10) 0.19 (0.05) 0.07 (0.02) 0.52 (0.32) - - - -
J 0.62 (0.43) 1.93 (0.07) 0.28 (0.06) 0.58 (0.58) - - - -
Forward1
C - 0.80 (0.47) 6.06 (0.13) 2.52 (0.11) 0.06 (0.01) - - - - -
J - 0.71 (0.69) 6.04 (0.18) 2.01 (0.12) 0.08 (0.02) - - - - -
Hybrid
C 0.82 (0.40) 6.39 (0.12) 2.50 (0.11) 0.05 (0.01) - 0.86 (0.23) - - -
J 0.77 (0.61) 6.97 (0.18) 1.68 (0.06) 0.05 (0.01) 0.34 (0.10) - 0.88 (0.31) - - -
Hybrid+
C 0.78 (0.40) 4.57 (0.15) 2.54 (0.11) 0.06 (0.01) - 0.86 (0.23) 0.25 (0.01) -0.06 (0.02) -0.08 (0.02)
J 0.59 (0.51) 4.92 (0.20) 1.85 (0.08) 0.04 (0.01) 0.31 (0.10) - 0.88 (0.27) 0.51 (0.03) -0.10 (0.06) -0.16 (0.05)
Both Hybrid and Hybrid+ (in bold as it was the best model) models included the S ARS A algorithm as model-free strategy and the Forward1 model-based algorithm (see full text for details). Values correspond
to mean parameter estimates and in between brackets are the standard deviations of the parameters given on the transformed scale used for parameter fitting. Regarding the parameter nomenclature used (when
placed in between parameters, the respective parameter estimate was shared between both first-stage and second-stage): learning rate for first-stage (α1) and second-stage (α2) choice; inverse temperature for
first-stage (β1) and second-stage (β2) choice; perseveration for first-stage (κ1) and second-stage (κ2) choice; eligibility trace (λ); L11, L22 and L3 are the reinforcement strength (or aversion) for high, medium
and low outcome, respectively (see text for full details); ω is the model-based weight.
Not only did this generated data confirm the expected and previously described dif-
ferences between MF and MB-RL, but the simulations also showed that when compared
against pure MF and pure MB approaches, the Hybrid model matched better the repeat
first-stage choice pattern (particularly the asymmetry between the high and the low outcome
levels when compared to pure MB simulations) as well as the logistic regression results
(which exhibited a more reasonable balance between the coefficients of the reward main ef-
fect and the reward× transition effect) of subjects’ behaviour (Figs. 3.2C and 3.3; 3.4C and
3.5). Although these results supported the qualitative validity of the above computational
modelling analyses, they also highlighted some quantitative limitations. One of the most
striking differences between the Hybrid model simulations and the observed data was the
weight given to the most recent trial and, consequently, the discrepancies in the exponential
decays (decay constants for the reward main effect/reward × transition for C = -0.78/-0.94
versus simulations = -0.37/-0.22, and J = -1.62/-1.50 versus simulations -0.36/-0.17).
Motivated by these observations, a new model (Hybrid+) was conceived in which three
additional parameters (one for each outcome level: L1 for high, L2 for medium and L3 for
low) were incorporated in the previously best Hybrid model. The goal was to improve
the model’s characterization of the influence of each reward level, particularly the one just
received, on subsequent first-stage choices. This influence turned out to reflect something
close to a one-step MB effect. That is, if the transition on the trial had been common, the
QHybrid value of the first-stage choice taken on that trial was boosted (or decreased) with a
value dependent on the outcome level received. On the other hand, if the transition had been
rare, then the increment (or reduction) was applied to the first-stage choice action not chosen
on that trial. This way, a positive value (L > 0) denotes the strength of the reinforcement by
reward, whereas a negative value (L < 0) quantifies the aversion for that particular outcome
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level.
Comparisons between the models (Table 3.7) show that this new model fitted the data
significantly better than chance (predictive probabilities significantly exceeded chance level
in both subjects, p < 0.05) and it performed better than the previous ones (all exceedance
probability values > 0.99). The extra parameters were justified according to the BIC,
BICint and the exceedance probability. An important question is whether the original RL
parameters remained stable after such adjustment. Indeed, as presented in Table 3.8, very
few changes in the parameters were observed by comparing the Hybrid model against the
Hybrid+ model. Ultimately, this newly generated model could only be seen as a significant
improvement if it also addressed the limitations found with the simulation results obtained
with the previous best Hybrid model. Indeed the simulated choice data results generated by
the Hybrid+ model successfully captured not only the observed pattern of repeat probability
at first-stage choice (compare Fig. 3.8A and 3.8D), but also the logistic regression profiles
of both reward main effect (compare Fig. 3.8B and 3.8E) and reward × transition effect
(compare Fig. 3.8C and 3.8F). Moreover, the best-fitted values of the additional parameters
(hyperparameter mean values for C: L1 = 0.25, L2 = -0.06, L3 = -0.08 and J: L1 = 0.51, L2
= -0.10, L3 = -0.16) revealed that high outcome level had a high reinforcement strength but
both medium and low outcome had an aversive impact, as previously noted. In conclusion,
both model comparison and simulation results supported the validity of the newly generated
Hybrid+ model.
A final complementary approach to relating logistic and computational analyses is by
explicitly comparing the coefficients obtained from the regression analysis with the RL pa-
rameters from the best fitted Hybrid+ model. Such correlations can also be assessed on
simulated data in order to provide a reference of what can be expected. When the analysis
was applied to the choice behaviour across sessions of both experimental subjects, we found
that the stronger the effect of the reward × transition interaction regression coefficients the
greater the estimated MB ω parameter of the model (data: r = −0.69, p < 0.001; simula-
tions: r = −0.18, p < 0.001; see Fig. 3.9A). We also found a significant negative correlation
between the inverse temperature parameter at first-stage choice (with lower values revealing
stochasticity in the choice) and the residuals from the regression model (data: r = −0.44,
p < 0.001; simulations: r = −0.41, p < 0.001; see Fig. 3.9B), and a positive correlation
between both logistic and computational first-stage choice perseverance measures (sepa-
rately for each subject given the different number of κ parameters: data: r = 0.80/0.41,
p < 0.001/0.035, simulations: r = 0.35/0.08, p < 0.001/< 0.001; see Fig. 3.9C).
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Fig. 3.8 The impact of both reward and transition information on first-stage chosen
picture behaviour. (A) Likelihood of repeating the same first-stage picture choice, aver-
aged across sessions, as a function of outcome and transition on the previous trial. Error bars
depict SEM. (B-C) Logistic regression results on first-stage chosen picture with the contri-
butions of the reward main effect (B) and reward × transition (C) from the five previous
trials. (D-F) Similar results obtained from simulations (100 runs per session and respecting
the exact reward structure subjects experienced) using the best fit Hybrid+ model. Dots
represent fixed-effects coefficients for each session (red when p < 0.05, grey otherwise).
Bar and error bar values correspond, respectively, to mixed-effect coefficients and their SE.
Dashed lines illustrate the exponential best fit on the mean fixed-effects coefficients of each
trial into the past. ** α = 0.01 and * α = 0.05 in two-tailed one sample t-test with null-
hypothesis mean equal to zero for the fixed-effects estimates.
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Fig. 3.9 Correlation in both subjects between the logistic regression estimates and com-
putational modelling parameters across sessions. (A) Relationship between the model-
based weight parameter ω obtained from the Hybrid+ model fitting for each session and
the corresponding regression coefficient for the reward × transition interaction term. The
greater the MB weight, the stronger the reward × transition effect in the logistic regres-
sion. (B) Positive correlation between the computational preseveration κ1 parameter and
the regression coefficient for repeat first-stage choice independently of reward and transi-
tion. (C) Relationship between the inverse temperature parameter at first-stage choice β1
obtained from the Hybrid+ model fitting and the residual values from the regression model
(the greater the β1 parameter, the better was the logistic regression fit). Dashed lines repre-
sent the regression line of the fit for each individual subject or across subjects (in red). r is
the Pearson’s linear correlation coefficients and p is the p-values across subjects in (A) and
(B), whereas in (C) top values are for subject C and bottom values are for subject J.
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Lastly, in an attempt to test the possibility that habits were forming progressively (Dick-
inson, 1985), we assessed the correlations between relevant estimates and their respective
session number. We did not find a significant linear increase with time for the main ef-
fect of reward (data: r = −0.04/0.31, p = 0.844/0.115; simulations: r = −0.44/0.15,
p = 0.016/0.457; see Fig. 3.10A), or for a reduction in the ω parameter from the com-
putational modelling (data: r = 0.04/0.11, p = 0.836/0.568; simulations: r = 0.21/0.12,
p = 0.259/0.539; see Fig. 3.10B). Nonetheless, we did observe that the reward × transition
interaction on first-stage choice tended to reduce with time significantly in both subjects
(data: r = 0.53/0.50, p = 0.003/0.008; simulations: r = −0.01/−0.24, p = 0.959/0.228; see
Fig. 3.10C).
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Fig. 3.10 Evolution across sessions of logistic regression and computational modelling
estimates. Across time and for both subjects, no significant decrease in the regression
coefficients for the reward effect (A) or model-based weight parameter ω (B) was found.
However, a significant reduction was found for the effect of the regression coefficients for
the reward × transition effect (C) with time (to note that the more positive the regression
coefficient the weaker the effect). Dashed lines represent the regression line of the fit for
each individual subject. r is the Pearson’s linear correlation coefficients and p is the p-
values; top values are for subject C and bottom values are for subject J.
These findings suggest other factors may also potentially influence choice across time
without a corresponding interference with the MF/MB balance, in particular possible tired-
ness (cumulative fatigue across days given the concomitant electrophysiological experi-
ments) or attention. Interestingly, first-stage choice behaviour in both subjects became
slightly more stochastic with time, as revealed by a gradual decrement in the inverse temper-
ature parameter (data: r = −0.47/−0.68, p = 0.009/< 0.001; simulations: r = −0.02/−0.06,
p = 0.898/0.768; see Fig. 3.11A). Also relevant was the negative correlation found for first-
stage reaction time mean and session number, indicating that subjects got gradually slower
throughout the experiment (data: r = 0.59/0.78, p < 0.001/< 0.001; see Fig. 3.11B).
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Fig. 3.11 Evolution across sessions of the inverse temperature parameter as well as the
reaction time for first-stage choice. As the number of sessions performed increased, sub-
jects got progressively more stochastic (smaller inverse temperature values) in their choice
behaviour (A) and took longer to make a choice at first-stage (B). Dashed lines represent
the regression line of the fit for each individual subject. r is the Pearson’s linear correlation
coefficients and p is the p-values; top values are for subject C and bottom values are for
subject J.
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Reaction time analysis
We have shown that choice behaviour takes into account both reward and transition infor-
mation from more than just the last trial. From a motor planning perspective, adjusting one’s
behavioural strategy should presumably take longer than merely repeating a choice. Given
the profile we observed of first-stage choice repeat probabilities as a function of reward and
transition (Fig. 3.3), a similar dependency might therefore also be expected in first-stage
reaction times. If present, such a response latency effect would further support the existence
of MB-RL, and may even reflect prospective computation at choice time of the expected ac-
tion values over the possible future states. However, it is important to note that the decision
to switch or repeat first-stage choice can be made at the feedback epoch of the previous trial
when the reward is revealed. For this reason, it would not be surprising if these effects are
either small or absent. Based on the same line of thought, first-stage choices could also be
in general faster than second-stage ones.
The first-stage choices were relatively fast, and were significantly shorter than second-
stage ones (C: first-stage reaction time M = 499 ms SD = 201 versus reaction time second-
stage M = 514 ms, SD = 210 with t(31168) = −6.41, p < 0.001, d = 0.50; J: first-stage
reaction time M = 647 ms, SD = 191 versus second-stage reaction time M = 663 ms, SD =
194 with t(29326) = −7.08, p < 0.001, g = 0.54). Since the choice data exhibited action
biases, we expected that they would also appear in reaction times (C: F(2, 15582) = 530.96,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.06, with relative latencies of down < left < right surviving multiple
comparison tests; J F(2, 14661) = 66.67, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.01, with relative latencies of
left < right < up, again surviving multiple comparison test). As a consequence, all analyses
used z-scores of log transformed reaction time standardised according to each action for
the respective session (high z-scores indicate slow responses and low z-scores denote fast
reaction time).
The results in Figure 3.12A show clear differences between common and rare trials as a
function of high or low outcomes received. The reaction time for first-stage choice follow-
ing a high outcome obtained through a common transition was consistently faster than if it
was through a rare one. On the other hand, after a low outcome the first-stage choice was
faster if the previous trial had a rare transition. These findings are in agreement with the
expectation that slower decisions occur in situations where the likelihood of choice switch-
ing is highest. Such situations are the ones where MB control is required, and the slower
latency in response could be interpreted as the potential time costs associated with more
demanding prospective computations. Of note, following a medium outcome, RTs were
consistently slower with no significant differences between transition types. The differential
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RT results following medium and low outcomes is somewhat surprising given the similar
choice repetition profile across these outcomes (see Fig. 3.3). However, a medium outcome
leads the agent to the challenging trade-off between exploration (aiming for the high reward)
and exploitation (avoiding the low outcome). Therefore, this demanding computation could
explain the relatively long RT.
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Fig. 3.12 The impact of both reward and transition information on first-stage choice
reaction time. (A) The log transformed, z-scored, first-stage reaction time (high z-scores
indicate slow responses), averaged across sessions, as a function of reward and transition
type on the previous trial. Error bars depict SEM. (B-C) Multiple linear regression results
on first-stage reaction time with the contributions of the reward (B) as well as the reward
× transition (C) information from the five previous trials. Dots represent the fixed-effects
coefficients for each session (coloured red when p < 0.05 and grey otherwise). Bar and error
bar values correspond, respectively, to the mixed-effect coefficients and their SE. Dashed
lines illustrate the exponential best fit on the mean fixed-effects coefficients of each trial into
the past. ** α = 0.01 and * α = 0.05 in two-tailed one sample t-test with null-hypothesis
mean equal to zero for the fixed-effects coefficients.
To complement this analysis, we performed linear regressions on reaction time for the
first-stage choice using similar principles as the ones used for choice behaviour (Table 3.9
and 3.10; Fig. 3.12 B and C). The data are consistent with a significant reaction time mod-
ulation, from more than one trial into the past, by both the reward main effect (i.e., the
effect of previous reward on first-stage RT; Fig. 3.12B) as well as the reward × transition
effect (i.e., the effect of previous reward as well as previous transition on first-stage RT; Fig.
3.12C). Although the interaction effect was similar between the subjects, the main effect
of reward on the last trial differed (positive coefficients for subject C but negative ones for
subject J): a high reward (independently from the transition) made the reaction time faster
on the following trial in subject J, but increased the response latency in subject C (also ob-
served in Fig. 3.12A). To note that the main effect of the type of transition (i.e., the effect
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of previous transition on first-stage RT) on the latency of future responses was small or
non-existent (see effects of T predictors in Tables 3.9 and 3.10). One might have expected
that encountering a rare trial, on its own, could slow down the following decisions given its
surprise effect; but this was not apparent.
Table 3.9 Fixed and mixed-effects linear regression results for the previous trial predic-
tors of first-stage reaction time
Fixed-effects analysis Random-effects analysis
Subject C Subject J Subject C Subject J
Const 0.01 (<0.01)** 0.02 (<0.01)** 0.01 (0.01)** 0.02** (0.01)**
Ft 0.15 (0.04)** 0.38 (0.06)** 0.23 (0.03)** 0.50 (0.05)**
Rt−1 0.16 (0.04)** -0.68 (0.05)** 0.24 (0.03)** -0.71 (0.11)**
Tt−1 0.06 (0.02)** 0.03 (0.02) 0.06 (0.03)** 0.06 (0.02)**
Rt−1 × Tt−1 0.28 (0.04)** 0.23 (0.03)** 0.31 (0.05)** 0.24 (0.04)**
The dependent variable was z-scores of log transformed reaction time at trial t standardised
according to each side of response for the respective session (high z-scores indicate slow re-
sponses and low z-scores denote fast reaction time). The variables used as predictors were: F
is a linear function corresponding to the trial number; R is previous outcome level (assumed
as continuous and with low=1, medium=2, high=3); and T is previous transition (rare=1,
common=0). Const is the constant term. Predictors were mean centred and continuous vari-
ables were also scaled by dividing them by two standard deviations (adjustments made before
the computation of the interaction terms). In bold are the predictors of interest, such as the
reward main effect (rewardt−1) and the reward× transition effect (rewardt−1 × transitiont−1).
Values of fixed-effects results are the mean and in between brackets the standard error of the
mean of the regression coefficients across sessions; mixed-effects results are the estimated
regression coefficients and in between brackets their standard error. ** for α = 0.01 and *
for α = 0.05 in either two-tailed one sample t-test with null-hypothesis mean equal to zero
for the fixed-effects results or confidence interval estimation for the mixed-effects results.
To explore motivational levels and response vigour in another way, we examined the
time to the first attempt to eye fixation at first-stage. Interestingly, we found a pattern in
subject C very similar to that observed in subject J’s reaction time, where the reward from
the previous trial made the latency to fixation shorter (Fig. 3.13A). However, there was no
effect of the reward × transition interaction term, as this action does not require prospective
evaluation of choices (Fig. 3.13B). Therefore, we believe that the previous trial reaction time
differences could be secondary to a particular learning feature during the training protocol
(despite similar protocols, subject C took significantly longer than J in the last steps of
training).
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Table 3.10 Fixed and mixed-effects linear regression results for predictors of first-stage
reaction time up to five trials back
Fixed-effects analysis Mixed-effects analysis
Subject C Subject J Subject C Subject J
Const 0.02 (< 0.01)** 0.02 (0.01)** 0.02 (0.01)** 0.03 (0.01)**
Ft 0.14 (0.04)** 0.41 (0.07)** 0.23 (0.03)** 0.51 (0.05)**
Rt−1 0.24 (0.04)** -0.66 (0.05)** 0.29 (0.03)** -0.69 (0.07)**
Tt−1 0.08 (0.02)** 0.03 (0.02) 0.09 (0.02)** 0.06 (0.02)**
Rt−1 × Tt−1 0.23 (0.05)** 0.20 (0.03)** 0.30 (0.04)** 0.22 (0.04)**
Rt−2 -0.14 (0.02)** -0.09 (0.02)** -0.14 (0.02)** -0.04 (0.02)**
Tt−2 0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02)** 0.08 (0.01)**
Rt−2 × Tt−2 0.09 (0.04)* 0.07 (0.03) 0.13 (0.03)** 0.10 (0.03)**
Rt−3 -0.07 (0.02)** -0.02 (0.02) -0.08 (0.02)** -0.03 (0.02)**
Tt−3 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 0.05 (0.04)** 0.09 (0.02)**
Rt−3 × Tt−3 0.02 (0.04) -0.01 (0.03) 0.14 (0.03)** 0.10 (0.03)**
Rt−4 -0.01 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) -0.07 (0.02)** -0.04 (0.02)**
Tt−4 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02)** 0.03 (0.01)**
Rt−4 × Tt−4 -0.02 (0.04) 0.04 (0.02) 0.10 (0.03)** 0.07 (0.02)**
Rt−5 -0.03 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02)* 0.11 (0.04)** -0.04 (0.01)**
Tt−5 < 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.06 (0.03)** 0.02 (0.02)**
Rt−5 × Tt−5 0.06 (0.04) 0.04 (0.05) 0.14 (0.03)** 0.16 (0.04)**
The dependent variable was z-scores of log transformed reaction time at trial t standardised accord-
ing to each side of response for the respective session (high z-scores indicate slow responses and
low z-scores denote fast reaction time). The variables used as predictors were: F is a linear func-
tion corresponding to the trial number; R is outcome level (assumed as continuous and with low=1,
medium=2, high=3); and T is transition (rare=1, common=0). Const is the constant term. Predictors
were mean centred and continuous variables were also scaled by dividing them by two standard devi-
ations (adjustments made before the computation of the interaction terms). In bold are the predictors
of interest from i trials back, such as the reward main effect (rewardt−i) and the reward × transi-
tion effect (rewardt−i × transitiont−i). Values of fixed-effects results are the mean and in between
brackets the standard error of the mean of the regression coefficients across sessions; mixed-effects
results are the estimated regression coefficients and in between brackets their standard error. ** for
α = 0.01 and * for α = 0.05 in either two-tailed one sample t-test with null-hypothesis mean equal
to zero for the fixed-effects results or confidence interval estimation for the mixed-effects results.
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Fig. 3.13 The impact of both reward and transition information on the first attempt to
eye fixation at first-stage. Multiple linear regression results on z-scores of log transformed
first-stage eye fixation time (high z-scores indicate slow first eye fixation attempt) with the
contributions of the reward (A) as well as reward × transition interaction (B) information
from the five previous trials. Dots represent the fixed-effects coefficients for each session
(coloured red when p < 0.05 and grey otherwise). Bar and error bar values correspond,
respectively, to the mean value of the fixed-effect coefficients and its SEM. Dashed lines
illustrate the exponential best fit on the mean fixed-effects coefficients of each trial into the
past. ** for α = 0.01 and * for α = 0.05 in two-tailed one sample t-test with null-hypothesis
mean equal to zero for the fixed-effects coefficients.
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3.5 Discussion
Despite the extensive work in both MF-RL (or habitual) and MB-RL (or goal-directed)
behaviour (Daw and Dayan, 2014; Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Doya et al., 2002), very few
studies attempted to elicit simultaneous signatures of both learning strategies (Daw et al.,
2011; Gershman et al., 2012; Otto et al., 2013; Wunderlich et al., 2012a). The evidence
and consistency of both behavioural and computational modelling results support the idea
that, like human subjects performing an equivalent decision-making task (Daw et al., 2011),
non-human primates employ both MF and MB-RL strategies. In both subjects, reward
history (relevant for both learning strategies) and state-transition knowledge (used in MB
computations) had a significant impact on behaviour and, as also expected by the theory,
such influence decayed exponentially as a function of trials into the past. This was evident
in the logistic analysis and reassured the appropriateness in the use of the RL modelling.
One of the most important conclusions from the trial-by-trial computational analysis
was the overall better fit of the Hybrid model when tested against pure MF or MB methods.
This is consistent with human reports in a similar two-step task (Daw et al., 2011; Deserno
et al., 2015; Wunderlich et al., 2012b). In addition to previous reports of MF-RL existence
in these animals (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Samejima et al., 2005; Schultz et al., 1997),
this study reports choice and reaction time signatures of MB-RL as formally defined by the
theory. Moreover, the rigour of our model comparison procedure allowed us to not only test
variants of individual classes of RL models (e.g. several variants of each learning approach),
but also compare how well different classes of RL models predicted choice.
The MF S ARS A algorithm fit better than Q-learning. This bolsters the previous finding,
in a completely different task, of neural substrates consistent with the implementation of
S ARS A in non-human primates (Morris et al., 2006). It does, however, conflict with evi-
dence from rodents favouring Q-learning (Roesch et al., 2007). This observation is relevant
to future studies and theories, and merits further investigation.
The best MB-RL approach involved the explicit state-transition probability distributions
being known from start. A manifest cause for this is the extensive exposure of the subjects
to the task. Another possible consequence of the extensive task experience is the observed
dominance of MB over MF behaviour as given by the high ω parameter. In fact, this much
stronger MB control remarkably differed from the human studies (here ω was close to 90%
versus 40-60% found in humans by Daw et al., 2011; Deserno et al., 2015; Wunderlich et al.,
2012b). Even if partially instructed at start, human transition learning in an equivalent task
seemed to only settle after few trials (Daw et al., 2011; Deserno et al., 2015; Wunderlich
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et al., 2012b); although in other studies human subjects implemented incremental learning
of transition matrices (Gläscher et al., 2010). Any working memory load potentially re-
quired for state-transition learning, as it seemed to have happened in humans, could increase
reliance on a MF-RL strategy (Otto et al., 2013). By knowing the task structure well, our
subjects could reduce such finite executive burden and increase MB control (Economides
et al., 2015).
However, methodological and computational reasons might also explain MB domi-
nance. The reward in the task were three different levels and our random walk design
evolved such that there were sequences of a few trials with similar reward levels which
alternated with discrete changes (in similar human studies reward probabilities that diffused
as a random walk were used). We used the discrete reward jumps to help the subjects learn
what is already a difficult task for a non-human primate. However, previous computational
work has suggested that low uncertainty in estimates is a determinant factor for behavioural
control, while arbitrating between the two systems (Daw et al., 2005). Therefore, the more
non-stationary properties of the environment could have increased MF uncertainty, at the
same time that having sequences of known outcomes may have reduced MB uncertainty.
Finally, this MB-RL supremacy remained constant across session with no evidence for a
significant emergence of habitual behaviour (Dickinson, 1985; Gläscher et al., 2010).
Our validation procedures assessed parallelisms between regression and computational
modelling results. Hence, the procedures used quantified how well the models predicted
subject’s choices as well as their ability to generate the observed behavioural patterns. Al-
though commonly used in RL studies, few studies have directly investigated the relationship
between both types of analysis (Katahira, 2015). As in other behavioural studies (Corrado
et al., 2005; Lau and Glimcher, 2005), this approach was fruitful in identifying discrepan-
cies between adequate model predictive performance and generative limitations, evident,
for instance, in the failure of the original Hybrid model (Daw et al., 2011) to replicate the
stronger previous trial’s influence on first-stage choice, prompting modelling refinement
(Hybrid+ model). In general, despite some disparities, both descriptive and computational
approaches were mutually consistent, for instance with the expected (also by the simulated
data) correlation between the reward × transition interaction coefficient and the MB weight
parameter (ω).
The novel Hybrid+ model, which fits best, closely reproduced the observed choice be-
haviour. Its additional parameters modelled the reinforcement (or aversion) strength of each
reward level on either chosen or unchosen first-stage option, given the agent’s transition
knowledge. Similarly, other authors have also used and found success by adding, to MF-
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RL methods, forgetting to actions not chosen and allowing aversion from a lack of reward
(Ito and Doya, 2009). In fact, these latter adjustments seem to be essential for equivalence
between regression and computational results (Katahira, 2015). Our new adjustment can
also be regarded as some regularization procedure given potential knowledge of changes
in the reward settings. This way, the added parameters could be related to other processes
going beyond MF-RL but also not quite fulfilling the theoretical definition of MB-RL, as it
happens in serial reversal tasks (Doll et al., 2012). To solve such tasks, some form of heuris-
tic directly or indirectly relating the choice with the counterfactual option could be used to
detect changes in the reward structure and promote adaptive behaviour. Even so, modern
theoretical accounts of RL seem to incorporate these issues. Some authors have considered
either multiple MB-RL systems or prior knowledge about high-level structures of behaviour
as a way of augmenting more classical RL methods (Botvinick and Weinstein, 2014; Doya
et al., 2002). Nevertheless, we view these extra parameters as a MF implementation of a
MB effect (Akam et al., 2015) – MF, since it depends on an effect of the past trial rather than
an assessment of a future one; MB, since it includes a one-step working-memory-for-state
version of MB reasoning.
Importantly, though, is to acknowledge an alternative to our Hybrid+model as the possi-
bility of habituation to sophisticated forms of conditional evaluation based on relationships
between current state, outcome and the next action. In line with this, a less classical but
alternative MF learner with time could just use second-stage state associated with reward
information to choose the next first-stage choice. In fact, in our formal logistic definition of
reward × transition interaction effect (Rt−1 × Tt−1 × Ct−1) as a predictor of next first-stage
choice, it is embedded the second-stage state definition (Tt−1 × Ct−1). It is challenging to
disentangle both possibilities in choice behaviour. However, this hypothesis does not ex-
plain well some choice and RT effects observed in our data. We not only observed a long
temporal tail of MB effects in the choice regression analyses, but we also found that the
effect of full MB learner remained after refitting all parameters with the Hybrid+ model.
The RT differences between common and rare trials as a function of outcome are also not
expected by such alternative strategy.
Theoretical accounts have suggested a speed accuracy trade-off between MF and MB
computations, with the former being fast and the latter relatively slow (Keramati et al.,
2011). It was then expected that decisions taking into account both reward and transition
structure would take longer. Indeed, first-stage reaction time analysis confirmed this hypoth-
esis, regardless of the possibility that a decision can be made on the previous trial when the
outcome is known. Furthermore, this latter effect followed a similar exponential decay with
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trials into the past as in choice data. Such finding does not fit well with alternative accounts
for reaction time in sequential decision making that consider sequential action chunking
as an explanation for faster responses (Dezfouli and Balleine, 2013). It also seems to go
against other MB accounts emphasising pre-computations at the time of outcome where the
re-evaluation of the utility of the states given the received reward helps future choice (Daw
and Dayan, 2014; Gershman et al., 2014; Moore and Atkeson, 1993). Overall, the reaction
time evidence is then supportive of a forward looking MB valuation process happening at
the time of choice (Doll et al., 2015; Johnson and Redish, 2007).
A final reaction time result deserves attention, particularly given its disparity with choice
data. We found a stronger influence of the main effect of reward on reaction time (subject J)
and eye fixation time (both subjects) in comparison to the reward× transition effect. In other
words, the influence of MF control on response vigour was stronger than MB control, and
these effects were seen with a behaviour dominated by MB-RL. Others have also reported
that even in over-trained scenarios response latency can still be influenced by learned action
values (Wunderlich et al., 2012a). It is then appealing to relate this finding with theoretical
proposals suggesting that MF control, by being the main reporter of the average rate of
reinforcement, is the main mediator of the vigour of actions (Niv et al., 2007).
In conclusion, we have implemented a decision learning task in non-human primates
with formal definitions of reinforcement learning MF and MB approaches and reported a
detailed quantitative and computational analysis. We were able to show, to our knowledge
for the first time, clear evidence of combined MF and MB-RL behaviour in those animals.
Future studies focusing on the neural signals may uncover the biological substrates of these
computational mechanisms.

Chapter 4
Value-based pupil responses in
non-human primates performing a
reinforcement learning task
4.1 Abstract
While interacting with the environment, animals learn to estimate the future values available
for different possible actions, and then choose accordingly. There is evidence that multiple,
partially separate, systems are involved, including model-based (MB) methods, for which
estimates are prospective, based on a learned characterization of the environment and its
affordances; and model-free (MF) methods, for which estimates are calculated from direct,
retrospective, experience of rewards, using a temporally sophisticated form of prediction
error. In a sequential decision task where both RL strategies were employed, we found
that pupil dilation at particular time points during performance of the task reflected key
factors associated with values and learning. At both pre- and post-choice epochs, pupil
diameter reflected the expected value of the action that was to be chosen. The pupil response
was best correlated with value estimates derived from a MB system; pupil diameter also
reflected further task-specific features of MB calculations. Finally, when feedback was
provided, pupil diameter reflected a reward prediction error signal. Overall, our data suggest
that pupillary responses encode several key elements of value-based reinforcement learning
processes.
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4.2 Introduction
In decision-making tasks in which subjects must make a sequence of choices in distinct
states of the world before gaining affectively important outcomes, prediction of future re-
wards plays a critical role in optimal choice. Reinforcement learning (RL) is concerned
with learning to make such predictions and thus appropriate choices (see chapter 1); it pro-
vides a foundational framework for understanding psychological and neural underpinnings
of decision-making (chapter 2). As already introduced in the previous chapters, there are
at least two different RL methods for making predictions. Model-based (MB) valuation
exploits a model of the structure of the environment, including how actions influence the
(typically stochastic) transitions among different states. By contrast, model-free (MF) meth-
ods are blind to the underlying structure of the environment and instead learn by creating
a temporally-sophisticated form of prediction error from sampled experience. It has been
shown that the choices made by humans (Daw et al., 2011) and other animals (see chapter 3)
typically exhibit characteristics of both MF and MB-RL strategies; the suggestion has been
made that their estimates are integrated according to a weighted combination. However,
much remains to be discovered about the systems and their combination.
Here, we consider whether pupil dilation might contribute to this evolving understand-
ing. Changes in pupil diameter have long been used as a marker of arousal, attention,
memory load, fear or novelty (Beatty, 1982; Bradshaw, 1967; Hess, 1972; Hess and Polt,
1964; Kahneman and Beatty, 1966). The pupil has been shown to dilate and/or constrict in
ways that reflect these cognitive operations. Dilation is under the control of several path-
ways, including noradrenergic and cholinergic neuromodulation, and indeed has been used
as a peripheral expression of the central activation of these substances (Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005; Samuels and Szabadi, 2008; Sara, 2009). More recently, an effort has been
made to link these pupil changes to modern theories of learning and decision-making (J.Yu
and Dayan, 2005; Schultz et al., 1997). Pupil metrics have been associated with computa-
tional factors that drive learning in unpredictable or volatile environments, like uncertainty
and learning rate adjustments (Nassar et al., 2012; O’Reilly et al., 2013; Preuschoff et al.,
2011; Silvetti et al., 2013a). Other motivational learning factors, such as the expected re-
ward, also seem to modulate pupil size (Gilzenrat et al., 2010; Kennerley and Wallis, 2009b;
O’Doherty et al., 2003; Satterthwaite et al., 2007; Varazzani et al., 2015); but this relation-
ship is controversial (Lavin et al., 2014; Preuschoff et al., 2011).
We therefore investigated pupil dynamics in two adult rhesus monkeys performing a
value-based decision task designed to detect simultaneous signals of both MF and MB-
4.3 Methods 97
RL approaches (Fig. 4.1). Several aspects of the task made it particularly suitable for
relating pupil diameter to some key components of reinforcement learning and decision
making. First, we could assess whether pupil diameter encoded the expected value even
before choices were made, and/or after those choices. Secondly, taking advantage of the
two different RL computations elicited by the task, we could investigate whether dilation
was more closely linked with MF or MB estimates. Finally, we could examine whether
pupil diameter was modulated by previous reward history, as in the form of a prediction
error. This would be expected if the pupil diameter reflected learning adjustments.
4.3 Methods
The data presented in this chapter comes from a further analysis of the data set shown in
chapter 3. Therefore, all information pertaining to Subjects and experimental apparatus,
Task: design and timeline, Choice behaviour and reaction time analysis, Computational
modelling, Model fitting procedures, and Model comparison and validation procedures are
discussed in detail in the Methods section of chapter 3. Information not particularly detailed
there and relevant for the present chapter, as well as specific methodological features related
to the present pupil data analysis is described.
Stimuli
All visual stimuli used were the same across sessions for both subjects, and were presented
at pre-determined degrees of visual angle on a 19-inch computer screen (800×600 screen
resolution and 60Hz video refresh rate) positioned 62 cm in front of the subjects eyes. A red
square (0.4◦ in width) in the centre position was used as fixation cue. Six decision option
pictures (5◦ in size) were chosen from the internet, reduced in size and modified through
a custom-made image processing algorithm to make the average luminance equivalent for
all. Similarly, the background colours used (grey, violet and brown) were measured with
a SpectraScan PR650 luminance meter (Micron Techniques Ltd.) and adjusted to obtain
equivalent values (one-way ANOVA: F(2, 9) = 0.66, p < 0.5417; overall mean of 54.2
cd/m2). Finally, three stimuli used as secondary reinforcers (5◦ in size) were generated as
different spatial combinations of the same number of dark pixels in a white background,
also to assure luminance equality across the three (although not equivalent to the remaining
stimuli used).
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Fig. 4.1 Two-stage decision task. (a) Timeline of events and epochs for analysis. Eye fix-
ation was required while a red fixation cue was shown (500/750 ms for C/J, respectively),
otherwise subjects could saccade freely and indicate their decision (dotted arrow as an ex-
ample) with a manual joystick movement. Once the second-stage choice had been made, the
nature of the outcome was revealed by a secondary reinforcer cue (here, the pause symbol
represents high outcome). Once the latter cue was removed and depending on the outcome
level, there could be an additional delay followed by reward delivery. The inter-trial interval
(ITI) was 1.5 s. Epochs for pupil analysis are marked along the timeline and each one is
represented by colour. (b) The state-transition structure (kept fixed throughout the experi-
ment). Each second-stage stimuli had an independent reward structure: the outcome level
(defined by the magnitude of the reward and the delay to its delivery) remained the same for
a minimum number of trials (a uniformly distributed pseudorandom integer between 5 and
9) and then, either stayed in the same level (with one-third probability) or changed randomly
to one of the other two possible outcome levels.
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Eye data acquisition and pupil data preprocessing.
Subjects were seated in a primate chair inside a silent and dark room with their heads fixed,
and facing the computer screen. Each subject’s eye position and pupil dilation was moni-
tored with an infrared eye tracking system having a sampling rate of 240 Hz (ISCAN ETL-
200). We used Monkeylogic software (http://www.monkeylogic.net/): to control the presen-
tation of stimuli and task contingencies; to generate timestamps of behaviourally-relevant
events; and to acquire as well as calibrate joystick and eye data (1000 Hz of analog data
acquisition).
Blinks were identified on the basis of pupil diameter as well as eye position and removed
through linear interpolation of values before and after each identified blink (interpolation
time window: from 30 ms before until 30 ms after each blink) using a custom-built code.
Blink-filtered pupil data were then low-pass filtered by applying a second-order Butterworth
filter with a normalized cut-off frequency of 3.75 Hz. To eliminate small day-by-day fluc-
tuations in tonic pupil diameter or position of eye recording equipment, pupil data were
z-scored in each session using the across-session overall mean and standard deviation.
Our pupil analyses focused on six different task epochs (each one coloured in Fig. 4.1a):
1. PreChoice1 epoch: from 900 ms before until 100 ms after first-stage pictures pre-
sentation;
2. Choice1 epoch: from 100 ms before until 700 ms after first-stage choice;
3. Transition epoch: from 100 ms before until 1500 ms after background colour changed
from first-stage (grey) to the respective state in second-stage (brown or violet);
4. PreChoice2 epoch: from 900 ms before until 100 ms after second-stage pictures
presentation; 5) Choice2: from 100 ms before until 700 ms after second-stage choice;
5. Choice2 epoch: from 100 ms before until 700 ms after second-stage choice;
6. Feedback epoch: from 100 ms before until 700 ms after the secondary reinforcer
picture presentation (i.e. when the upcoming outcome level is revealed).
It is important to note that PreChoice1 is not adjoining Choice1 and PreChoice2 is not
adjoining Choice2, with some time missing between each.The reason for this was because
during the actual decision period subjects saccade to see the stimuli location and this has an
impact on pupil metrics (due to changes in light between background and stimuli).
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During the task, in the absence of a fixation cue, the animal was free to look around.
If gaze strayed from the screen (defined as x or y positions > 15◦; nearest integer values
of the mean of both width and height screen limits), light levels would decrease, leading to
a marked increase in pupil size (Fig. 4.2). We therefore excluded trials in which subjects
looked off the screen for more than 50 ms during the analysed epochs (we initially approxi-
mated this value by inspecting the raw data, but then formally tested it; see Fig. 4.3). Figure
4.4 shows the proportions and timings of the trials excluded. Table 4.1 displays the trial
conditions of the excluded trials for the transition (proportion of trials excluded of 0.09 ±
0.03 for subject C and 0.39± 0.10 for subject J) and feedback (proportion of trials excluded
of 0.73 ± 0.08 for C and 0.14 ± 0.06 for J) epochs, the ones with more off-screen gazes.
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Fig. 4.2 Relationship between eye position (expressed in visual degrees away from zero)
and subsequent pupil size (z-scored based on within-session mean and standard devia-
tion) during all trials (from beginning to end of each trial) from all sessions. Off-screen
positions led to higher subsequent pupil size. For every recorded eye position, the aver-
age pupil size associated with the subsequent 250 milliseconds was stored as a value in the
square belonging to that particular eye position. Each square spanned 5 visual degrees along
both X and Y axes and the analysis covered eye positions ranging from -30 to +30 visual
degrees along both X and Y axes such that 144 squares (12 × 12) were obtained. The black
lines mark the off-screen limits we defined. The displayed color of each square is based on
the mean z-scored pupil diameter value obtained for that particular square. a) Subject C; b)
Subject J.
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a b
Fig. 4.3 Pupil dilation when gaze goes off-screen. The pupil dilated significantly more for
off-screen gazes lasting longer than 50 ms compared with an on-screen reference; whereas
no significant difference can be observed from the reference when the gaze was off-screen
for less than 50 ms. This threshold time was based on a careful initial exploratory inspection
of the data. The procedure to create this figure was as follows: for each off-screen trial, the
adjusted pupil dilation for 750 ms after the first moment when the gaze went off the screen
was recorded, with the adjustment being the subtraction of the mean of the dilation for
150 ms before this moment. A similar procedure was applied for on-screen trials, but the
starting point of the analysis was the average of the first off-screen time across sessions.
Pupil responses for the respective conditions were first averaged within session and then
averaged across sessions. Shaded areas display s.e.m.. a) Subject C; b) Subject J.
Table 4.1 Relevant trial conditions for the two epochs where off-screen gazes were most
frequently observed
Proportion of excluded trials
Epoch Trial condition Subject C Subject J
Transition
High outcome, common transition 0.11 (0.05) 0.55 (0.13)
High outcome, rare transition 0.03 (0.04) 0.31 (0.11)
Medium outcome, common transition 0.09 (0.05) 0.36 (0.12)
Medium outcome, rare transition 0.03 (0.03) 0.33 (0.12)
Low outcome, common transition 0.11 (0.05) 0.33 (0.10)
Low outcome, rare transition 0.05 (0.04) 0.27 (0.11)
Feedback
High outcome 0.81 (0.10) 0.12 (0.07)
Medium outcome 0.71 (0.12) 0.20 (0.10)
Low outcome 0.29 (0.11) 0.15 (0.08)
Results are mean (s.e.m) values across sessions.
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Fig. 4.4 Timings of the first off-screen gazes for each analysed epoch. Proportion of trials
still included in the analysis for: (a) pre-choice1 epoch; (b) choice1 epoch; (c) transition
epoch; (d) pre-choice2 epoch; (e) choice2 epoch; and (f) feedback epoch. Subject C in blue
and subject J in red.
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Pupil diameter analyses
Several multiple linear regression models were performed separately for each subject and
session to quantify predictors of pupil change at different epochs. For graphical purposes
they were fit as sliding regression analysis to the mean of z-scored pupil diameter during the
preceding 100 ms time-window, and then shifted in 1 ms steps until we had analysed the
entire epoch. We then displayed the across sessions mean (and s.e.m.) of the resultant time-
series of regression coefficients (β) for the regressors of interest. When assessing statistical
significance of the predictors from each regression, 200 ms non-overlapping time-windows
were used instead and the same model applied. Then, one-sample t-tests with Bonferroni
multiple comparison correction were performed for the null hypothesis that the mean of the
resultant regression coefficients differed significantly from zero.
Two types of predictors were used. One set comprised observable behavioural vari-
ables: ternary outcome level R or RewPic2t (low=1, medium=2, high=3); binary T tran-
sition (rare=1, common=0); C1 and C2 are first- and second-stage choices, respectively.
The other set of variables was derived from the best-fitting computational modelling (see
chapter 3), and comprised: Chosen1Qhyb and Unchosen1Qhyb, which are the Hybrid+
Q-values of the chosen and unchosen first-stage options, respectively; Chosen1Qm f and
Unchosen1Qm f , which are the MF-RL (S ARS A algorithm) Q-values of the chosen and
unchosen first-stage options, respectively; Chosen1Qmb and Unchosen1Qmb, which are
the MB-RL (Forward1 algorithm) Q-values of the chosen and unchosen first-stage op-
tions, respectively; Chosen2Q and Unchosen2Q, which are the (MB and MF) Q-values
of the chosen and unchosen second-stage options, respectively; RPE2 is the reward predic-
tion error at second-stage. Due to the high linear correlation between the Chosen1Qhyb
and Unchosen1Qhyb (mean r across sessions = 0.55/0.43 for C/J, all sessions with p <
0.05), we orthogonalised Unchosen1Qhyb with respect to Chosen1Qhyb for regression
analyses in which both variables were predictors. For similar reasons, we orthogonalised
Unchosen1Qmb with respect to Chosen1Qmb (mean r across sessions = 0.76/0.75 for C/J,
all sessions with p < 0.05). All these variables, when used as predictors in regression analy-
sis, were mean centered and continuous (and ternary) variables were also scaled by dividing
them by two standard deviations so that the magnitudes of regression coefficients could be
directly compared (Gelman, 2008). These adjustments were performed before the compu-
tation of the interaction terms. The error terms of the regression models are represented by
ε.
We built ten regression models. The first set tested the possibility that z-scored pupil
diameter (Pupil) at trial t encoded upcoming expected value at pre-choice1 (Eq. 4.1) and
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at pre-choice2 (Eq. 4.2). Forced first- and second-stage choice trials were excluded from
these two previous regression analyses, because animals did not know before options were
presented whether the choice would be a forced one. We examined pupil modulation by
expected value at the time of choice with two similar regressions applied at choice1 epoch
(Eq. 4.3) and choice2 epoch (Eq. 4.4).
PupilPrechoice1t =βRRt−1 + βT Tt−1 + βRT Rt−1 × Tt−1+
βChosen1QhybChosen1Qhybt + βUnchosen1QhybUnchosen1Qhybt + εt
(4.1)
PupilPrechoice2t =βRRt−1 + βT Tt + βRT Rt−1 × Tt+
βChosen2QChosen2Qt + βUnchosen2QUnchosen2Qt + εt
(4.2)
PupilChoice1t =βRRt−1 + βT Tt + βRT Rt−1 × Tt+
βChosen1QhybChosen1Qhybt + βUnchosen1QhybUnchosen1Qhybt + εt
(4.3)
PupilChoice2t =βRRt−1 + βT Tt + βRT Rt−1 × Tt+
βChosen2QChosen2Qt + βUnchosen2QUnchosen2Qt + εt
(4.4)
Next, two complementary multiple regressions were conducted to investigate whether
pupil changes reflected value estimates from MF-RL, MB-RL, or a combination of both.
In the first model, we aimed to directly compare MF and MB-RL expected values at pre-
choice1 epoch (Eq. 4.5). As we will see, this showed a preponderant influence of MB
values in predicting the pupil response. Therefore, in a second analysis, we tested the null
hypothesis that expected value coding in pupil was purely explained by this learning strat-
egy. For this, we created a regressor, Di f fChosenQmbQm f , defined at the same time points
as the ChosenQmb, using the partial derivative with respect to the MB/MF weighting pa-
rameter ω that captures how ChosenQmb would change if it had been computed according
to a different value of ω (i.e. ω = 0 for MF-RL). In this case, it is just the difference be-
tween ChosenQmb and ChosenQm f , and it characterises how pupil response would differ
if it were correlated with ChosenQm f or any weighted mixture of both learning strate-
gies. This approach was adopted to reduce the correlation between the regressors of interest
(ChosenQmb and ChosenQm f ). We then run the regression model (Eq. 4.6) and, if the
null hypothesis was true, then the effect of Di f fChosenQmbQm f on pupil dilation would
not differ significantly from zero (one sample two tailed t-test with Bonferroni correction
for multiple comparisons). For the same reasons as previously described, forced first-stage
choice trials were again not included in these two regressions.
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PupilPrechoice1t =βRRt−1 + βT Tt−1 + βRT Rt−1 × Tt−1+
βChosen1Qm f Chosen1Qm ft + βUnchosen1Qm f Unchosen1Qm ft+
βChosen1QmbChosen1Qmbt + βUnchosen1QmbUnchosen1Qmbt + εt
(4.5)
PupilPrechoice1t =βRRt−1 + βT Tt−1 + βRT Rt−1 × Tt−1+
+ βChosen1QmbChosen1Qmbt + βDi f fChosenQmbQm f Di f fChosenQmbQm ft
(4.6)
The next step was to confirm whether pupil changes reflected knowledge about the state-
transition structure, as well as the interaction between this and first-stage chosen and uncho-
sen values at transition epoch (Eq. 4.7).
PupilTransitiont =βT Tt+
βChosen1QmbChosen1Qmbt + βUnchosen1QmbUnchosen1Qmbt+
βChosen1Qmb×TChosen1Qmbt × Tt+
βUnchosen1Qmb×T Unchosen1Qmbt × Tt + εt
(4.7)
As a non-parametric test of the effect of learning about rewards, we regressed pupil
diameter at feedback against the upcoming reward, and also the previous reward history
of the current second-stage choice. At trial t, a given second-stage choice C2t will have
its RewPic2t or upcoming outcome level (same as R variable but renamed here for con-
sistency with the other predictors), its most-recent, Lag1RewPic2t, second-most recent,
Lag2RewPic2t, and third-most recent, Lag3RewPic2t, rewards obtained with that choice
(zero was assumed for lag variables that were associated with no observation). This regres-
sion can be described as (Eq. 4.8).
PupilFeedbackt =βRewPic2RewPic2t + βLag1RewPic2Lag1RewPic2t + βLag2RewPic2Lag2RewPic2t
βLag3RewPic2Lag3RewPic2t + βT Tt + εt
(4.8)
The prediction error at this point in a trial would be the difference between the current
reward and a weighted sum of previous rewards. As a non-parametric test of this, we ex-
amined the values of the βRewPic2, βLag1RewPic2, βLag2RewPic2 and βLag3RewPic2 obtained from this
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regression model (Eq. 4.8). Some of these predictors were different from zero before the
moment the upcoming reward was known to the subject, and since we were interested in the
change consequent on the new information from the feedback signal, we baseline corrected
each predictor β time-series (by subtracting the mean β values during the first 200 ms of the
epoch). The last step of this analysis, was to calculate the mean values (and s.e.m) across
sessions of these baseline corrected β coefficients from the moment the upcoming reward
coding in the pupil started (approximated, by inspection of the results, to 400ms after the
secondary reinforcer onset in both subjects) until the end of the feedback epoch.
A more parametric examination of the prediction error comes from looking at the re-
lationship between pupil diameter and the two components R and Chosen2Q which are
subtracted to form RPE2 (Eq. 4.9). A pattern expected for a reward prediction error signal
at feedback epoch would be: a positive correlation between pupil diameter and R; and neg-
ative correlation between pupil diameter and Chosen2Q. A contrast of parameter estimates
was also used to examine the influence on pupil size of the difference between the expected
value of the second-stage choice and the value of the outcome that was actually received
(that is, [1 -1] contrast on R and Chosen2Q values, i.e., testing the difference between both
variables regression coefficients).
PupilFeedbackt =βRRt + βChosen2QChosen2Qt + βT Tt + εt (4.9)
Finally, we also correlated pupil dynamics at feedback epoch directly with the RPE2
derived by the computational model (Eq. 4.10).
Pupilt =βRPE2RPE2t + βT Tt + εt (4.10)
Importantly, for each of the regressions, we considered an additional model which also
included two further control predictors: xpost and ypost, corresponding to the average ab-
solute x and y eye position at trial t for the analysed time-window, respectively. This acted
as a control for the potential confounding effect of eye position, in addition to excluding
trials with off-scree gaze. The results of the original model were reported, unless significant
differences were noted with this controlling measure.
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Choice behaviour and computational modelling
Subjects solved a two-stage decision task (Fig. 4.1). The task and the analysis of the be-
haviour are described in detail in chapter 3; we repeat just the details necessary for character-
izing the pupil response. In the task, two sequential choices between isoluminant stimulus
pairs had to be made before subjects received a reward. A grey background represented
the first-stage state and each choice was between two options presented as pictures. Each
of these first-stage choices could lead to either a common (70% transition probability) or
rare (30% transition probability) second-stage state, represented by different isoluminant
background colours (brown and violet). In the second-stage, another two-option choice
between pictures was required, and it was reinforced according to one of three different
levels of reward (high, medium or low outcomes). Subjects then returned to the first-stage
choice following an inter-trial interval. Importantly, to encourage learning, the outcome
level of each second-stage option remained constant for five to nine trials and subsequently
switched with a probability of two-thirds to one of the other two possible outcomes.
As analysed in detail in chapter 3, subjects exhibited a hybrid mixture of MB and MF
control. MB control was relatively dominant, but not to the complete exclusion of MF in-
fluence, with the mean value of the parameter MF= 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1 =MB governing the relative
weighting being near 0.9. Here, we used the model to quantify the various components of
choice, such as expected values associated with the MB and MF components of the best-
fitting hybrid accounts and outcome prediction errors, and regressed these against changes
in pupil diameter.
Expected value coding in the pupil
A key characteristic of the task is that subjects can start planning aspects of their first-
and second-stage decisions before the options were actually presented (albeit not the actual
motor actions required). For the first-stage choice, the decision to switch or repeat the
previous selection could be made from the moment the feedback at the previous trial was
provided. For second-stage choice, subjects could start planning their decision as soon as the
second-stage state was known. Thus, given evidence that pupil diameter encodes features
before (de Gee et al., 2014; Fiedler and Glöckner, 2012) as well as after (Einhauser et al.,
2010; Einhäuser et al., 2008) choices are made, we used multiple linear regression to assess
the extent to which trial-wise estimates of first-stage (Fig. 4.5a-b; see Eq. 4.1) as well as
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second-stage (Fig. 4.5c-d; see Eq. 4.2) upcoming chosen and unchosen action-values (Q-
values), derived from the best fitting Hybrid+ model, predicted pupil response at epochs
pre-choice1 and pre-choice2, respectively (Fig. 4.1 to see epochs along the timeline). In
this regression, we controlled for the most recent reward, the most recent transition and the
interaction between the two. We found that the value of the choice about to be made, at both
decision stages, significantly increased pupil diameter before the options were presented.
The value of the option not chosen was also associated with significant pupil dilation, but to
a much lesser degree (Fig. 4.5).
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Fig. 4.5 Pupil diameter encodes expected value of upcoming choices. Time courses of
the mean across sessions (shaded regions represent s.e.m.) for the effects of first-stage (a-
b) and second-stage (c-d) chosen as well as unchosen Q-values derived by the Hybrid+
model regressed on z-scored pupil size at pre-choice1 and pre-choice2 epochs, respectively
(controlling for recent reward, recent transition and the interaction between the two; see Eq.
4.1 and Eq. 4.2 in Methods for details). Asterisks indicate 200 ms time bins in which the
coefficients differed significantly from zero (two tailed t-test with Bonferroni correction for
multiple comparisons).
We then used a similar strategy to examine the relationship between pupil diameter and
expected values at the time of first-stage (Fig. 4.6a-b; see Eq. 4.3) and second-stage (Fig.
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4.6c-d; see Eq. 4.4) choices. It is important to note that pre-choice (Fig. 4.5) and choice
(Fig. 4.6) epochs are non-contiguous, as they are separated by times at which the subjects
made saccades to look at the pictures associated with the choices. We observed that the pupil
response started to encode the expected chosen value for first- and second-stage positively
shortly after the choice was made, and this remained relatively constant throughout the
remaining part of the epoch. In regard to the value of the unchosen option, there was a
tendency for an initial weak positive effect to be lost after the decision was made. Overall,
these findings suggest that pupil size reflected the expected value of the choice, both before
and after it is made.
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Fig. 4.6 Pupil diameter encodes expected chosen value at choice time. Time courses of
the mean across sessions (shaded regions represent s.e.m.) for the effects of first-stage (a-b)
and second-stage (c-d) chosen as well as unchosen Q-values derived by the Hybrid+ model
regressed on z-scored pupil size at choice1 and choice2 epochs, respectively (controlling for
most recent reward, most recent transition and the interaction of both; see Eq. 4.3 and Eq.
4.4 in Methods for details). Asterisks indicate 200 ms time bins in which the coefficients
differed significantly from zero (two tailed t-test with Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons).
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Pupil and model-based reinforcement learning
We next investigated whether the expected value coding in pupil dilation was related to both
MF and MB values. These only differ for the first stage choice, so we confined our analysis
to the pre-choice1 epoch. We eschewed the choice1 epoch because after the first-stage
choice, the signal could be contaminated by the upcoming second-stage chosen value. We
constructed two regression models. The first included as predictors of interest chosen MF
and MB Q-values, as well as unchosen MF and MB Q-values (controlling for the previous
reward, the previous transition and the interaction between the two; see Eq. 4.5). The results
of this analysis showed a strong significant positive effect of chosen MB Q-values on pupil
size, but no correlation with unchosen or MF Q-values (Fig. 4.7). This finding suggests
that the previously observed expected value coding in the pupil (Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6),
predominantly reflected MB rather than MF value computations.
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Fig. 4.7 The relationship between pupil response and model-free and model-based
value estimates. Time courses of the mean across sessions (shaded regions rep-
resent s.e.m.) for the effects of trial-wise estimates of first-stage chosen/unchosen
model-free (Chosen1Qmf/Unchosen1Qmf) as well as chosen/unchosen model-based (Cho-
sen1Qmb/Unchosen1Qmb) Q-values derived by the Hybrid+ model regressed on z-scored
pupil size at pre-choice1 epoch (controlling for previous reward, previous transition and the
interaction between the two; see Eq. 4.5 in Methods for details). Asterisks indicate 200
ms time bins in which the coefficients differed significantly from zero (two tailed t-test with
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons).
To examine this observation further, we built a second regression model comprised by
two regressors of interest: the chosen MB Q-values and the difference between the chosen
MF and MB Q-values (controlling for also previous reward, current transition and the inter-
action of these two variables; see Eq. 4.6). We used this second approach in addition to the
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previous model (where valuations of both learning strategies were included) to make sure
potential multicolinearity issues due to correlations between MF and MB value estimates
are not interfering with our regression estimates. Furthermore, it is also a way of testing the
null hypothesis that the previously seen chosen value coding in the pupil was purely MB.
If the null hypothesis was true, then the pupil signal would be accounted for entirely by the
trial-by-trial chosen MB Q-values, and the difference regressor should not be significantly
positive or negative. By contrast, if the null hypothesis is falsified, it means that the pupil
response was better characterized, on average, by also having some MF valuation (i.e., a
mixed MF and MB pupil signal). We found that the modulation in pupil diameter of both
subjects was, overall, not better characterised when MF valuation was also taken into ac-
count (non-significant effect of the difference regressor coefficient on Bonferroni-corrected
one-sample t-tests for the entire epoch in subject C and from 500 ms before to 100ms before
first-stage stimuli presentation in subject J; see Fig. 4.8).
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Fig. 4.8 The expected value coding in pupil size is explained by pure model-based pre-
dictions. Time courses of the mean across sessions (shaded regions represent s.e.m.) for
the effect, on pupil size at pre-choice1 epoch, of trial-wise estimates of first-stage chosen
model-based Q-values (Chosen1Qmb) as well as a difference regressor (DiffChosenQm-
bQmf) derived by subtracting to Chosen1Qmb the first-stage chosen model-free values (see
Eq. 4.6 in Methods for details). Asterisks indicate 200 ms time bins in which the co-
efficients differed significantly from zero (two tailed t-test with Bonferroni correction for
multiple comparisons).
These regressions suggest that pupil diameter reflected valuations computed by pure
MB-RL methods. To investigate this hypothesis further, we related pupil metrics with other
features linked to MB computations. A distinctive signature of MB-RL is the combined
effect of knowledge about state transitions and observations of changes to rewards. We
therefore compared pupil dynamics during the transition epoch as a function of the tran-
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sition type on the current trial (Fig. 4.9a-b). In both subjects, pupil size increased to a
significantly greater degree following a common than a rare transition. Given that the pupil
encoded the MB value of the chosen option, one could interpret this pupil dilation follow-
ing a common transition as a high-arousal state, because it is an opportunity to pursue the
expected chosen outcome (given the first-stage choice pattern shown by both subjects, the
expected outcome corresponds to the highest reward possible). Similarly, when the vicis-
situde of a rare transition interfered with the reward expectation (i.e. the high reward) one
could expect some disappointment or task disengagement, and hence a smaller increase in
pupil size (Chiew and Braver, 2013; Hess and Polt, 1964).
To assess the possibility that the modulation of the pupil diameter according to transition
type also took into account the expected values, we built a regression model in which pupil
dilation after the transition could be accounted for by the following explanatory variables:
transition (coded rare=1 and common=0), chosen and unchosen first-stage MB Q-values,
and the interaction terms, namely first-stage chosen MB Q-values × transition and first-
stage unchosen MB Q-values × transition (see Eq. 4.7 ). The last two are the regressors
of interest: the higher the value of the first-stage choice the more disappointment a rare
transition would cause, and the less pupil dilation would be expected (i.e., a negative chosen
MB Q-value × transition effect is observed); on the other hand, a high-arousal state and
substantial pupil dilation would be expected if the value of the unchosen first-stage option
is high (such as when errors in first-stage choices are made) when a rare transition occurs
(i.e., a positive unchosen MB Q-value × transition effect occurs), as the subject still has an
opportunity to obtain a valuable outcome. Consistent with our hypothesis, we found in both
subjects a significant negative chosen MB Q-value× transition effect, as well as a significant
positive unchosen MB Q-value × transition effect once the transition was revealed (Fig.
4.9c-d). Furthermore, it is important to note that the main effect of transition remained
significant even after adding the MB-RL Q-values and corresponding interaction terms.
As a whole, the above evidence is consistent with the pupil size reflecting reward ×
transition knowledge, or MB-RL correlates, as well as information about the state-transition
consequences in the expected value.
Pupil encoded a reward prediction error at feedback
The final epoch of critical interest is after the subject knows what level of reward will be
provided – indicated by the secondary reinforcer picture. The pupil started to increase in
diameter 300-400ms after this picture was presented (Fig. 4.10). When we compared pupil
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Fig. 4.9 Pupil size at transition epoch reflected knowledge about the state-transition
structure as well as its impact on expected value. (a-b) Time course of z-scored pupil
diameter mean across sessions (shaded regions represent s.e.m.), aligned to transition (i.e.
change in the background colour) and sorted by common and rare trials. The horizontal
colour bar represents the mean t-statistic for a test that the transition coefficient (coded
rare=1 and common=0) is zero on a multiple regression that also included as predictors
the model-based first-stage chosen (Chosen1Qmb) and unchosen (Unchosen1Qmb) action-
values as well as their interaction with transition (see Eq. 4.7 in Methods for details). (c-d)
Time courses of the mean across sessions (shaded regions represent s.e.m.) for the effects of
the regression interaction terms Chosen1Qmb x Rare transition and Unchosen1Qmb x Rare
transition are shown in. Asterisks indicate 200ms time bins in which coefficients differed
significantly from zero (two tailed t-test with Bonferroni correction for multiple compar-
isons).
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response of both subjects across the three different outcome levels, we found that expecta-
tion of higher reward elicited a significantly stronger pupil dilation (Bonferroni-corrected
one-sample t-tests).
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Fig. 4.10 Pupil dilation as a function of the upcoming reward. Time course of z-scored
pupil diameter mean across sessions (shaded regions represent s.e.m.), aligned to the presen-
tation of the secondary reinforcer cue and sorted by outcome level. The horizontal colour
bar represents the mean t-statistic for a test that the outcome level coefficient is zero in a
multiple regression on pupil at feedback epoch (also controlling for transition, the outcome
level × transition interaction term, as well as chosen and unchosen second-stage Q-values).
However, also noticeable in Fig. 4.10, is the much higher pupil diameter for the big
reward condition even before the secondary reinforcer is presented, consistent with the ex-
pected value coding previously found. The reward structure of our task included sequences
of a few trials with similar reward levels, making it possible for subjects to anticipate the
upcoming reward at feedback as a function of past reward experience. This normally hap-
pened when the subject discovered a high reward second-stage option and, taking advantage
of its knowledge about the task’s structure, subsequently exploited the appropriate first-stage
choice. However, if a rare transition had occurred on that trial, this expectation should no
longer be supported. Therefore, we performed the same analyses but separating common
from rare trial conditions (Fig. 4.11). Consistent with our hypothesis, the anticipatory sig-
nal prior to secondary reinforcer onset was only present if a high outcome was received
following a common transition.
For the pupil diameter to reflect expectation of reward, it must show evidence of learning
from experience. To test this, we not only considered the effect of the current outcome level
on pupil at feedback epoch, as before, but also extended as possible predictors the three most
recent rewards obtained with the current second-stage choice. In contrast to the prominent
4.4 Results 115
a b
Subject J
Time from secondary reinforcer (in ms)
-100 100 300 500 700
Pu
pi
l d
ia
m
et
er
 (z
-s
co
re
)
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1 High outcome (Common)
High outcome (Rare)
Medium outcome (Common)
Medium outcome (Rare)
Low outcome (Common)
Low outcome (Rare)
Subject C
Time from secondary reinforcer (in ms)
-100 100 300 500 700
Pu
pi
l d
ia
m
et
er
 (z
-s
co
re
)
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1 High outcome (Common)
High outcome (Rare)
Medium outcome (Common)
Medium outcome (Rare)
Low outcome (Common)
Low outcome (Rare)
- Feedback epoch - - Feedback epoch -
Fig. 4.11 Pupil dilation as a function of the upcoming reward and transition. Time
course of z-scored pupil diameter mean across sessions (shaded regions represent s.e.m.),
aligned to the presentation of the secondary reinforcer cue and sorted by outcome level and
transition type on the trial.
positive effect of upcoming reward, the pupil coding for the three preceding outcomes with
the same second-stage choice became significantly less positive once the reward level was
made known to the subjects (Fig. 4.12a-b; see also Eq. 4.8). In fact, the observed pattern of
negative reward weights decaying gradually with trials into the past (Fig. 4.12c), resembled
the quantitative reward prediction error encoded by midbrain dopamine neurons (Bayer and
Glimcher, 2005).
In order to test this more quantitatively, we regressed the pupil response at feedback
against the inputs for the second-stage reward prediction error computation: the expected
second-stage chosen Q-value and the outcome level actually received (controlling for tran-
sition type). The feedback pupil signal revealed hallmarks of a reward prediction error (Fig.
4.13; see Eq. 4.9) -– an initial positive coding of the second-stage choice value expectation,
and a subsequent encoding of the reward outcome. Moreover, we also observed a significant
difference between both regression coefficients for the expected value of the second-stage
choice and the value of the outcome that was actually received (contrast Outcome level -
Chosen2Q in Fig. 4.13).
Finally, we directly regressed pupil size at feedback against the computationally derived
reward prediction error at the second-stage choice (controlling for transition type as well as
for outcome level and expected value of second-stage choice; the two latter regressors were
orthogonalised in respect to the second-stage reward prediction error) and also found the
expected positive encoding (Fig. 4.14; see Eq. 4.10).
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Fig. 4.12 Pupil changes at feedback epoch encoded the difference between the current
reward and a weighted average of previous rewards. (a-b) Time courses of the mean
across sessions (shaded regions represent s.e.m.) for the effects of the upcoming (Rew-
Pic2), the most-recent (Lag1RewPic2), the second-most-recent (Lag2RewPic2) and the
third-most-recent (Lag3RewPic2) reward experienced with the current second-stage choice
regressed on z-scored pupil size at feedback epoch (controlling for transition type; see Eq.
4.8 in Methods for details). Asterisks indicate 200 ms time bins in which the coefficients
differed significantly from zero (two tailed t-test with Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons). The results in (c) correspond to the mean (error bars depict s.e.m) value of
the RewPic2(t), Lag1RewPic2(t-1), Lag2RewPic2(t-2) and Lag3RewPic2(t-3) baseline ad-
justed regression coefficients (the first 200 ms mean served as baseline) for the period of
400 to 700 ms of the feedback epoch.
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Fig. 4.13 Pupil size correlated with the inputs for the second-stage reward prediction
error computation. Time courses of the mean across sessions (shaded regions represent
s.e.m.) for the effects of the outcome level (Outcome level), second-stage chosen Q-value
(Chosen2Q) and the contrast (Outcome level - Chosen2Q) regressed on z-scored pupil size
at feedback epoch (controlling for transition type; see Eq. 4.9 in Methods for details).
Asterisks indicate 200ms time bins in which the coefficients differed significantly from zero
(two tailed t-test with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons).
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Fig. 4.14 Pupil size encoded second-stage reward prediction error. Time courses of the
mean across sessions (shaded regions represent s.e.m.) for the effect of the computation-
ally derived second-stage reward prediction error (RPE2) regressed on z-scored pupil size
at feedback epoch (controlling for transition type; see Eq. 4.10 in Methods for details). As-
terisks indicate 200 ms time bins in which the coefficients differed significantly from zero
(one tailed t-test with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons).
In conclusion, outcome pupil data reflected the difference between the current reward
and a weighted average of previous rewards, consistent with a reward prediction error signal
defined by RL theory.
4.5 Discussion
We investigated pupil responses while two non-human primates performed a sequential de-
cision task believed to induce trial-by-trial adjustments in choice that combine both MF and
MB-RL control. Our results establish an association between pupil signals and key compo-
nents of RL at different moments of the task. First, pupil diameter tracked the expected value
of choices at both pre- and post-decision moments. Second, these value-related pupil mod-
ulations reflected MB-RL computations, as they revealed knowledge of the state-transition
structure as well as the impact of this information on upcoming reward expectations. Fi-
nally, pupil changes at feedback were consistent with the second-stage reward prediction
error signal crucial for value updating.
Effective decision-making requires that the values of possible choices are assessed and
upated as they change. It has previously been reported that pupil dilation tracks expected
reward; however, those studies did not formally address instrumental learning (Kennerley
and Wallis, 2009b; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Varazzani et al., 2015), used indirect measures
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of expected value (Gilzenrat et al., 2010) or reported interactions with other variables such
as uncertainty (Nassar et al., 2012; Satterthwaite et al., 2007). In fact, this latter association
has lead some authors to reject what they call the conjecture of expected reward coding
in pupil diameter altogether (Lavin et al., 2014; Preuschoff et al., 2011). Even though our
task included some non-stationary elements, we observed consistent choice behaviour that
allowed us to establish quantitative links between pupil diameter and trial-by-trial value
estimates produced by an RL model, with uncertainty being only a minor factor.
Our data duly suggested that pupil diameter encoded expected chosen values, at different
stages and moments of the decision process. There was also a weak, yet significant, effect
of the unchosen value as the subject got closer in time to the choice epoch, but that was
lost once the decision was made. Some subtleties of our pupil dynamics deserve discussion.
The chosen value effect on pupil size remained prominent throughout the pre-choice epochs,
even during eye fixation (given the expected pupil constriction with eye accommodation
while attempting fixation, any significant effect here is noteworthy). On a previous study,
pupil metrics were split into relative size changes and overall average diameter (Nassar
et al., 2012), as measures of the different phasic and tonic pupil-linked neuromodulatory
activity (Usher et al., 1999), respectively. On that account, one could interpret the sustained
correlation between expected value and pupil observed during both pre-choice epochs as
a motivational arousal effect on performance, due to a tonic locus coeruleus (LC) activity
and norepinephrine (NE) release (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; Bouret and Sara, 2005;
Usher et al., 1999). A candidate area for the modulation of such effect is the dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex, a brain region not only known to be involved in expected value coding
(Shenhav et al., 2013) and pupil dilation (Critchley et al., 2005; Ebitz and Platt, 2015), but
also hypothesized to modulate the firing pattern of the LC (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005).
The task was designed to elicit both MF and MB RL, allowing us to examine whether the
pupil signal was preferentially modulated by one of the two. Consistent with the dominant
influence of MB-RL in choice, we found that the pupil response before first-stage choice
was better correlated with the computationally-derived MB value estimates. Despite the
novelty of the finding, we were more surprised to see that the same pupil changes were not
better explained when MF-RL valuation was also taken into account.
Motivated by this, we tested and, indeed, found that pupil response varied with the type
of state-transition, once again, in favour of the pupil signal being a MB correlate. This
particular difference is strong evidence for the effect of value rather than unexpectedness
or uncertainty in our task. This is because a rare trial, as a low probability event given
the structure of the environment, would have been a surprise, and so, under those notions,
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would have been expected to have elicited more pupil dilation (Nassar et al., 2012; O’Reilly
et al., 2013; Preuschoff et al., 2011). Instead, we observed less pupil dilation in rare trials.
Perhaps consistent with this, a recent study into the effects of surprise and model change
also found a similar late (latencies of around 700-1200 ms in both) decrease in pupil size
that covaried with the need to adjust internal representations (O’Reilly et al., 2013).
Similarly, in our task, observing the less expected background colour (requiring sensory
processing, and hence time), led to an expected change in the inference about the upcom-
ing reward (Dayan, 2012b; J.Yu and Dayan, 2005). Further evidence for this came in the
interaction between transition and expected value: in rare trials, the higher the value of
the chosen first-stage option, the more the pupil constricted. This high value would have
been supported by the now unavailable, high probability, second-stage state. Conversely,
the higher the value of the unchosen first-stage option, the more the pupil dilated. This high
value would have been supported by the now available, low probability, second-stage state.
The independent effects on pupil size observed with transition as well as expected value
interaction with transition, also allude to links between sensory attention and reward (Got-
tlieb and Balan, 2010). One possibility for such pupil modulation is the contribution of the
cholinergic system (J.Yu and Dayan, 2005), given its role in fast enhancement of visual per-
ception and cortical modulation (Pinto et al., 2013), its phasic response after the detection
of cues which change the circumstances of the upcoming reward (Parikh et al., 2007) and
its effect in constricting the pupil diameter (Little et al., 1998).
Finally, we considered how current and previous rewards obtained with the same second-
stage choice influenced the pupil. While we observed a positive effect of the upcoming
reward, the coding of outcomes obtained on previous trials was negative and decayed grad-
ually with increasing trial lags. Such coding of current and previous rewards was reminis-
cent of the dopamine reward prediction error (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Schultz et al.,
1997), suggesting possible interneuromodulatory interactions between the dopaminergic
circuit and the pupil control systems (Dayan, 2012b; Weinshenker and Schroeder, 2007).
While an earlier study pointed to a relationship between pupil size and the learning effects
of uncertainty (Nassar et al., 2012), our data thus pointed to the coding of another key com-
putational element that drives learning – the reward prediction error.
Although we observed that the correlates of pupil dilation around the first-stage choice
were MB rather than MF, it is not possible to draw any conclusion about the second stage.
MB and MF values and prediction errors are essentially the same at the second stage –
both follow the same Rescorla-Wagner rule. Thus, although the prediction error is often
considered to be MF, we cannot determine whether the pupil had access to both learning
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systems just at different times points in the task, or whether it reflected the second-stage
MB error signal, and so was always reporting MB-RL.
In conclusion, we found that key elements of RL computations in an adaptive decision-
making task were encoded in pupil responses at different time points in the task. The study
reinforced the utility of pupillometry as a non-invasive method to track task-induced vari-
ables dynamically. However, that the pupil diameter reflected multitudinous signals in the
task, which were likely to be calculated and reported by different brain areas, implies one
should be cautious in the conclusions drawn from dilation alone.
Chapter 5
Model-free and model-based
reinforcement learning in prefrontal
cortex and striatal neurons
5.1 Abstract
Growing evidence supports the idea that animals use model-free (MF) and model-based
(MB) reinforcement learning (RL) valuations to make choices. Despite the known involve-
ment of multiple and partially separate cortico-subcortical circuits, the underlying mech-
anisms of the interaction between the strategies remain unknown. Therefore, we recorded
single-neuron activity from three prefrontal areas (frontal pole, anterior cingulate cortex and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and two dorsal striatal regions (caudate and putamen) while
two subjects performed a sequential decision task in which both RL strategies were em-
ployed. Here we show neural representations at different time points of key components
of MF and MB valuation, such as reward history, state-transition knowledge and choice
information. Taking advantage of the two different RL values elicited in the task, we also
investigated whether single-neuron activity at the time of choice correlated with MF, MB
or both action-value signals. Finally, we related the firing rate of neurons in each recorded
population to prediction error signals at two different moments of the task. Prediction errors
are essential in updating value expectations or for global reinforcement. Taken together, our
finding extends the computational and algorithmic work from previous chapters to provide
insight as to how the brain implements MF and MB RL strategies to optimise behaviour.
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5.2 Introduction
Humans and other animals seem to use two major competing and cooperating reinforce-
ment learning (RL) systems for behavioural control in sequential decision-making: a goal-
directed or model-based (MB) and an habitual or model-free (MF). As explained in detail
in chapter 1, both methods rely on previous experience and converge to the same behaviour
given enough experience, but they differ as to how this information is used to infer the
values of choices. MB-RL computes prospective estimates by integrating reward informa-
tion with knowledge about the state-transition function, which specifies how the state of the
world evolves probabilistically given particular actions. As a less flexible but simpler ap-
proach, MF-RL learns without any model of the environment just by bootstrapping sampled
experience and taking changes in expectations as indications of errors in its cached value
predictions. Either due to computational constraints or a speed-accuracy trade-off, it is ad-
vantageous for learning agents to have both strategies and take advantage of each according
to the required task.
The neural substrates for these different reward-learning systems involve complex con-
nections between a midbrain-striatal-prefrontal network, which we discussed extensively in
chapter 2. The phasic activity of midbrain dopaminergic neurons is known to report a reward
prediction error that could drive the updating of MF-RL predictions (Schultz et al., 1997).
Evidence from either lesion-based studies in animals or functional neuroimaging techniques
in humans, suggests an involvement of the primate putamen or more posterolateral striatum
(or dorsolateral striatum in rodents) also in MF learning, whereas more anterior regions of
the caudate (or dorsomedial striatum in rodents) and the prefrontal cortex has been impli-
cated in MB-RL (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2009; Daw and Dayan, 2014; Daw et al., 2005;
Hampton et al., 2006). Furthermore, neural representations of action-values, which map
state-action pairs into expected returns, are essential for the implementation of action selec-
tion in RL theory. Neurons throughout dorsal regions of the primate striatum were found
to encode cached action-values as computed by MR-RL methods and useful in guiding the
choice process (Lau and Glimcher, 2008; Samejima et al., 2005). However, it is important
to note that although these neural representations of action-values were considered to be
learned using MF methods, the tasks did not elicit differences between MF and MB value
computations. Thus, it is not possible to draw any conclusion whether these neurons are
actually just MF action-value neurons. In any case, there is no similar reports of neuronal
representations for MB action-values – with the closest perhaps being the hippocampal fir-
ing patterns consistent with forward search of paths ahead of the animal’s current location
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(Johnson and Redish, 2007). Finally, very few studies, and none not involving human sub-
jects, have focused on detecting simultaneous neuronal signals of both learning strategies
(Daw et al., 2011; Gershman et al., 2014).
Despite the evidence of these two methods for learning and calculating values, several
important questions remain unanswered: 1) is there single-neuron evidence of MB-RL as
formally proposed in RL theory; 2) how do the two forms of instrumental control interact
and determine action choice; 3) how do these signals evolve through the decision-making
process? Teasing these various questions apart, and understanding the neural properties and
substrates shared or unique to each learning strategy is critical to move modern learning
theory forward. Moreover, this knowledge could benefit the application of these RL models
to psychiatric and neurological disorders (Maia and Frank, 2011).
To answer these open questions, two rhesus monkeys were trained to perform a two-
stage decision task (Fig. 5.1), while single-neuron data was recorded simultaneously from
three prefrontal regions (frontal pole, FP; dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, ACC; dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, DLPFC) and from two dorsal striatal areas (caudate and putamen). The
simultaneous recordings from different brain regions allowed us to examine whether MF
and MB-RL computations are specific or not to different areas, whereas the behavioural
paradigm used provided a novel insight into the RL problem as it induced trial-by-trial
adjustments in choice that combined both learning strategies.
Although already introduced in previous chapters (chapter 3 and chapter 4), a brief de-
scription of the task is provided for general guidance. Two sequential binary choices had to
be made before subjects received a reward. A grey background represented the first-stage
state and each choice was between two options presented as pictures. Each of these first-
stage choices could lead to either a common (70% transition probability) or rare (30% tran-
sition probability) second-stage state, represented by different background colours (brown
and violet). In the second-stage, another two-option choice between pictures was required
and it was reinforced according to three different levels of reward (high, medium or low
outcomes). Subjects then returned to the first-stage choice following an inter-trial interval.
Importantly, to encourage learning, the outcome level of each second-stage option remained
constant for five to nine trials and subsequently switched with probability 2/3 to one of the
other two possible outcomes.
In chapter 3 we reported in detail the behavioural evidence that, just like humans (Daw
et al., 2011), our subjects solved the two-stage decision task using a hybrid mixture of MB
and MF control. In both subjects, reward history (relevant for both learning strategies)
and state-transition knowledge (used in MB computations) had a significant impact on be-
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Fig. 5.1 Two-stage decision task. a) Timeline of events. Eye fixation was required while a
red fixation cue was shown, otherwise subjects could saccade freely and indicate their deci-
sion (arrow as an example) with a manual joystick movement. Once the second-stage choice
had been made, the nature of the outcome was revealed by a secondary reinforcer cue (here,
the pause symbol represents high outcome). Once the latter cue was off the screen, there
was a fixed 500 ms delay and the possibility of a further delay (for both medium and low
outcomes) before juice was provided (for both high and medium outcomes). The inter-trial
interval (ITI) was 1.5s. Epochs for neural analysis are marked along the timeline and each
one is represented by colour. b) The state-transition matrix (kept fixed throughout the ex-
periment). Each second-stage stimuli had an independent reward structure (with outcomes
being defined by the magnitude of the reward and the delay to its delivery) according to a
form of random walk sampled afresh on each session. Task design influenced by Daw et al.
(2011).
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haviour, with their influence decaying exponentially as a function of trials into the past.
Here we show the neuronal correlates in prefrontal cortex and striatum of variables such as
reward, state-transition and first-stage choice crucial RL computations in this behavioural
paradigm. These factors were found either independently or in a combined way throughout
all the regions from which we recorded, but some areas exhibited specific functional seg-
regation. We then report single-neuron representations within each brain area of MF and
MB action-values, which control action selection. Finally, we focus on outcome updating
and prediction error signals known to guide reward learning. This way, we aimed to dissect
how the several ingredients of MF and MB-RL are combined and work together in the brain
to generate the choice behaviour we observed. Overall, our neurophysiological evidence
unifies findings from several other studies suggesting the idea of parallel MF and MB-RL
systems. However, the thoroughly intertwined neuronal architecture we found also presents
new challenges.
5.3 Materials and Methods
The data presented in this chapter comes from a further analysis of the data set shown in
chapter 3. Therefore, all information pertaining to Subjects and experimental apparatus,
Task: design and timeline, Choice behaviour and reaction time analysis, Computational
modelling, Model fitting procedures, and Model comparison and validation procedures are
discussed in detail in the Methods section of chapter 3. Specific methodological features
related to the present neuronal data analysis is described.
Neurophysiological Procedures
Surgical procedures were performed using aseptic techniques and under general anaesthesia.
Each monkey was implanted with a custom-designed titanium head holder. Following the
behavioural training, two recording chambers (C: in PEEK; J: in titanium) were stereotacti-
cally (Kopf Instruments, Tujunga, USA) implanted on each animal: one over the left hemi-
sphere at AP = 38(C)/37(J) mm, ML = 20.2(C)/18.1(J) mm (AP, anterior-posterior; ML,
medio-lateral; inter-aural line used as reference) and tilted laterally by 21◦(C)/26◦(J) from
vertical; and one over the right hemisphere at AP= 27(C)/27.5(J) mm, ML= 19.7(C)/17.9(J)
mm and tilted laterally by 22.5◦(C)/28◦(J) from vertical. We used a 1.5-T magnetic reso-
nance imaging (MRI) scanner for pre-op planning of the position of these chambers.
In subject C, we recorded simultaneously from the lateral FP, the dorsal bank of ACC
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and the DLPFC (dorsal bank of the principal sulcus) in the left hemisphere; and from the
the dorsal bank of ACC, the DLPFC (dorsal bank of the principal sulcus), the dorsal caudate
and the dorsal putamen from the right hemisphere. In Subject J, we recorded from the lateral
FP, the dorsal bank of ACC and the DLPFC (dorsal bank of the principal sulcus) in the left
hemisphere; and from the dorsal caudate and the dorsal putamen from the right hemisphere.
For single-neuron recording we used epoxy-coated (FHC Instruments, Bowdoin, USA)
or glass-coated (AlphaOmega Engineering, Nazareth, Israel) tungsten microelectrodes in-
serted through a stainless-steel guide tube mounted on a custom-designed plastic grid with
1 mm spacing between adjacent locations inside the recording chamber. Electrodes were
acutely and slowly advanced through the intact dura at the beginning of every recording
session using custom-built micro-drive assemblies manually controlled that lowered elec-
trodes in pairs or triplets from a single screw; or motorised microdrives (Flex MT™ and
EPS™ by Alpha Omega Engineering, Nazareth, Israel) with individual digital control of
electrodes. The approximate distance to lower the electrodes was determined from the MRI
images. Once into the desired location, time was given for the brain to settle and thus en-
sure stability during the recording session. Neurons were randomly sampled; no attempt
was made to select neurons on the basis of responsiveness or specific cortical layer. This
procedure ensured an unbiased estimate of neuronal activity, thereby allowing a fair com-
parison of neuronal properties between the different brain regions. After each recording
session, the microelectrodes were retracted and the microdrive assemblies were removed
from the recording chambers.
Neuronal signals were acquired, amplified, filtered and digitised (OmniPlex™ D Neural
Data Acquisition System by Plexon Instruments, Dallas, USA). Spike waveform sorting was
performed off-line using principal component analysis-based method (Offline Sorter™ by
Plexon Instruments, Dallas, USA). Channels were discarded if either neuronal waveforms
could not be clearly separated or because the waveforms did not remain stable throughout
the session.
Recording locations
We recorded single-unit spiking activity from a total of 941 neurons (C: 695 and J: 246) in
57 recording sessions (C: 30 and J: 27) across all five investigated regions: FP: 278 neurons,
ACC: 240 neurons, DLPFC: 187 neurons, Caudate: 116 neurons, Putamen: 120 neurons
(c.f., Appendix Appendix A). We recorded from up to 28 electrodes simultaneously per
session (mean/SD: 10/6 electrodes). Across all sessions, all pairs of regions were recorded
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simultaneously at least once.
To reconstruct and confirm the correspondence between the MRI sections and our record-
ing chambers and electrode locations we combined information from both pre- and post-op
MRI scans, the stereotactic measurements determined at surgery and the neurophysiolog-
ical mapping of sulci and gray and white matter boundaries during the acute recordings.
In the post-op MRI scanning we mounted on the chamber a custom-built grid with several
linear tracts that were filled with the magnetic resonance contrast-agent (1:1200 in 0.9%
saline) Magnevist® (Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals, Leverkusen, Germany) to visual-
ize the chamber and the angle of the grid tracts. Anatomical MRI data was preprocessed
(registration and realignment) using SPM8 software (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) in
order to make sure the interaural axis was in the precise stereotactic location. The chamber
positioning, together with the grid tracts, were then plotted onto the post-processing MRI
sections using commercial graphics software (Adobe Illustrator, San Jose, CA). A custom-
built MATLAB® version R2014b (The MathWorks, Massachusetts, USA) algorithm was
used to project each recording location (depth from dura penetration and respective AP and
LM grid position) on pre-op MRI scan images (as they had better quality and less artefacts).
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 display the full reconstruction with the location of the recorded neurons
for subject C and J, respectively.
Task epochs for neuronal analysis
For our neuronal analyses nine different task epochs (each one coloured in Fig. 5.1a) were
defined: 1) Start epoch: from 300ms before until 500ms after the presentation of the grey
background (first-stage state), which represented the start of the trial; 2) Fix1 epoch: from
500ms before until first-stage pictures presentation; 3) Choice1 epoch: from 300ms before
until 750ms after first-stage stimuli presentation; 4) Transition epoch: from 300ms before
until 1000ms after background colour changed from first-stage (grey) to the respective state
in second-stage (brown or violet); 5) Fix2 epoch: from 500ms before until second-stage
pictures presentation; 6) Choice2 epoch: from 300ms before until 750ms after second-stage
stimuli presentation; 7) Prefeedback epoch: from 750ms before until the presentation of the
secondary reinforcer picture; 8) Feedback epoch: from 300ms before until 1250ms after the
presentation of the secondary reinforcer stimulus; 9) ITI epoch: from 1500ms before until
the presentation of the grey background (first-stage state), which represented the start of the
trial.
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Fig. 5.2 Locations of neurons recorded from subject C. Each dot represents the location
of one neuron, but the spatial resolution was insufficient to differentiate two very close neu-
rons. Each location was estimated based on depth of penetration, electrophysiological ob-
servations during recordings and registration of the recording grid to pre and post-operative
MRI scans. Numbers correspond to the distance in millimetres anterior of the inter-aural
line (AP).
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Fig. 5.3 Locations of neurons recorded from subject J. Each dot represents the location of
one neuron, but the spatial resolution was insufficient to differentiate two very close neurons.
Each location was estimated based on depth of penetration, electrophysiological observa-
tions during recordings and registration of the recording grid to pre and post-operative MRI
scans. Numbers correspond to the distance in millimetres anterior of the inter-aural line
(AP).
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Neuronal analysis
All statistical and data analyses were conducted using MATLAB® version R2014b (The
MathWorks, Massachusetts, USA). To construct spike density histograms, each cell’s neu-
ronal activity was standardised by subtracting the mean over all time points and dividing by
the standard deviation, averaged across appropriate conditions and smoothed with a sliding
Gaussian kernel with σ = 100 ms. Averages of standardised firing rate across all neurons
were used for population analysis.
To test whether neurons encoded relevant behavioural or computationally-derived vari-
ables general linear models (GLMs) were used, more specifically multiple linear regression
(Equation 5.1), that expressed the dependent or observed response variable (neuronal firing
rate) y in terms of a linear combination of a constant term (β0), each regressor (variables of
interest or confounds) Xn weighted by coefficients βn and an error term ε.
y = β0 + β1X1 + ... + βnXn + ε (5.1)
For each epoch, the raw neuronal firing rates were averaged during 200-ms time win-
dows, starting in the first 200 ms of the respective epoch and then shifted in 10-ms steps
until the end of the entire epoch. Each time window was then standardised by subtracting
the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of all time windows across all trials. Re-
gression was then performed at each time bin. All regressors were mean-centred; continuous
ones were also scaled by dividing them by two standard deviations so that the magnitudes
of coefficients for binary and continuous regressors could be directly compared (Gelman,
2008). Such adjustments in the variables were performed before the computation of the
interaction terms.
In the task, the subjects were free to look around when there was no fixation cue. It
was then important to control for eye position as this could cause neural activity changes
and confound our analysis. To rule out activity due to eye movements, the respective epoch
of analysis was divided into non-overlapping 200 ms bins and the mean values of x- and y-
positions of the eyes were computed and used as nuisance predictors in all regression models
(they are not mentioned as predictors later just for convenience). The only exceptions were
the ITI and the start epochs due to technical problems in acquiring calibrated eye data at
those times.
To evaluate statistical significance and correct for multiple comparisons across time in
our GLMs, we performed a permutation test for every regressor and neuron. To do this we
permuted the trial order of the averaged firing rate matrix and then performed the same GLM
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analysis on this permuted data. This was repeated for 1000 permutations. For each permuted
regression and each regressor, the maximum and minimum t-statistic observed over all time
bins was calculated to create an empirical distribution of maximum and minimum t-statistics
observed from random data. The 97.5th percentile of the maximum t-statistic distribution
and the 2.5th percentile of the minimum t-statistic distribution were taken as the upper and
lower significance thresholds respectively. This protocol meant that all regressors and neu-
rons had individual significance threshold t-statistics. Using this permutation method, the
typical computed t-statistic threshold (e.g. at feedback epoch in ACC for outcome coding
the upper threshold ranged between 2.4 and 2.9), which was considerably stricter than the
typical upper threshold computed from a standard t-distribution. The point of maximum
selectivity for each neuron was defined as the time bin in each sliding GLM that had the
largest absolute t-statistic value for each regressor. The sign of the regression coefficient
associated with this bin was then used.
To determine the contribution of each regressor (or group of regressors) in explaining
the variance in a neuron’s firing rate, we calculated the coefficient of partial determination
(CPD) and then averaged this value across all neurons in each brain area to obtain an esti-
mate of the amount of variance explained for each regressor (or group of regressors) at the
population level. The CPD for regressor(s) Xi is defined by:
CPD(Xi) =
S S E(X−i)− S S E(X−i, Xi)
S S E(X−i)
(5.2)
where S S E(X) refers to the sum of squared errors in a regression model that includes a
set of regressors X, and X−i is a set of all the regressors included in the full model except
Xi (Cai et al., 2011). To note that a neuron could encode significantly a variable but have
a relatively low CPD value. This could be explained by the fact that the t-statistics, which
determine selectivity, indicate the role of a predictor given that other predictors are in the
model. If there is some correlation between predictors in the model, the marginal contribu-
tion of a predictor when all other predictors are already included in the model (i.e., the CPD
value) could be small. As we report CPD as a percentage, we multiply the CPD value by
one hundred. To avoid a bias in the population mean CPD for each regressor being driven
by either very selective or non-selective neurons, we excluded the top and bottom 5% of
neuronal CPDs and respective SEM in each brain area; we thus refer to population CPD
values as the “5% trimmed absolute mean CPD”. Further, we sought to understand whether
firing rates in a region were positively or negatively related to a regressor on average. To
look at this, we first sorted neurons by the sign of their maximum absolute t-statistic (with
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negative coders having a negative CPD by convention) and then by averaging we calculated
the net CPD for each population.
The latency of coding for a particular regressor of interest was the time at which the
population CPD reached half its maximum (determined by continuously falling down from
the maximum value). This measure was used as it is robust to differences in the strength
of coding or the amount of data and less sensitive to noise compared to measures based on
the time at which statistical significance is reached. Outcome coding was already signifi-
cant before the presentation of the secondary reinforcer, particularly in ACC and putamen.
Therefore, to rule out that differences in such pre-stimulus coding between regions lead to
spurious latency differences, we subtracted the baseline outcome coding before estimating
half maximum latencies. For statistical comparisons of latencies between regions we esti-
mated the SE of latencies by bootstrap across units (100 resamples), and then assessed the
significance of latency differences using one-way ANOVA testing.
GLMs for reward, transition and first-stage choice coding
In GLM-behav1, we focused on how each neuron’s firing rate was influenced by the most
recently experienced reward, transition and first-stage choice information. The regressors
used were: a constant (to model the mean firing rate across trials); three main effects regres-
sors defined the most recent information about reward (time the juice pump was on), tran-
sition (rare=1; common=0) and first-stage choice (1=car picture or PicA, 0=watering can
picture or PicB); and four regressors defined the interactions between the different types of
most recent information: reward× transition (to model multiplicative effects of both reward
and transition), reward × first-stage choice (to model multiplicative effects of both reward
and first-stage choice), transition × first-stage choice (to model the second-stage state), and
reward × transition × first-stage choice (to model multiplicative effects of reward, transi-
tion and first-stage choice). The model was applied to all epochs between feedback and
choice1 epochs. Note that the most recent information about reward at feedback epoch cor-
responds to the reward about to be delivered, transition information at transition epoch is
the transition revealed on that epoch and first-stage choice at choice1 epoch is the first-stage
choice made on the previous trial. It is important to emphasise that a decision regarding the
next first-stage choice can be made from the moment the reward is revealed at the feedback
epoch. Hence, we included for the feedback, ITI, start and choice1 epochs two additional
regressors: the first-stage choice about to be made (1=car picture or PicA, 0=watering can
picture or PicB) and a regressor for whether the subject will repeat or switch its previous
first-stage choice (i.e. the interaction term between the most recent and the next first-stage
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choices). Because the animal could not predict forced trials, only choice trials on the next
first-stage decision were included on these latter four epochs (for the remaining epochs both
forced and choice types of trials were included). Finally, at choice1 and choice2 epochs
the animal has to perform an action by moving a joystick (towards one of three possible
locations) and, therefore, we also included the respective response side of the action taken
(coded as a dummy variable and using the left side as the reference group) as well as the
reaction time (in ms).
To better investigate how the most recent information about transition on a given trial
may influence the way neurons encode the reward information, we applied to the feed-
back epoch a slightly modified version of the previous GLM-behav1. Therefore, our GLM-
behav2 included as regressors: the constant term; a second regressor differentiating the most
recent transition information (rare=1; common=0); a third regressor modelled a linear re-
lationship between firing rate and the reward on common trials only; a fourth modelled a
linear relationship between firing rate and reward on rare trials only; the remaining predic-
tors were the same and followed the same principles as in GLM-behav1 (such as first-stage
recent and next choice, switch or repeat as well as response side and reaction time). The
third and fourth regressors were our predictors of interest and each one of them was or-
thogonalized with respect to the first and second, to ensure that parameter estimates for the
second regressor would reflect differences in mean firing rate between common and rare
trials.
In order to better understand how single-neuron computations across regions integrate
two different types of information obtained at distinct epochs in the trial, we tested whether
the the overall strength (or direction) of the encoding of the transition regressor at transition
epoch was related to the overall strength (or direction) of coding of reward at feedback.
To achieve this goal, we used the mean of either the absolute (for testing overall strength)
or signed (to take direction of coding into consideration) beta coefficient values for the
transition regressor at transition epoch as a ”population transition code”. We then regressed
(we used linear robust regression to avoid the higher sensitivity of least square methods to
very selective neurons) this fixed population code against the sliding absolute (for testing
overall strength) or signed (to take direction of coding into consideration) beta coefficient
values for the reward regressor at feedback epoch.
GLMs for action-value coding
In GLM-comp1, we focused on how each neuron’s firing rate at choice1 epoch was in-
fluenced by the trial-by-trial computational estimates of MF and MB action values (or Q-
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values) for first-stage choice stimuli (car picture or PicA, watering can picture or PicB). The
regressors used were: a constant (to model the mean firing rate across trials); the four re-
gressors of interest composed by PicA and PicB Q-values for each MF and MB approaches;
the chosen first-stage choice (1=PicA, 0=PicB); the first-stage response side of the action
taken (coded as a dummy variable and using the left side as the reference group); and the
reaction time (in ms).
We defined the following types of neurons: QMF-value only as any neuron with a sig-
nificant regressor at any time of the epoch for either PicA or PicB MF Q-values but not for
MB Q-values; QMB-value only as any neuron with a significant regressor at any time of the
epoch for either PicA or PicB MB Q-values but not for MF Q-values; QHYBRID-value as any
neuron with a significant regressor at any time of the epoch for either PicA or PicB MF
Q-values or either PicA or PicB MB Q-values. We also looked at the specific selectivity for
a particular first-stage stimuli within each of these neuron types, by identifying the neurons
where the significant regressors were only significant for one of the stimuli but never for the
other one. Finally, we assessed whether the three main types of neurons additionally had
selectivity for chosen first-stage choice, chosen first-stage response side, reaction time and
eye position.
GLMs for value-based neural signals at transition epoch
The GLM-behav3 assessed the impact of current common versus rare transition on the
neural coding at transition epoch for the previous reward, taking into account the current
common vs rare transition, and whether the first-stage choice aimed to repeat or switch
the second-stage state where that reward was received (i.e., whether first-stage choice was
the one more likely associated, given the 70%/30% state-transition matrix used, with the
previous trial’s second-stage state and hence reward). This model used as regressors: the
constant term (to model the mean firing rate across trials); a second regressor differentiating
the current transition type (rare=1; common=0); a third regressor differentiating whether
the first-stage choice aimed to repeat or switch the previous second-stage state (repeat=1;
switch=0); the next for regressors were our regressors of interest and modelled a linear rela-
tionship between firing rate and the reward on common and repeat trials only, rare and repeat
trials only, common and switch trials only and, rare and switch trials only, respectively; the
remaining predictors were the previous and current trial’s chosen first-stage stimulus (1=car
picture or PicA, 0=watering can picture or PicB) and the transition × current current trial’s
chosen first-stage stimulus (to model the second-stage state). The fourth, fifth, sixth and
seventh regressors were our predictors of interest and each one of them was orthogonalized
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with respect to the first three regressors, to ensure that parameter estimates for the second re-
gressor would reflect differences in mean firing rate between common and rare trials and for
the third regressor would reflect differences in mean firing rate between repeat and switch
trials.
In line with the previous regression model and to assess directly the effect of transition
on expected chosen value neural coding at transition epoch, we used both the first-stage
chosen Q-value estimates as well as the second-stage chosen Q-value estimates derived
by the best-fit computational model (HYBRID+ model). In GLM-comp2, the regressors
used were then: the constant term (to model the mean firing rate across trials); a second
regressor differentiating the current transition type (rare=1; common=0); a third regressor
modelled a linear relationship between firing rate and the chosen first-stage Q-value on
common trials only; a fourth regressor modelled a linear relationship between firing rate
and the chosen first-stage Q-value on rare trials only; a fifth regressor modelled a linear
relationship between firing rate and the second-stage chosen Q-value on common trials
only; a sixth regressor modelled a linear relationship between firing rate and the second-
stage chosen Q-value on rare trials only; the remaining predictors were the current trial’s
chosen first-stage stimulus (1=car picture or PicA, 0=watering can picture or PicB) and
the transition × current current trial’s chosen first-stage stimulus (to model the second-
stage state). The third, fourth, fifth and sixth regressors were our predictors of interest and
each one of them was orthogonalized with respect to the first two regressors, to ensure that
parameter estimates for the second regressor would reflect differences in mean firing rate
between common and rare trials.
GLMs for neural representations of second-stage prediction error signals
In regard to the second-stage reward prediction error coding across regions, we aimed to
investigate how the firing rate at feedback was modulated not only by the upcoming re-
ward, but also by the previous reward history of the current second-stage choice. At trial t, a
given second-stage choice will have its upcoming reward (Rew), its most-recent (Lag1Rew),
second-most recent (Lag2Rew) and third-most recent (Lag3Rew) rewards obtained with that
choice (zero was assumed if no experienced reward was observed for each lag variables).
Therefore, the GLM-behav4 model was conducted using the following regressors: the con-
stant term (to model the mean firing rate across trials); the Rew variable; the Lag1Rew
variable; the Lag2Rew variable; and the Lag3Rew variable; the remaining predictors were
transition (rare=1; common=0), reward × transition, current first-stage choice (1=car pic-
ture or PicA, 0=watering can picture or PicB), reward× current first-stage choice, transition
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× current first-stage choice, reward × transition × current first-stage choice, next trial first-
stage choice and repeat or switch the current first-stage choice on the next trial.
Given the observed results with this last regression, we aimed to test if the neural re-
sponse at feedback epoch reflected a difference between the current or upcoming reward
and the weighted average of previous rewards, consistent with a theoretical reward predic-
tion error signal. For this, we calculated and plotted the mean value (and respective SEM)
of the beta coefficients across all neurons of each region for Rew, Lag1Rew, Lag2Rew and
Lag3Rew during the period of time of 200 to 600ms post-secondary reinforcer (this period
of time was based on the striatal phasic response findings of the GLM-behav4 but it is also
consistent with the approximate latency and duration of dopamine increase in striatum after
stimulation of dopaminergic neurons; see Schultz 2007).
Similarly to what we did before, we also aimed to confirm the second-stage reward
prediction error signal by using the trial-by-trial computational estimates inferred from be-
haviour, and used two approaches for this. First, we assessed the relationship between firing
rate at feedback epoch with the computational inputs of the prediction error signal: the
current or upcoming reward, Rew, and the expected chosen Q-value for second-stage, Cho-
sen2Q. Hence, the GLM-comp3 used as regressors: the constant term (to model the mean
firing rate across trials); the Rew variable; the Chosen2Q variable; and the remaining predic-
tors were transition (rare=1; common=0), current first-stage choice (1=car picture or PicA,
0=watering can picture or PicB), transition × current first-stage choice, next trial first-stage
choice and repeat or switch the current first-stage choice on the next trial. Finally, we re-
gresses neural activity at feedback epoch directly with the second-stage reward prediction
error signal derived by the best-fit computational model.
5.4 Results
We recorded simultaneous single-cell activity from 278, 240, 187, 116 and 120 neurons lo-
cated in FP, ACC, LPFC, Caudate and Putamen, respectively (Fig. 5.2 and 5.3 for recording
locations). Our analysis methods focused on determining the percentages of single neurons
in each area with significant effects for our variables of interest, as well as on quantifying,
at the population level, the averaged amount of variance in neuronal firing rates explained
by such factors. We applied these procedures across different task epochs to reveal temporal
dynamics of relevant information.
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Neuronal encoding of reward, transition and first-stage choice
First, we focused on the relationship between neuronal activity and key elements of choice
behaviour, such as reward (from the current trial and into the next trial), transition, the
combination of these two variables and first-stage choice.
Reward coding
Because the task design meant that current choice was influenced by both the reward and
transition of the previous trial, most of our neuronal analyses explored how task relevant
variables were encoded across the epochs linking trials, particularly from feedback of the
current trial through to the choice of the next trial. Following the presentation of the sec-
ondary reinforcer and during the feedback epoch of the current trial, the proportion of neu-
rons encoding the magnitude of the upcoming reward (Fig. 5.4a) was significantly above
chance level (all binomial tests, p < 0.05) and relatively high (not less than 75%) in all
recorded regions (Fig. 5.4b). The areas with higher percentage of those cells were ACC
(94%) and putamen (93%), then caudate (84%), DLPFC (78%) and FP (76%). At the pop-
ulation level, reward size explained more of the variance in the firing rate of ACC neu-
rons than any other region, followed by both striatal regions and finally FP and DLPFC
(Fig. 5.4e). Regional differences in the latencies of the reward signals were also observed
(F(4, 495) = 183.7, p < 0.05; see Fig. 5.4c), but here putamen (latency to reach half maxi-
mum: 251±31 ms SE) was the fastest, followed by caudate (280±13), then ACC (302±14),
FP (327±10) and finally DLPFC (305±45). Although none of these areas showed a signif-
icant bias in the number of selective neurons encoding reward either positively or negatively
(all binomial test, p > 0.05), it is possible to find differences in relative strength between
the two subpopulations of selective cells with opposite coding schemes. To clarify this, we
assessed the net population reward signal for each brain area by averaging together the neu-
ronal variance of significant neurons that encoded reward with either positive (CPD defined
as positive value) or negative (CPD defined as negative value) regression coefficients (Fig.
5.4f). Both caudate and putamen had greater tendency to increase their average firing rate
for higher outcomes, whereas the relationship in ACC and FP was negative, slightly more
prominent and transient in the latter.
We then examined the temporal dynamics of the reward selectivity from feedback until
the next first-stage choice (Fig. 5.4d, 5.4e and5.4f). After its initial peak, the encoding of
reward in ACC neurons remained substantial during the bulk of the feedback epoch. Despite
a subsequent gradual reduction, it remained the region with the highest CPD strongest until
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Fig. 5.4 Population encoding of reward. a) A spike density histogram of an ACC single-
neuron example encoding (negatively) the outcome level at feedback epoch. b) Bar plot
with the prevalence of neurons significantly encoding reward, based on the sign of the re-
gression coefficient (+ or -). Single black or grey lines and asterisks, p < 0.05 (chi-squared
tests), for differences between areas in the number of selective cells overall, and each type
of signed coding, respectively. No significant differences from the chance 50%-50% split
were found for the proportion of neurons with positive or negative regression coefficients
(all regions binomial test with p > 0.05). c) Comparison of reward coding latencies (time
to reach half maximum coding) between regions. Grey dots are outliers; vertical thin lines
are median values. d) Prevalence of neurons significantly encoding reward across epochs
from secondary reinforcer presentation to choice1 epoch. e) Time course of the reward
coding at the population level, as determined by the absolute coefficient of partial determi-
nation (CPD) value, from feedback to choice1 epochs. f) Time course of the population
net reward CPD value, averaged across neurons that significantly encoded reward with ei-
ther positive or negative regression coefficients, from feedback to choice1 epochs. For e-f)
The 5% trimmed absolute mean (solid coloured line) and respective SEM (shading) across
recorded neurons was used; solid vertical line corresponds to secondary reinforcer presen-
tation; dotted vertical line represents the mean first-stage reaction time across subjects and
sessions.
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the next first-stage choice. Neuronal activity during feedback in DLPFC showed a sustained
post-maximum reward selectivity after reaching its maximum, whereas the coding in both
caudate and putamen reduced shortly after their respective peaks. The reward coding in FP
was particularly transient and confined solely to the feedback epoch. Finally, it is important
to note that in all regions, the neural encoding of the most recent reward increased with the
arrival of the next first-stage choice. The time course of this later rise was fastest in ACC
(at the start epoch), then followed by caudate, putamen, DLPFC and finally FP.
Transition coding
The information about reward is important for both RL approaches, but the knowledge
of the state-transition structure differentiates MB from MF-RL. Therefore, we investigated
whether there were neurons that significantly discriminated a common from a rare transition
during the transition epoch (Fig. 5.5a). A greater proportion of such neurons was found in
ACC (69% of cells) when compared to all other regions (p < 0.05 in all pairwise χ2 tests),
with no significant difference found between the number of selective cells increasing their
firing rate for a rare (positive coding) or a common (negative coding) transition (χ2 test with
p > 0.05; Fig. 5.5b). Putamen and caudate both had slightly fewer selective cells, but also
did not show a bias for positive or negative coders (both with χ2 test with p > 0.05; Fig.
5.5b). However, FP and DLPFC were found to have significantly more neurons increasing
their firing rate when rare transitions occurred (both χ2 tests with p < 0.05; Fig. 5.5b).
At the population-level and when compared to the remaining areas, the neuronal activity in
ACC was not only the first (303±13 ms) to show such transition coding (F(4, 495) = 57.27,
p < 0.05; multiple comparison tests all with p < 0.05; Fig. 5.5c) but it was also the better
explained by the transition regressor (see Transition epoch in Fig. 5.5e). With the exception
of putamen, which showed a slight preference at the population level to increase its spiking
for common transitions, all other regions increased their firing rate for rare transitions (i.e.,
positive coding) but the signal was much more pronounced in FP (see Transition epoch in
Fig. 5.5f).
For MB-RL value updating, the state-transition information requires integration with the
received reward and, therefore, it is important to hold this information until the outcome is
revealed. When we analysed how this transition coding evolved in time, we found that the
strong coding signal present in ACC at the time of transition persisted until about the mo-
ment the outcome was made known to the subject (Fig. 5.5d-e). In fact, when the analysis of
transition selective cells was restricted to the short period in the feedback epoch just before
the secondary reinforcer presentation (note that Fig. 5.5d feedback results correspond to the
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Fig. 5.5 Population encoding of state-transition information. a) A spike density his-
togram of an ACC single-neuron example encoding (negatively by convention) the tran-
sition type (common versus rare) at transition epoch. b) Bar plot with the prevalence of
neurons significantly encoding transition type, based on the sign of the regression coeffi-
cient (+/− for increased firing rate if rare/common transition, respectively). Single black
or grey lines and asterisks, p < 0.05 (chi-squared tests), for differences between areas in
the number of selective cells overall, and each type of signed coding, respectively; double
white asterisks, p < 0.05 for the proportion of neurons with positive or negative regression
coefficients different from the chance 50%-50% split (binomial test); position of white as-
terisks indicates the larger population. c) Comparison of transition coding latencies (time
to reach half maximum coding) between regions. Grey dots are outliers; vertical thin lines
are median values. d) Prevalence of neurons significantly encoding transition across epochs
from transition to feedback epoch. e) Time course of the transition coding at the population
level, as determined by the absolute coefficient of partial determination (CPD) value, from
transition to feedback epochs. f) Time course of the population net transition CPD value,
averaged across neurons that significantly encoded transition with either positive or nega-
tive regression coefficients, from transition to feedback epochs. For e-f) The 5% trimmed
absolute mean (solid coloured line) and respective SEM (shading) across recorded neurons
was used; solid vertical line corresponds to the moment the background colour changes in-
dicating the second-stage state, and hence the transition type; dotted vertical line represents
the secondary reinforcer presentation.
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entire feedback period), a significantly greater percentage of ACC neurons (22%) compared
to all other regions was found (pairwise χ2 test, all p<0.05), and caudate (11%) and putamen
(12%) were the only other areas with a number above chance level of such selective cells
(binomial test, all p < 0.05).
Combined reward and transition coding
Having found neurons, predominantly in ACC, with modulations in their firing rate caused
by either the reward or the transition information, we next focused on the combined effects
of these two factors.
First, we focused on potential additive effects. We started by looking at how many cells
that significantly differentiated a common from a rare trial at the transition epoch, also en-
coded the upcoming reward later at feedback. We found that this was the case in most
recorded regions (103/119 in FP, 157/165 in ACC, 59/69 in DLPFC, 49/52 in caudate and
58/64 in putamen). We then looked at the same relationship but taking into account positive
and negative coding neurons. We did not find a significant difference in the proportion of
neurons significantly encoding reward at feedback as a function of whether the transition
coding at transition was either positive or negative (all binomial tests with p > 0.05). How-
ever, positive coding neurons at transition epoch (i.e. neurons increasing their firing rate for
rare transitions) were more likely (64% in FP, 71% in ACC, 52% in DLPFC, 57% in caudate
and 60% in putamen) to encode negatively reward at feedback (i.e. decrease their firing rate
for higher rewards). On the other hand, cells that significantly increased their firing rate
for a common transition at transition epoch (negative coders for transition) showed higher
tendency (62% in FP, 61% in ACC, 59% in caudate and 59% in putamen) to spike more
for high reward (positive reward coders), with the exception of cells from DLPFC (35% in
DLPFC).
The next step was to examine similar effects but at the population level. We first asked
how much the transition coding at the time of transition could predict the reward coding at
feedback across the population of neurons of each recorded region. For this, we regressed
the mean regression coefficients for the transition variable across the transition epoch of all
neurons of the population against the sliding regression coefficients for reward at feedback
epoch (Fig. 5.6a). Because this analysis takes into account the direction of how each factor
is encoded (positively or negatively for either transition or reward), we also run other similar
regressions but looking at the predictive effect of: 1) the overall coding of transition (i.e. the
mean of the absolute regression coefficient values for transition at transition epoch; Fig.
5.6b) on the signed reward coding; 2) the signed transition coding on the overall coding of
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reward (i.e. the sliding absolute regression coefficients values for reward at the feedback
epoch; Fig. 5.6c);and 3) the overall coding of transition on the overall coding of reward
(Fig. 5.6d).
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Fig. 5.6 Relationship between transition coding at transition epoch and reward cod-
ing at feedback epoch. Sliding robust linear regression results of: a) the mean value of
the transition regression coefficients at transition epoch against reward coding regression
coefficients at feedback epoch; b) the mean absolute value of the transition regression coef-
ficients at transition epoch against reward coding regression coefficients at feedback epoch;
c) the mean value of the transition regression coefficients at transition epoch against absolute
value of the reward coding regression coefficients at feedback epoch; d) the mean absolute
value of the transition regression coefficients at transition epoch against absolute value of
the reward coding regression coefficients at feedback epoch. Mean (solid coloured line) and
respective SEM (shading) of regression coefficients across recorded neurons are shown.
In line with our observations in the single-cell counting analysis, all but DLPFC re-
gions showed a negative correlation between the regression coefficients for signed transi-
tion and signed reward codings, with the most negative value found around 350-500 ms
post-secondary reinforcement (Fig. 5.6a). We also found that in both striatal regions the
greater the selectivity for overall transition coding, the stronger these neurons encoded re-
ward positively at feedback (Fig. 5.6b), and neurons in caudate were slightly faster to show
this positive correlation than in putamen. In contrast, FP cells revealed a rather strong nega-
tive correlation between both variables, with greater selectivity for overall transition coding
at transition being associated with stronger negative reward coding at feedback. The ACC
and DLPFC neurons also presented a tendency for a negative correlation, but this was much
weaker than in FP. In regards to how much the strength of rare transition coding at transition
could predict any type of reward selectivity, a positive relationship was found in FP and, to
a less extent, in ACC (Fig. 5.6c).
We also investigated, across the recorded regions, the number of neurons showing at
feedback epoch a concomitant transition and reward selectivity (Fig. 5.7a). The ACC
(140/240 neurons), when compared to other regions (91/278 in FP, 52/187 in DLPFC,
48/116 in caudate, 50/120 putamen neurons), had a significantly greater percentage of such
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cells (p < 0.05 in all pairwise χ2 tests), if the entire feedback epoch was considered. Inter-
estingly, 21% of these ACC cells encoding significantly both variables did so even when the
analysis was rather restricted to the short period in the feedback epoch before the secondary
reinforcer presentation. This apparent prescience is possible because the reward structure of
the task involved sequences of a few trials with similar reward levels. We consider it further
below. At the population level, we also observed that neuronal activity in ACC was much
better explained by both variables than the other recorded regions either before or after the
secondary reinforcer (Fig. 5.7b).
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Fig. 5.7 Additive impact of both reward and transition main effects on neural activity
at feedback epoch. a) A spike density histogram of an ACC single-neuron example of
the firing rate at feedback epoch for each outcome level as a function of the transition type
on the current trial (solid line=common transition; dotted line=rare transition). b) Coding
at the population level of information relative to both reward and transition main effects at
feedback epoch, as determined by the absolute coefficient of partial determination (CPD)
value for both predictors. The 5% trimmed absolute mean (solid coloured line) and respec-
tive SEM (shading) across recorded neurons was used. Solid vertical line corresponds to
secondary reinforcer presentation.
To understand further this joint modulation of reward and transition at feedback across
the population, we examined whether the linear relationship between the neurons’ firing
rates and reward at feedback was modulated by the transition type in the current trial (Fig.
5.8). Note that, in addition, this analysis also helps to exclude the possibility of a type I
error for the observation that some neurons encoded the upcoming reward even before the
secondary reinforcer was presented (and also the increased ACC reward coding before sec-
ondary reinforcer presentation in Fig. 5.4e). The predictability is greatest when the subject
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Fig. 5.8 Population encoding of reward as a function of transition type at feedback
epoch. Reward coding by common (solid coloured line) and rare (dotted coloured line)
transition types at the population level of each recorded region, as determined by the abso-
lute coefficient of partial determination (CPD) value (a) and the beta regression coefficients
(b) at the feedback epoch. The 5% trimmed absolute mean (thick line) and respective SE
(thin lines) across recorded neurons was used. Solid vertical line corresponds to secondary
reinforcer presentation.
discovered a high reward second-stage option and, taking advantage of knowledge about the
task’s structure, subsequently exploited the appropriate first-stage choice (i.e., the first-stage
choice more often associated with the second-stage state where the high reward was found).
However, if a rare transition had occurred on that trial, this expectation should reduce sig-
nificantly. This is because, even if the subject had a long memory trace of the second-stage
stimuli rewards, the reward assignments kept changing for the unchosen options, making it
hard for the subject to guess the reward associated with an option that is had not experienced
recently.
The overall coding of reward, as measured by the CPD, was stronger if the current
trial had a common transition than if rare across the recorded regions, but the difference
was much stronger in ACC, putamen and FP (Fig. 5.8). Regarding these three regions,
the difference between transition types was transient in FP but mantained across the entire
feedback epoch for both ACC and putamen. As expected, the anticipatory reward coding
(i.e., before the secondary reinforcer presentation), which was most prominent in ACC and
putamen, dropped substantially following a rare transition (Fig. 5.8a).
The regression coefficients for the coding of reward (Fig. 5.8b) after the secondary
reinforcer are shown and tell a slightly different story. The only region in which these
differed as a function of the transition type was the FP, with a stronger negative coding for
reward for common versus rare transitions. In other words, FP appears to possess in a more
homogeneous population code (given that we considered signed regression coefficients of all
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neurons) for information regarding the current state-transition context when coding reward
at feedback.
In a final analysis, we used the reward × transition interaction effect (i.e., the product of
both terms as regressor) to see if the effect of reward on the neuronal firing rate depended
upon the current transition type. Neurons showing a significant reward × transition effect
after the secondary reinforcer presentation were present in a proportion above chance level
(all binomial tests with p < 0.05) in all regions recorded (30% in FP, 46% in ACC, 35%
in DLPFC, 39% in caudate and 38% in putamen; Fig. 5.9a), and both ACC and putamen
had a significant bias towards coding the effect of the interaction term positively (i.e., the
extent to which high outcomes increase firing rate is greater on rare transition trials). Among
the prefrontal areas, ACC had significantly more neurons selective for reward × transition
(p < 0.05 in all pairwise χ2 tests; Fig. 5.9a), albeit not significantly more so than caudate or
putamen (p > 0.13 in both pairwise χ2 tests). At the population level, the coding of reward
× transition was generally weak, and did not reflect differences between regions (Fig. 5.9b).
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Fig. 5.9 Population encoding of the reward × transition interaction at feedback epoch.
a) Bar plot with the prevalence of neurons significantly encoding reward × transition inter-
action, based on the sign of the regression coefficient (+/− if higher rewards have a stronger
positive/negative relationship to firing rate in rare trials as compared to common trials, re-
spectively). Single black or grey lines and asterisks, p < 0.05 (chi-squared tests), for differ-
ences between areas in the number of selective cells overall, and each type of signed coding,
respectively; double white asterisks, p < 0.05 for the proportion of neurons with positive
or negative regression coefficients different from the chance 50%-50% split (binomial test);
position of white asterisks indicates the larger population. b) Time course of the reward ×
transition interaction coding at the population level, as determined by the absolute coeffi-
cient of partial determination (CPD) value at feedback epoch. The 5% trimmed absolute
mean (solid coloured line) and respective SE (shading) across recorded neurons was used;
solid vertical line corresponds to secondary reinforcer presentation.
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At this stage, it is important to summarise the results from the above neuronal analysis
on reward and transition. In regards to reward coding, we found that: 1) the ACC was the
region that most prominently encoded the value of the reward at the time of feedback, and
this information remained present until the subsequent first-stage choice; 2) the relationship
between firing rate and the reward magnitude was predominantly positive for striatal re-
gions and negative for both ACC and FP. When the neural activity related to state-transition
information was assessed: 1) the ACC was also the region that most prominently encoded
the transition type from when this was revealed until the feedback epoch; 2) at the level of
the whole population, FP coding showed a particular bias towards positive encoding of rare
transitions. Finally, we also looked at the way both reward and transition was combined
and found the following: 1) at the time of feedback, reward and transition information was
simultaneously present in ACC; 2) there were specific relationships between the way FP
neurons were selective for the transition, when this was revealed, and the way they coded
for rewards, at the time of feedback; and finally, 3) for FP neurons, the actual transition
experienced in a trial influenced the coding of reward at the time of feedback.
First-stage decision coding
Next we considered whether neurons encoded information about the first-stage decision,
including both the selected picture (Fig. 5.10) as well as the motor action required to realise
this choice (Fig. 5.11).
In the choice1 epoch, most regions contained neurons that encoded the first-stage stim-
ulus (Pic A or Pic B) about to be chosen (all binomial tests, p < 0.05; Fig. 5.10a-b). The
proportions of such neurons were similar across regions (most χ2 test had p > 0.05; see for
details Fig. 5.10b). Furthermore, no substantial differences were evident at the population
level when we analysed at choice1 epoch the impact of first-stage stimulus choice on the
spiking activity of the neurons from the five regions (Fig.5.10c), although ACC presented a
consistent trend for slightly greater coding. In contrast, FP did not show any encoding for
first-stage chosen stimulus throughout the entire epoch.
We also found neurons across the recorded regions encoding the first-stage stimulus
chosen on the previous trial (independently of whether it was also chosen on the current
trial) and whether the current first-stage choice was a repeat or a switch of the previous
trial’s one (both with all binomial tests, p < 0.05). The proportion of these two latter
types of cells was also not significantly different across regions (most pairwise χ2 test had
p > 0.05). However, the ACC was the region with the highest likelihood of having any of
the three types of the first-stage selective cells (p < 0.05 in all pairwise χ2 tests) and this
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Fig. 5.10 Population encoding of first-stage stimulus at choice1 epoch. a) A spike den-
sity histogram of an ACC single-neuron example encoding (positively by convention) the
chosen first-stage stimulus (car picture or PicA versus watering can or PicB) at choice1
epoch. b) Bar plot with the prevalence of neurons significantly encoding the chosen first-
stage stimulus, based on the sign of the regression coefficient (+/− for increased firing rate
if PicA/PicB, respectively). Single black or grey lines and asterisks, p < 0.05 (chi-squared
tests), for differences between areas in the selective cells overall number and for each type
of signed coding, respectively. c) Chosen first-stage stimulus coding at the population level,
as determined by the absolute coefficient of partial determination (CPD) value at choice1
epoch. d) Coding at the population level of all types of information relative to first-stage
stimulus choice, as determined by the absolute CPD value at choice1 epoch for three pre-
dictors: currently chosen first-stage stimulus, previous trial’s first-stage chosen stimulus and
repeat/switch of first-stage choice. The 5% trimmed absolute mean (solid coloured line) and
respective SEM (shading) across recorded neurons was used; solid vertical line corresponds
to the first-stage stimuli presentation; dotted vertical line represents the mean first-stage
reaction time across subjects and sessions.
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Fig. 5.11 Population encoding of the chosen first-stage response side at choice1 epoch.
a) A spike density histogram of a putamen single-neuron example encoding the chosen first-
stage right side at choice1 epoch. b) Bar plot with the prevalence of neurons significantly
encoding any of the three possible chosen first-stage response sides (left side versus right
side versus down/up side for subject C/J respectively). Single black lines and asterisks,
p < 0.05 (chi-squared tests), for differences between areas in the selective cells overall
number. c) Chosen first-stage response side coding at the population level, as determined
by the absolute coefficient of partial determination (CPD) value at choice1 epoch. The 5%
trimmed absolute mean (solid coloured line) and respective SEM (shading) across recorded
neurons was used. Solid vertical line corresponds to the first-stage stimuli presentation;
dotted vertical line represents the mean first-stage reaction time across subjects and sessions.
was also the case when we examined how much neuronal variance was explained by all
three types of first-stage stimulus information (Fig. 5.10d).
Finally, to make a choice between pictures at first-stage, subjects have to perform a
joystick movement to select that option. We also found in all regions significantly more
neurons than chance that encoded the first-stage side of response (Fig. 5.11a) (all binomial
tests, p < 0.05). They existed in relatively high proportions (Fig. 5.11b). The FP had the
smallest percentage of such cells (p < 0.05 in all pairwise χ2 tests). When we looked at
the population explained variance of each region, it was evident that the first-stage response
side coding was stronger in putamen (Fig. 5.11c).
Action-value coding
When making choices in sequential decision tasks, animals often make predictions about
the value of candidate actions in order to obtain good outcomes and avoid bad ones. Under
the RL framework, MF and MB methods both estimate action-values (or Q-values), which
specify the overall amount of reward expected in the long-run depending on the actions the
agent might take. We used multiple linear regression to assess the extent to which trial-
wise MF and MB Q-values for each of the first-stage stimuli, derived from the best fitting
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computational model, predicted the firing rate of the recorded neurons. In addition to their
participation in choice by encoding action-values of the available options, neurons may also
encode the value of the option actually chosen, possibly to contribute to value updating (Lau
and Glimcher, 2008; Samejima et al., 2005). Therefore, we not only looked at the selectivity
for MF or MB Q-values of any of the two first-stage stimuli (Fig. 5.12 and Table 5.1),
but also investigated any additional significant encoding for the chosen first-stage stimulus
(Table 5.1). Finally, other first-stage behavioural measures including response side, reaction
time (RT), and eye position were taken into account.
Table 5.1 Regression summary with MF, MB and Hybrid neuronal cell types for action-
value coding
FP ACC DLPFC Caudate Putamen
QMF-value only 61 (22%) 40 (17%) 40 (21%) 26 (22%) 23 (19%)
(for only one first-stage stimulus) 53 (87%) 30 (75%) 33 (83%) 22 (85%) 14 (61%)
+ first-stage choice 13 (21%) 16 (40%) 11 (28%) 7 (27%) 5 (22%)
+ first-stage side 33 (54%) 30 (75%) 21 (53%) 14 (54%) 18 (78%)
+ first-stage RT 24 (39%) 18 (45%) 13 (33%) 12 (46%) 16 (70%)
+ first-stage eye position 37 (61%) 33 (83%) 34 (85%) 17 (65%) 14 (61%)
QMB-value only 57 (21%) 52 (22%) 38 (20%) 42 (36%) 30 (25%)
(for only one first-stage stimulus) 36 (63%) 30 (58%) 25 (66%) 27 (64%) 23 (77%)
+ first-stage choice 16 (28%) 24 (46%) 19 (50%) 7 (17%) 12 (40%)
+ first-stage side 25 (44%) 33 (63%) 25 (66%) 21 (50%) 20 (67%)
+ first-stage RT 22 (39%) 25 (48%) 11 (29%) 20 (48%) 16 (53%)
+ first-stage eye position 39 (68%) 43 (83%) 30 (79%) 34 (81%) 23 (77%)
QHybrid-value 79 (28%) 118 (49%) 60 (32%) 28 (24%) 33 (28%)
(for only one first-stage stimulus) 23 (29%) 16 (14%) 19 (31%) 5 (18%) 7 (21%)
+ first-stage choice 22 (28%) 61 (52%) 22 (37%) 10 (36%) 9 (27%)
+ first-stage side 41 (52%) 85 (72%) 33 (55%) 22 (79%) 25 (76%)
+ first-stage RT 31 (39%) 69 (58%) 23 (38%) 13 (46%) 26 (79%)
+ first-stage eye position 56 (71%) 103 (87%) 54 (90%) 25 (89%) 27 (82%)
No action-value 81 (29%) 30 (12%) 49 (26%) 20 (17%) 34 (28%)
In bold are the main neuronal cell types and for these the percentages listed in parentheses are relative to the total number of recorded neurons
in the region. The other rows list additional selectivity patterns for the three main cell types, with the percentages in parentheses relative to
the number of neurons in the respective main neuronal cell type. Abbreviations: FP, frontal pole; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; DLPFC,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; MF, model-free; MB, model-based; RT, reaction time.
We found neurons in all brain areas having significant regression coefficients at any time
of the choice1 epoch for the first-stage stimuli MF Q-values but not for MB Q-values (22%
in FP, 17% in ACC, 21% in DLPFC, 22% in caudate and 19% in putamen; Fig. 5.12a-b).
Similarly, we found neurons in all areas which encoded MB Q-values but not MF Q-values
(21% in FP, 22% in ACC, 20% in DLPFC, 36% in caudate and 25% in putamen; Fig.
5.12d-e; Table 5.1). No significant difference in the proportion of cells was found across
regions for the MF Q-value only neurons (p > 0.05 in all pairwise χ2 tests). On the other
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Fig. 5.12 Model-free and model-based action-value coding at choice1 epoch. a-b) A
spike density histogram of a caudate single-neuron example encoding (positively by conven-
tion) the model-free action-value (Qmf) for picture A (PicA) but not for picture B (PicB).
c) Bar plot with the prevalence of neurons significantly encoding Qmf action-value, based
on the sign of the regression coefficient (+/− for Qmf PicA/Qmf PicB selectivity, respec-
tively). Single black or grey lines and asterisks, p < 0.05 (chi-squared tests), for differences
between areas in the number of selective cells overall, and for each type of signed coding,
respectively; double white asterisks, p < 0.05 for the proportion of neurons with positive
or negative regression coefficients different from the chance 50%-50% split (binomial test);
position of white asterisks indicates the larger population. d-e) A spike density histogram
of an ACC single-neuron example encoding (positively by convention) the model-based
action-value (Qmb) for picture A (PicA) but not for picture B (PicB). f) Bar plot with the
prevalence of neurons significantly encoding Qmb action-value, based on the sign of the
regression coefficient (+/− for Qmb PicA/Qmb PicB selectivity, respectively). Single black
or grey lines and asterisks, p < 0.05 (chi-squared tests), for differences between areas in
the number of selective cells overall, and for each type of signed coding, respectively. For
a-b) and d-e), solid vertical line corresponds to the first-stage stimuli presentation; dotted
vertical line represents the mean first-stage reaction time across subjects and sessions.
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hand, the caudate contained significantly more neurons encoding MB Q-value only than
any prefrontal region (p < 0.05 in all pairwise χ2 tests) and marginally higher percentage
than putamen (pairwise χ2 = 9.30, p = 0.06). The large majority of both MF Q-value only
and MB Q-value only selective cells showed specific selectivity for only one of the first-
stage stimuli (Fig. 5.12a-b, d-e) and not for the other (percentages within MF Q-value only
neurons: ranged from 61% in putamen to 87% in FP; percentages within MB Q-value only
neurons: ranged from 58% in ACC to 77% in putamen).
In order to realize the hybrid choice behaviour detailed in chapter 3, an integrated value
signal needs to be computed in which MF and MB value signals are weighted and com-
bined. An important question is whether this can be observed at the single-neuron level. In
other words, whether neurons have access to action-values of both learning strategies during
the choice1 epoch. Although all recorded regions included such Hybrid Q-value neurons
(28% in FP, 49% in ACC, 32% in DLPFC, 24% in caudate and 28% in putamen), a sig-
nificantly greater percentage of these cells was found in ACC (p < 0.05 in all pairwise χ2
tests). Despite there being such a high percentage of Hybrid Q-value neurons in ACC, it is
interesting to note that only a relatively small percentage (14%) showed specificity for MF
and MB Q-values of the exact same first-stage choice (Table 5.1). This is the same as saying
that a high percentage of the ACC Hybrid Q-value neurons had, during the entire period of
choice1 epoch, access to a mixture of information regarding both MF and MB action-value
coding of both first-stage stimulus, which could facilitate the calculation by somewhere else
of the Hybrid Q-values.
We also assessed how many of the selective MF and MB action value cells also showed
significant regression coefficients to the other behavioural measures analysed (Table 5.1).
Overall, there was no significant difference between regions in this characteristic. How-
ever, ACC was the region most likely to combine choice with MF coding (40% among
the selective MF Q-value only cells), and both DLPFC and ACC also encoded more fre-
quently MB Q-value only and choice (50% and 46% among the selective MB Q-value only
cells of DLPFC and ACC, respectively). Note, though, the consistently high percentages of
putamen action-value neurons that also encoded first-stage RT and chosen side of response
(Table 5.1).
Next, we considered the same information, but now at the level of the whole population.
In each area recorded, we measured how much variance in each neuron’s firing rate was
explained by the MF Q-values only and the MB Q-values only (Fig. 5.13a-b). We found
that both MF and MB Q-values consistently explained more of the variance in firing rate
in ACC neurons than in neurons from any other region. To investigate if a bias towards
152 Neuronal results
a particular learning strategy was present in each brain area, we calculated the averaged
explained variance for the population taking into account all neurons CPD for MF only and
MB only action-values (Fig. 5.13c; the convention was positive values for MF and negative
values for MB, therefore, an averaged negative value indicates bias towards MB action value
coding). ACC neurons showed a strong bias for a MB Q-value coding, leading to a large net
negativity in the population response. Caudate and putamen were also biased in favour of a
MB strategy, but to a lesser and later extent than the ACC. That there is no net value signal
at the population level in FP and DLPFC arises since MB and MF influences are balanced.
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Fig. 5.13 Population encoding of model-free and model-based action-values. Coding
at the population level, as determined by the absolute coefficient of partial determination
(CPD) value at choice1 epoch, for first-stage a) model-free (Qmf) and b) model-based
(Qmb) action-values. c) The balance between model-free and model-based action-value
coding as determined by the 5% trimmed absolute mean (solid coloured line) and respective
SEM (shading) across all neurons taking the CPD values for Qmf (positive sign by conven-
tion) and subtracting the CPD values for Qmb (negative sign by convention). Therefore, an
averaged negative value indicates bias towards Qmb coding. Solid vertical line corresponds
to the first-stage stimuli presentation; dotted vertical line represents the mean first-stage
reaction time across subjects and sessions.
Neural representations of prediction error signals
Learning in both RL approaches is mediated by discrepancies in predictions, called pre-
diction errors, which can be used to improve the value estimates and also to choose good
actions. In our two-stage Markov decision task, two moments in time are particularly impor-
tant for detecting prediction error signals: the transition epoch, because the state-transition
type (common versus rare) has consequences for the expected value; and the feedback
epoch, when the subject knows what level of outcome will be provided, and must update
second-stage value estimates.
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Prediction error signal at transition epoch
The two possible state-transitions from first to second-stage give rise to a first-stage predic-
tion error signal – the value expected at the time of first-stage choice is compared to a value
of the second-stage state at which the subject has just arrived. A good example of this is
when subjects experienced on the previous trial a high outcome on a particular second-stage
state, then on the following trial they choose the first-stage choice that most likely leads to
that same second-stage state and are then faced with either a common or a rare transition.
In this example, the common transition would not generate a significant error in value pre-
dictions (even if the choice behaviour of our subjects is a hybrid of both strategies, pure
MF and pure MB also do not show such differences in this context), given that the subject
will be able to pursue his initial chosen value expectation (assuming he chooses the appro-
priate second-stage stimulus). By contrast, if a rare transition occurred, there is a tendency
for a greater error because the chosen expected value is less closely related to the value of
the second-stage that the subject predominantly expected. In this case, the error would be
stronger if predictions had been derived from a pure MF valuation; whereas MB predictions
should not be as greatly affected, since they already include the 30% chance of such rare
trials. Neurons that report such first-stage prediction error signals should considerably re-
duce their firing rates when a rare transition occurs in the above example (Fig. 5.14). This
is because the value of the second-stage state that the subject actual transitioned to, is likely
lower than the second-stage state more often associated with the chosen first-stage option.
Looking across regions at the average normalised firing rates of all neurons in the case
described above, we found that activity in both caudate (Fig. 5.14d) and putamen (Fig.
5.14e) reduced for repeat-rare compared to repeat-common. Note also that the FP cells
(Fig. 5.14a) responded in precisely the opposite manner: following a high outcome on the
previous trial and a first-stage choice aiming to repeat the same second-stage state experi-
enced on the previous trial, neurons increased their firing rate more for a rare transition than
a common one. Given these effects in the average firing rate, we used multiple regression
analysis for quantification (Fig. 5.15). We considered how the encoding of the previous
outcome at the transition epoch was affected as a function of repeat-common, repeat-rare,
switch-common and switch-rare. The results confirmed an abrupt negative correlation be-
tween the firing rate at transition epoch and the previous outcome coding for repeat-rare
(when compared to repeat-common) in both caudate (Fig. 5.15d) and putamen (Fig. 5.15e),
although the decrease was more pronounced in the former. On the other hand, and as ex-
pected, FP showed a rather positive correlation for the same condition.
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Fig. 5.14 Impact of transition on neural activity of each region according to the pre-
vious outcome and the first-stage choice. Average normalized neural activity (shading
is SEM) at transition epoch across all neurons of each region according to the previous
outcome level (left-column for previous high; center-column for previous medium; and
right-column for previous low), the current transition (common or rare) and whether the
first-stage choice was the one more (’repeat’) or less (’switch’) likely associated with the
previous trial’s second-stage state (i.e., ’repeat’ or ’switch’ the second-stage state where
the previous reward was experienced). Solid vertical line corresponds to when the type of
transition is revealed.
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Fig. 5.15 Population coding of previous outcome at transition epoch as a function of the
first-stage choice and the transition type. Mean value of the beta regression coefficients
(shaded area depicts SEM) for reward on the previous trial at transition epoch across all
neurons of each region, according to whether the transition was common or rare and whether
the first-stage choice was the one more (’repeat’) or less (’switch’) likely associated with the
previous trial’s second-stage state (i.e., ’repeat’ or ’switch’ the second-stage state where
the previous reward was experienced). Solid vertical line corresponds to when the type of
transition is revealed.
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We sought to confirm these results by taking advantage of the trial-by-trial estimates
from our best-fit computational model. To link this approach with the results observed in
Fig. 5.14, we investigated across regions how the firing rate at transition epoch varied as a
function of the first-stage chosen action-value derived from our HYBRID+ model and the
current state-transition (Fig. 5.16).
The results are broadly consistent with our previous analysis. For high chosen first-
stage values, a rare transition causes a significant reduction in the firing rate (which would
be consistent with a negative prediction error) in both caudate and putamen, and a prominent
increase in FP spiking activity. Note that a subtle latency difference was observed between
the striatal regions. For the low value condition (right column of Fig. 5.16e) a rare transition
increased the neural activity first in the caudate (peak between 200-250ms) earlier than in
putamen (500-550ms). The combination of values and choices arises when a relatively low
first-stage option is picked (for reasons that could include suboptimal behaviour), but with
the rare consequence of going to the less likely second-stage state. This unexpected state
could indeed be better in terms of outcome and may generate a response akin to a positive
prediction error, hence the rise in firing rate.
In formal terms, the first-stage prediction error at transition epoch is the difference be-
tween the value of the second-stage choice about to be made and the first-stage chosen
action-value derived by our HYBRID+ model (as there is no reward associated the state-
transition; see chapter 3 - Equation 3.5 of the Methods section). Therefore, a prediction
error signal should correlate positively with the value of the second-stage choice and nega-
tively with the expected first-stage chosen action-value in rare trials, once the transition is
made known to the subjects. To confirm this, we performed a regression analysis having
those two values as predictors of the firing rate at the transition epoch, and being assessed
differently according to the transition type (Fig. 5.17).
The neural activity pattern in caudate at transition epoch was, once again, consistent with
the features described above for a prediction error signal at rare trials: slight positive coding
for second-stage chosen action-value and negative coding for first-stage chosen action-value
(see Chosen1Qhyb-Rare and Chosen2Q-Rare in Fig. 5.17d). Interestingly, using the com-
putational variables the same signal was weaker and less sharp in putamen (Fig. 5.17e). On
the other hand, the coding scheme observed in FP, as expected, showed the inverse prop-
erties: encoded negatively the second-stage choice and positively the expected first-stage
chosen action-value, and this was more prominent in rare trials (Fig. 5.17a). It is important
to highlight that this prediction error only appears in rare trials, implying that this is not a
general TD prediction error signal of dopaminergic neurons (Schultz et al., 1997).
5.4 Results 157
- ACC -
High first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000A
ve
rag
e n
orm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
 Common
 Rare
- FP -
High first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000A
ve
rag
e n
orm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
 Common
 Rare
d)
a)
d)
- FP -
Medium first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000A
ve
rag
e n
orm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
 Common
 Rare
- FP -
Low first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000A
ve
rag
e n
orm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
 Common
 Rare
- ACC -
Medium first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000A
ve
rag
e n
orm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
 Common
 Rare
- ACC -
Low first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000A
ve
rag
e n
orm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
 Common
 Rare
- DLPFC -
High first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000A
ve
rag
e n
orm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
 Common
 Rare
- Caudate -
High first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000A
ve
rag
e n
orm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3  Common
 Rare
e)
- Caudate -
Medium first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3  Common
 Rare
Av
era
ge
 no
rm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
- Caudate -
Low first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000A
ve
rag
e n
orm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3  Common
 Rare
- Putamen -
High first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000A
ve
rag
e n
orm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
 Common
 Rare
- Putamen -
Medium first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000A
ve
rag
e n
orm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
 Common
 Rare
f) - Putamen -
Low first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000A
ve
rag
e n
orm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
 Common
 Rare
- DLPFC -
Medium first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000A
ve
rag
e n
orm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
 Common
 Rare
- DLPFC -
Low first-stage chosen value
Time from transition (in ms)
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000A
ve
rag
e n
orm
ali
se
d f
irin
g r
ate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
 Common
 Rare
Fig. 5.16 Impact of transition on neural activity of each region according to the previ-
ous outcome and the first-stage chosen action-value. Average normalized neural activity
(shading is SEM) at the transition epoch across all neurons of each region according to ter-
ciles of first-stage chosen action-value (left-column for high tercile values; center-column
for medium tercile; and right-column for low tercile) and the current transition (common or
rare). Solid vertical line corresponds to when the type of transition is revealed.
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Fig. 5.17 Population coding of first-stage chosen action-value and second-stage choice
value at transition epoch as a function of transition type. Mean value of the beta regres-
sion coefficients (shaded area depicts SEM) at transition epoch across all neurons of each
region for first-stage chosen action-value (Chosen1Qhyb) and second-stage chosen action-
value (Chosen2Q) derived by our HYBRID+ model, according to whether the transition was
common or rare. Solid vertical line corresponds to when the type of transition is revealed.
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Second-stage choice reward prediction error signal in striatum
Second-stage learning is equivalent for both RL methods since there is no further stage to
anticipate. In the model, it follows a temporal-difference (TD) learning rule for predicting
the immediate reward at feedback. Neuronal activity reporting the necessary reward predic-
tion error should encode the discrepancy between the current and the expected reward (Fig.
5.18).
We found that both caudate and putamen (Fig. 5.18d-e) regions phasically increased
their neuronal activity at feedback epoch when outcomes were better than expected (right-
column of Fig. 5.18), but reduced their firing rate if the outcome was worse than predicted
(left- column of Fig. 5.18). Note some subtle differences between these two areas. First,
receiving a medium outcome was encoded differently: in caudate the neural activity for
a medium outcome level reflected a profile slightly more comparable to that of the worst
outcome level; whereas in putamen the medium outcome level elicited a firing rate pattern
closer to that observed after receiving the high outcome outcome. Secondly, when the up-
coming reward was the low outcome and following the initial drop in neural activity (i.e.,
from about 400m post-secondary reinforcer onwards), neurons in putamen showed a marked
and persistently increased firing rate throughout the remaining period of the feedback epoch.
Such rebound effect was not observed in caudate, where the neural activity returned to base-
line. Despite these differences, both patterns of response were qualitatively consistent with
a reward prediction error, and were particularly distinct from other brain areas.
The FP cells presented a prominent response if a high reward was expected but the actual
outcome was the lowest possible (left-column of Fig. 5.18a). On the other hand, if the
expectation medium or low (center- and right-columns in Fig. 5.18a) FP neurons increased
their spiking when either the highest or the lowest reward was received. A medium outcome
did not elicit firing rate modulation in any expectation scenario. A relatively similar pattern
of response, yet less phasic, was observed in ACC – increased neuronal activity if either a
high expectation was followed by a low outcome (left-column of Fig. 5.18b) or a high/low
reward was received when the expectation was not high (center- and right-columns in Fig.
5.18b). Nonetheless, in this latter scenario ACC encoded negatively the actually received
outcome (i.e., more spiking activity for lower outcomes), something not observed in FP.
Finally, in DLPFC neurons the only feature to highlight were the differences in latency for
each outcome level actually received specifically observed in the low expectation scenario
(right-column in Fig. 5.18c), with a firing rate reduction faster if the actual outcome was
low and slower if the outcome was high.
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Fig. 5.18 The neural activity across regions as a function of the expected and actually
received outcome with the current second-stage choice. Average normalized firing rates
(shaded area depicts SEM) at feedback epoch across all neurons of each region according
to the previous outcome level (left-column for previous high; center-column for previous
medium; and right-column for previous low) experienced with the current second-stage
choice and the outcome level (high, medium or low) about to be received with that same
choice. Solid vertical line corresponds to secondary reinforcer presentation.
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Following this, we used multiple linear regression analysis to quantify this involvement
of caudate and putamen in second-stage value learning. Our aim was to confirm that the fir-
ing rate at feedback epoch of both areas was positively correlated with the outcome revealed
by the secondary reinforcer and negatively correlated with the last reward obtained with the
same second-stage choice (Fig. 5.19). In addition, if both striatal regions actually reflected a
classical TD prediction error signal, the weights of the previous reward information should
have decayed exponentially with trials into the past (Fig. 5.20) and resemble the phasic
response observed in dopaminergic cells (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005). Indeed, we observed
the above quantitative features in caudate and putamen, strongly favouring the encoding of
the second-stage reward prediction error in these two regions.
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Fig. 5.19 Population coding of reward history at feedback epoch. Mean value of the
beta regression coefficients (shaded area depicts SEM) at feedback epoch across all neurons
of each region for the upcoming reward (Rew), the most-recent (Lag1Rew), the second-
most recent (Lag2Rew) and the third-most recent (Lag3Rew) rewards obtained with the
current second-stage choice. The Solid vertical line corresponds to secondary reinforcer
presentation; dotted grey lines correspond to the period of time from 200 to 600 ms post-
secondary reinforcer.
So far, we have used direct, task-based, measures to test the second-stage prediction
error signal. To examine these results further, we took advantage of our model fitting and
regressed the firing rate at feedback against both the upcoming reward and the computation-
ally derived second-stage chosen value (Fig. 5.21). The results show that the signal in both
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Fig. 5.20 Reward history impact on the neural activity at feedback epoch across re-
gions. Mean (and SEM) values of the beta regression coefficients at the period of time
of the feedback epoch between the two dotted grey lines in Fig. 5.19 (corresponding to
200-600 ms post-secondary reinforcer) across all neurons of each region, for the upcoming
reward (t), the most-recent (t-1), the second-most recent (t-2) and the third-most recent (t-3)
rewards obtained with the current second-stage choice.
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caudate (Fig. 5.21d) and putamen (Fig. 5.21e) followed the pattern expected for a reward
prediction error signal: positive correlation with upcoming reward and negative correlation
with second-stage chosen value. Finally, we directly correlated neural activity at feedback
against the computationally derived reward prediction error at second-stage choice and also
found the expected positive correlation in both caudate and putamen (Fig. 5.22). These
results provide more robust evidence linking the neural activity at feedback of both caudate
and putamen with the second-stage reward prediction error expected by our RL modelling.
Furthermore, they also show that the error signal arises slightly earlier in putamen than in
caudate.
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Fig. 5.21 Population coding of expected second-stage value and the actual reward re-
ceived at feedback epoch. Mean value of the beta regression coefficients (shaded area
depicts SEM) at feedback epoch across all neurons of each region for the upcoming re-
ward (Rew) and the chosen second-stage action-value (Chosen2Q) derived by the best-fit
computational model. Solid vertical line corresponds to secondary reinforcer presentation.
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Fig. 5.22 Simple linear regression on neural activity at feedback across regions for
the second-stage reward prediction error. Mean value of the beta regression coefficients
(shaded area depicts SEM) at feedback epoch across all neurons of each region for the trial-
by-trial second-stage reward prediction error values derived by the best-fit computational
model. Solid vertical line corresponds to secondary reinforcer presentation.
5.5 Discussion
We recorded single-neuron activity from regions in the prefrontal cortex (FP, ACC and
DLPFC) and in the dorsal striatum (caudate and putamen) of two non-human primates while
they performed a sequential decision task which induced trial-by-trial adjustments in choice
that combine both MF and MB-RL control. The striatum is the main input structure of the
basal ganglia for both cortical as well as dopaminergic projections, and is believed to partic-
ipate in the selection of rewarded actions by encoding the value of the available choices. On
the other hand, lesion studies in humans and animals imply that PFC areas make fundamen-
tal and specialized contributions to optimal reward learning and decision making. Using an
analysis approach that took into account both observable behavioural variables and com-
putational measures derived from RL models of the task, we have reported experimental
data which demonstrates a robust link between neural signals and key components of RL at
different moments in the task.
We follow the organization of the results section, separating the discussion according
to the three major epochs of the task (reward/transition/choice; the transition from first-
to second-stage; the observation of the secondary reinforcer), and then according the key
brain regions: the ACC, the FP, the caudate and putamen and the DLPFC. We consider both
behaviourally- and model-defined correlates.
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Reward, transition and choice coding in the prefrontal cortex and basal
ganglia
A key characteristic in RL is the ability to use past experience to select the best course of
action from among competing alternatives. More than just simply having representations
based on reward history (as in MF valuation), the knowledge of how actions influence the
transitions among different states (as in MB valuation) may be critical to flexible decision
making when faced with environmental changes. With this in mind, we highlight our main
findings about the single-neuron and population correlates of the most recent reward, state-
transition and first-stage choice. We then assess the implications for the structures that are
thereby highlighted.
First, despite the ubiquitous coding of the upcoming reward (in our case, the value of the
attended secondary reinforcer stimulus) throughout the brain (Apicella et al., 1991; Kenner-
ley and Walton, 2011; Kennerley et al., 2009; Paton et al., 2006; Platt and Glimcher, 1999;
Roesch and Olson, 2003), correlates of reward magnitude were found to be significantly
more common and stronger in ACC, but faster to emerge in putamen and caudate. Regional
differences in the overall population code were also observed, with caudate and putamen
neurons firing more to higher rewards, but ACC and FP neurons responding more for lower
outcomes. The information about the most recent reward remained persistently high in ACC
from feedback until the next trial’s first-stage choice. Second, more ACC neurons encoded
the type of transition; with the population selectivity remaining high from the moment the
state-transition occurred until the moment the feedback was revealed. Moreover, individ-
ual neuron’s selectivity for the transition type spanned both transition and feedback epochs.
Finally, we looked at factors related to first-stage choice and found that among areas, it
was in the ACC that the explanation of neuronal activity at choice epoch by all types of
first-stage stimulus information: previous choice, current choice and whether previous and
current were the same (i.e., repeat or stay first-stage strategy) was most proficient. On the
other hand, the putamen more prominently encoded the first-stage side of response, consis-
tent with its well known involvement in movement preparation and action execution (Romo
et al., 1992; Schultz and Romo, 1992).
In addition to these additive effects, we also presented neural evidence of combined ef-
fects of these different behavioural factors. This analysis provided a more detailed descrip-
tion of the computations performed by single-neurons as well as of the various populations.
First, we found that the strength of the transition coding at the transition epoch was posi-
tively correlated with the (positive) reward coding in striatum and negatively correlated with
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the (negative) reward coding in the FP at feedback. Here, strength includes increases or de-
creases of neural activity with the rare transition. Concomitantly, the strength of reward
coding (again ignoring the direction of firing rate changes) was positively correlated with
the (directional) transition coding at the transition epoch in the FP. These findings suggest
that in FP the greater the encoding of the transition the more negative is the encoding of re-
ward later in the trial, and the greater the increase in firing rate for rare transition (compared
to common) the more reward information is coded at feedback. Second, ACC revealed a
particularly strong additive effect of both reward and transition at feedback. And finally, the
way reward was coded at the population level at feedback epoch was different according to
the transition type in FP.
Probably the most noticeable feature of the above results was the multiple encoding of
relevant learning variables by ACC compared to other regions. The link between reward
and transition coding is particularly critical for MB valuation, which exploits a model of the
structure of the environment to compute the cumulative reward. A subpopulation of neurons
in ACC may support this link by multiplexing both reward and state-transition computa-
tions at feedback. The involvement of ACC in reward-guided learning and decision-making
has been extensively documented using either lesion, neurophysiological or functional neu-
roimaging work (Alexander and Brown, 2011; Hayden et al., 2011b; Kennerley and Walton,
2011; Kennerley et al., 2006; Matsumoto et al., 2007; Quilodran et al., 2008; Rushworth
et al., 2011; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008; Shenhav et al., 2013). The key computations
more consistently associated with ACC across the different types of studies seem to be re-
ward monitoring and the coding of choice-reward associations in non-stationary or foraging
environments (Behrens et al., 2007; Hayden et al., 2011b). Furthermore, the ACC feature
of multiplexing at the single neuron level different types of decision variables, for example
value and choice, has been also shown by others in a context of a pure decision making task
(Hayden and Platt, 2010; Kennerley et al., 2011, 2009).
The bias towards a negative net reward coding (i.e., increased firing rate for lower out-
comes) in ACC corroborates previous studies, which reported more ACC neurons respond-
ing to errors than to rewarding feedback (Quilodran et al., 2008). It is also in line with
several event-related potential studies that have consistently localized an ACC component
called the error-related negativity, as it is typically more negative after participants make
incorrect responses, compared to correct choices (Gehring et al., 1993). However vari-
ous other factors could be important. One is that this error-related activity is confounded
by the fact that errors happen less frequently than rewards (given that subjects are often
overtrained) and, indeed, when both are counterbalanced the neural sensitivity to reward
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and unrewarded (error) outcomes seem to equalise (Jessup et al., 2010; Kennerley et al.,
2011). Given that in our task there were no errors per se, but instead reward reassignments,
a second hypothesis is to relate our ACC feedback-related activity with a potential role in
directing behaviour towards goals or in foraging guidance (Rushworth et al., 2012). In fact,
the error-related activity observed in ACC is modulated by the amount of predicted reward
and by external signals indicating the necessity to shift response, which challenges the idea
of a mere error detection signal and rather suggests a role in predicting the likely outcomes
of actions (Alexander and Brown, 2011; Amiez et al., 2005). Third, a wealth of evidence
has related the ACC activity with the ability for internally maintained goals to overcome
prepotent or stimulus-driven responses – or cognitive control, as it happens in Stroop test
(see Shenhav et al. 2013 review). Such control is more often required in difficult situations
when automatic responses could lead to bad outcomes. In our case, a low outcome is often
associated with subsequent demanding decisions involving a cost-effectiveness evaluation
in order to maintain the goal of searching for the best long term reward possible. Fourth, a
high outcome is slightly more instructive in the task than a low outcome level (i.e., with a
high outcome subjects aim to repeat the same second-stage choice, whereas low outcomes
may not necessarily mean to avoid a particular second-stage state, as there is another option
where a good outcome could be found). Thus low outcomes are also associated with more
uncertainty about the outcomes of his future choices.
Our interpretation of the present outcome-related ACC results is also closely related to
recent recordings from rat ACC (Karlsson et al., 2012), where a radical shift in the pattern
of ACC activity occurred at the start of a period of exploratory behaviour (i.e., when an ex-
ploitative period ended in favour of a knowing nothing period) rather than during the acqui-
sition of new information per se, suggesting that the ACC was active at the point at which
estimation uncertainty increased. It also fits well with human neuroimaging observations
that ACC is more active in response to new observations when there is higher uncertainty of
the outcomes provided by the environment (Behrens et al., 2007; Rushworth and Behrens,
2008).
The psychological concept of cognitive control linked to ACC function mentioned above,
entails leveraging higher-order representations or contextual information to overcome what
could be viewed as habitual actions (Braver, 2012). This yields, therefore, compelling sim-
ilarity with the MB-RL state-transition knowledge and could be related with the prominent
transition coding observed here in ACC. In fact, human subjects performing a similar two-
stage decision task with higher MB weight in their choice, also had higher values of goal-
directed behaviour across different cognitive control tasks (Otto et al., 2014), supporting
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this correspondence. Some computational cognitive control theories for ACC use the RL
framework and, although not clearly stated, their implementation has an implicit MB-RL
role for ACC (Alexander and Brown, 2011; Holroyd and Yeung, 2011). The Predicted Re-
sponse Outcome (PRO) model proposed by Alexander and Brown (2011) is one theory that
has managed to reproduce most ACC results found in cognitive control tasks. Broadly, it de-
tects if an expected outcome fails to occur at the expected time (a negative surprise reported
by an unmet prediction error signal), and does this by monitoring the error likelihoods of all
possible outcomes. This latter knowledge of all possible outcomes, very much resembles
the MB-RL awareness of the entire decision-tree. Moreover, in a recent human neuroimag-
ing study with a saccadic planning task directly assessing information theoretical measures,
the activity in ACC was specifically correlated with trials on which an internal model was
updated (O’Reilly et al., 2013), in line with our observations of an ACC involvement in
state-transition coding.
Our findings on the FP are particularly novel. We found a FP population bias towards
a transient negative relationship between reward magnitude and firing rate at feedback as
well as an increased activity for rare transitions at transition epoch. Although this coding
was generally weak, such a pattern of responding in the population of FP neurons seemed
relatively homogeneous and specific to factors that are key for updating the behavioural
strategy. Low outcomes are, as mentioned earlier, associated with a subsequent exploratory
period where subjects aim to find the highest outcome, and rare transitions are particularly
relevant when interpreting the context of the received outcome. Consistent with this, FP not
only combined both reward and transition information from different task epochs, but it also
showed different encoding of reward at feedback depending on whether the current transi-
tion was common or rare. The overall conclusions from recent FP lesion studies highlight
its particular involvement in rapid learning and in context-dependent allocation of cognitive
resources, which is overall supportive of the short-lived FP activity profile we observed.
The only other study to record from single-cells in the primate FP found surprisingly simple
neuronal responses (Tsujimoto et al., 2010, 2012). In that study the monkey was cued to re-
peat or switch the choice of the previous trial and a response signal in FP was found around
feedback time to encode the response that was correct according to the cued strategy. The
authors considered that this could promote learning by associating outcomes with responses
based on some memory, rule or stored representations. Others further emphasised this result
as a forward implementation of internal models relevant for the task (Koechlin, 2011), with
particular advantages in exploratory contexts (Daw et al., 2006).
Concerning the findings in other regions, the earlier coding in striatum of the reward
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information revealed by the secondary reinforcer is not surprising given the robust corticos-
triatal projections from extrastriate visual cortex (Saint-Cyr et al., 1990). The population
bias towards a positive reward coding is also consistent with previous findings in other re-
ward learning contexts (Schultz et al., 2003), which also reported more striatal response for
increasing reward expectations. Of interest, a recent study reporting neural responses to
objects frequently changing their value (as in our task), also found a positive value for the
difference between striatal neurons responding more strongly to high-valued objects and to
low-valued objects (Kim and Hikosaka, 2013).
We were surprised by the apparent absence of coding in the DLPFC for specific re-
ward, transition or choice. The disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex with transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) in humans performing a similar two-stage task impaired MB
behaviour in favour of behaviour driven by MF control (Smittenaar et al., 2013). Further-
more, previous recordings in primate DLPFC, while subjects sought an optimal choice,
found that single neurons’ firing rates changed with both choice and reward history (Barra-
clough et al., 2004; Seo et al., 2007). We believe that the incongruity between our findings
and these other studies could be related to particularities of our experimental design. First,
note that the single-neuron results from others have used tasks requiring saccade-contingent
choices, whereas the current study required a joystick movement to indicate the decision.
Therefore some discrepancy might be expected given the DLPFC’s strong connection to
supplementary eye fields (Huerta and Kaas, 1990). Unpublished results from several stud-
ies in our lab indicate that neuronal selectivity in ACC and DLPFC increase when choices
are made by forelimb (joystick) or eyes, respectively (c.f., Kennerley et al., 2009). In any
case, this cannot explain the TMS result. For this, we believe that the subjects in the hu-
man study may have been more reliant on working memory than our subjects, who had
extensive exposure to the task, and that the TMS disrupted the working memory, rather
than MB function of DLPFC. Our best best-fitting behavioural MB-RL model for both sub-
jects involved the state-transition probability distributions being known from start of the
sessions (see chapter 3 for details). By knowing the task structure well, our subjects could
reduce the requirement on working memory associated with state-transition learning, two
processes known to elicit DLPFC activity (Funahashi et al., 1993; Gläscher et al., 2010;
Otto et al., 2013; Watanabe, 1996). In fact, as humans increase familiarity with a similar
two-stage task as the one used here, model-based reasoning seem to depend less on such
executive processing (Economides et al., 2015). At the computational level, any such en-
hanced efficiency in the implementation of MB reasoning could involve a progressively MF
implementation of MB reasoning via representational change (Akam et al., 2015). At the
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implementational level, it may recruit long-term or episodic memory systems, such as the
hippocampus, which have also been involved in MB learning by keeping active sequential
representations or paths of the environment (Bornstein and Daw, 2012; Johnson and Redish,
2007).
Model-free and model-based value representations for action selection
Learning action values, i.e. the mapping from state-action pairs to expected return, is key to
action selection in RL. This mapping can be MF or MB; the resulting action values repre-
sent the long-run desirability of actions, and thus are the basis of appropriate choice (Sutton
and Barto, 1998). Complementing and extending previous reports of MF action-value en-
coding in the primate brain (Lau and Glimcher, 2008; Samejima et al., 2005), we found
single-neuron representations of MB action values. Despite the multiple views on MB (or
goal-directed) behaviour (Daw and Dayan, 2014; Doll et al., 2012), this is, to our knowl-
edge, the first evidence of single-neuron representations of MB action values, as formally
defined in RL. Another of our novel results was the discovery in both prefrontal and striatal
regions of neurons that covaried with both MF and MB action-values during the time of
first-stage choice. Further, cells selective only for MF or MB value predictions were found
to be widespread and richly interdigitated across the different neuronal populations. All
these findings sit comfortably with the hybrid approach found to fit the choice behaviour
the best (see chapter 3), albeit without using the overall hybrid weight that we identified
behaviourally. They also shed light on contemporary controversies surrounding the neural
mechanisms of the action selection process (Rushworth et al., 2012).
Two divergent ideas have recently attained prominence about the potential mechanisms
and pathways involved in value-based decision making circuitry, suggesting either a parallel
or serial operation (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011). One view proposes
that prefrontal and subcortical regions may compare options in different frames of reference,
and that these computations can take place in a simultaneous and parallel manner during de-
cision making (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). According to this hypothesis, a choice emerges
through a distributed consensus between regions, although the decision signal may emerge
first in one area depending on its advantageous specialisation for the particular task. In the
alternative model, decisions are made solely through a serial pathway where different val-
uations of the options are represented in distinct parts of the brain leading to a final single
utility measure capturing the subjective value of each option (Padoa-Schioppa, 2011). The
fact that in our study prefrontal and striatal areas showed relatively similar representations
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at choice time of both MF and MB valuations of the available options, lends support to a
parallel organisation for the action-selection circuitry. It is important to note that some par-
allel views (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010) intend for prefrontal cortex and striatum to compute
different things, not the same thing, and we also do not know if these are not just part of
a single calculation. Nevertheless, the higher prevalence of hybrid value neurons in ACC
together with its early latency in MF and MB population coding, specifically implicate this
structure in integrating MF and MB values in order to guide optimal behaviour.
The proposal that the ACC is involved in competition-related processes of monitoring
as well as in resolving response error and conflict, fits well with its apparent involvement
in numerous cognitive processes including behavioural flexibility (Hayden and Platt, 2010;
Quilodran et al., 2008), action-outcome prediction (Alexander and Brown, 2011), environ-
mental volatility (Behrens et al., 2007; Kolling et al., 2012) or more broad concepts of
conflict (van Veen et al., 2001) and cognitive control (Shenhav et al., 2013). In a recent hu-
man study in which the task design favoured either MF or MB control, a comparison signal
was also found in ACC reflecting the difference in the uncertainty of the estimates derived
by each valuation strategy (Lee et al., 2014). In fact, the connectivity profile in resting-
state functional MRI of the primate ACC region in which our neurons have been recorded,
closely resembles the profile of the human anterior rostral cingulate zone implicated in all
these studies (Neubert et al., 2015). Furthermore, the observed mixed action-value coding
of ACC at choice time goes well with its access to both reward history (of MF and MB im-
portance) and transition information (of unique MB relevance) discussed earlier, and with
its well known multiplexing qualities (Hayden and Platt, 2010; Kennerley et al., 2009). In
conclusion, our ACC results suggest that several ideas about this brain region could poten-
tially be unified into a more normative framework of study based on clear computational
features of RL theory.
Our task was stimulus-based, in that values were associated with stimuli, and actions
were directed at them too. Thus what we have called action values might instead have been
called stimulus values. Various other tasks are action-based, with values being associated
with such things as the side of a joystick movement Samejima et al. 2005 or a saccade
Lau and Glimcher 2008. Outcome-related values associated with specific stimuli prior to
decisions, and independent of the nature of the movement performed (referred by some
authors as ”offer-value” neurons) have previously been described in the orbitofrontal cortex
(Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006). These neurons were found not in a learning context,
but while monkeys chose between two overlearned stimuli associated with different types
of reward offered in different amounts. Although the values used in such economic decision-
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making task could be viewed as cached values (and in this sense could be considered MF
action-values), both MF and MB valuation coincide for that specific choice and do not allow
any clear distinction between the learning strategies used. Finally, note that some evidence
suggests that ACC is specialised to represent value according to the action required, whereas
orbitofrontal cortex does so in according to the stimuli concerned (Kennerley et al., 2006;
Rudebeck et al., 2008). However, other authors have also documented that disrupting the
ACC interferes with learning about stimulus-outcome associations Amiez et al. (2006), in
line with our findings showing representations of action-values for stimuli.
Our observations were in general supportive of the idea that some striatal neurons encode
action-values derived purely from a MF-RL algorithm (Lau and Glimcher, 2008; Samejima
et al., 2005). The proportion of such neurons we found (22%/19% in caudate/putamen) was
relatively smaller than those previously reported (43% in Samejima et al. 2005, 62% in Lau
and Glimcher 2008). Furthermore, we also found significantly fewer neurons (7%/5% in
caudate/putamen) whose activity covaried with MF action-values and also with the chosen
option (in our case the chosen first-stage stimulus), compared with other studies (22% in
Samejima et al. 2005, 31% in Lau and Glimcher 2008). Finally, a relatively high percentage
of putamen MF action-value cells also correlated with response side and reaction time –
suggesting that the involvement of this region in selecting and executing the adequate motor
plan (as it encoded strongly the first-stage response side) could be potentially modulated by
the MF action value of the available options.
When comparing our data with these two striatal studies, several methodological con-
siderations may be important. First, our task was stimulus-based and, as a consequence, it
requires a more allocentric representation of the choice. This may be more demanding than
a more natural hand movement or saccade. This might help explain the smaller number of
MF action-value cells that we observed. Second the location of recordings varied: Same-
jima et al. 2005 recorded in the more posterior putamen and in dorsal parts of the caudate
nucleus; Lau and Glimcher 2008 recorded in the caudate nucleus only; and our recordings
were restricted to more anterior regions of dorsal caudate and putamen. Third, those studies
restricted their analysis to neurons that were active during the task (Samejima et al., 2005)
or selected cells based on firing activity (phasically active neurons) and responsiveness in a
prior saccade task (Lau and Glimcher, 2008). We made no distinction between tonic or pha-
sic striatal neurons and did not select neurons based on their responsiveness, in both cases
to try and collect a representative sample of the overall activity across the primate dorsal
striatum. Finally, some of the cells reported in those studies could also be MB action-value
cells because both learning strategies coincide in their tasks. It is interesting to see that if
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one takes into account MF only and MB only cells (59% in caudate and 44% in putamen),
the total proportions are quite similar to those observed in the previous studies. Hybrid cells
were excluded from this, since those previous studies did not engender conflict between MB
and MF values.
However, MF action value neurons were not restricted to striatum. Many were also
found in prefrontal regions, although the population representation of the MF value was
not strong. The ACC offered the strongest code for MF values, and indeed exhibited this
even before presentation of the first-stage choice. This involvement of ACC in MF-RL has
received some support from previous literature. From both lesion and electrophysiological
data, the modulation found in this area by the history of actions and outcomes together with
its involvement in error monitoring has conveyed a functional link with the dopaminergic
prediction error signal and with MF behaviour (Amiez et al., 2005; Kennerley and Walton,
2011; Kennerley et al., 2011; Matsumoto et al., 2007). Given the strong anatomical connec-
tions between ACC and VTA/SNpc it is no surprise that ACC and dopamine computations
share some similarities (Williams and Goldman-Rakic, 1998). There are, however, some
caveats. First, most previous studies used either simple learning tasks or focused on the ac-
tion selection process with values learnt from direct experience, which makes it impossible
to distinguish MF from MB valuations. Second, the value- related signals observed in ACC
include complex feedback information (Quilodran et al., 2008), as it encodes information
about many aspects of decisions (Kennerley et al., 2011, 2009) and outcomes that have been
observed but not directly experienced (Hayden et al., 2009). Such elaborated reward signals
are less likely to be part of a conventional MF calculation.
Neurons selective for MB values were also widespread in the prefrontal cortex and stria-
tum. It was notable that the area with the highest relative percentage of such cells was the
caudate; however, at the level of the whole population, the ACC dominated. The part of the
caudate in which most of our recordings were performed is anatomically the region with
highest afferent projections from ACC (Haber and Knutson, 2009). In addition, the more
anterior regions of caudate seem to be not only necessary for (if lesioned) but also capa-
ble of modulating (if stimulated) the acquisition of new associations in instrumental tasks
(Miyachi et al., 1997; Williams and Eskandar, 2006), in line with theoretical proposals sug-
gesting greater MB-RL involvement at the start of the learning process (Daw et al., 2005).
Previous neurophysiological studies also documented greater activity in anterior caudate for
the initial phases of learning, as well as more flexible value coding, whereas the more pos-
terior primate striatum has shown greater responses for over-learned motor sequences and
more stable value coding (Belin et al., 2009; Kim and Hikosaka, 2013; Miyachi et al., 2002;
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Pasupathy and Miller, 2005). Furthermore, other authors have highlighted a role in sequence
representations or in integrated information comparison (Cai et al., 2011; Seo et al., 2012),
processes more often linked with MB valuation.
The apparently limited selectivity of neurons in the DLPFC for action values might
seem unexpected. Previous work has reported that DLPFC encodes the value of chosen
items during early phases of decision-making prior to the transformation to the actual re-
sponse (Cai and Padoa-Schioppa, 2014; Kim et al., 2008). It has also been demonstrated that
DLPFC neurons encode strategies and rules in various types of tasks (Asaad et al., 2000;
Genovesio et al., 2005; Wallis et al., 2001; White and Wise, 1999). However, in all these
other studies a saccade was used to indicate choice, by contrast with the hand-movement
required by our subjects. Perhaps more fundamental is the observation that lesions to the
DLPFC do not seem to cause severe action selection deficits, unless the task requires a be-
haviour determined by a rule (Baxter et al., 2008; Buckley et al., 2009). Furthermore from
a functional point of view, the role of DLPFC seems to extend beyond the maintenance of
short-term memories to be crucial in guiding attention towards behaviourally relevant in-
formation (Buckley et al., 2009; Kadohisa et al., 2013; Lebedev et al., 2004), rather than a
specific role in decision making per se.
First-stage reward prediction error encoding
A key characteristic of the design of the task is that the prediction about the future reward
is almost certain to change as a result of the stochastic transition from first- to second-stage
state. This engenders a temporal difference prediction error, which is used by the MF system
to update the prediction of the first-stage stimulus that was chosen. This is the case even
if the choice itself depended on both MB and MF values. In principle, it is possible to
calculate the prediction error using either MB or MF assessments of value. Note, though,
in the task, that these two assessments coincide at the second stage, rendering part of the
difference moot. Further, the MB system does not use the prediction error for learning,
basing its valuation instead on the state-action-state transition probabilities, and the history
of outcomes (Gläscher et al., 2010).
It has been previously shown that this first-stage prediction error signal exists in humans
performing the same two-stage task (Daw et al., 2011). Unexpectedly, the BOLD signal
in both ventral striatum and medial prefrontal cortex reported a prediction error based on a
mixture of MF and MB evaluations, in proportions matching those that determined choice
behaviour for the individuals concerned. Such a hybrid was unexpected in ventral striatum,
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since this is the favoured location for BOLD correlates of MF prediction errors (McClure
et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Seymour et al., 2004). It was also unexpected for medial
(and ventromedial) prefrontal cortex, as these have been more closely associated with MB
evaluation, given the sensitivity to task contingencies shown by their value-related signals
(Hampton et al., 2008, 2006; Valentin et al., 2007). Our data also suggest the concomitant
existence of MB and MF prediction errors during performance. Neural activity in both stri-
atal regions, although slightly more consistent and faster in caudate than putamen, showed
features of an error signal useful for the learning purposes. On the other hand, the unique
pattern of response from FP neurons strongly favour the involvement of this region in report-
ing planning prediction errors. Daw et al. (2011) speculated that their results implied a more
interactive relationship between the learning strategies, with temporal difference prediction
errors calculated using MB values coexisting with more conventional MF ones, and being
used to optimise behaviour either online or through learning. This could operate through
the actor-critic algorithm (Barto et al., 1983, 1995), with an integrated MF and MB critic
training a combined actor.
One of our most novel findings was the single-neuron FP signal observed at the time of
transition. The FP firing rate increased to a greater extent for higher first-stage chosen val-
ues given a rare transition than given a common one. In other words, the FP neural activity
encoded a quantity akin to the foregone expected value or regret, because the rare transition
would prevent the subject from pursuing the value its first-stage choice might have been
expected to enable. These findings extend previous single-neuron reports of FP activity in
a non-feedback related epoch, and are also supportive of a role for the FP in counterfactual
choice and sequential decision making, as has previously been proposed (Boorman et al.,
2011, 2009; Charron and Koechlin, 2010; Koechlin et al., 1999). The existence of such a
correlate in the non-human primate is ground-breaking, as it challenges ideas of a unique an-
thropoid reasoning and planning ability supported by lateral FP (Koechlin, 2011). Although
this idea of FP (in particular, the lateral FP part where our recordings were performed) being
a specialised human brain structure also has some anatomical support with the mismatch in
functional MRI connectivity patterns of lateral FP between humans and macaques (Neubert
et al., 2014), it is important to note that such patterns of connectivity were obtained in dif-
ferent cognitive states (i.e., anaesthetised animals versus restive awake humans), making it
hard to directly relate findings from both species.
One might object that the positive correlation with the expected first-stage chosen value
and the slight negative correlation with the upcoming chosen second-stage value shown in
the FP suggests that this is just a negatively-signed prediction error signal (consistent with
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the negative outcome encoding we observed in this area). However, this ignores the depen-
dence on the nature of the transition – it is this that implicates counterfactual reasoning.
Both lesion and functional neuroimaging studies in humans have suggested that FP mon-
itors alternative courses of action. This role is better exemplified in sequential decision-
making tasks, with their extra richness and complexity (Boorman et al., 2011, 2009; Burgess
et al., 2007, 2000; Charron and Koechlin, 2010; Koechlin et al., 1999). Serial order be-
haviour and the ability to hold different levels of schemata for action in mind simultane-
ously, has long been of great relevance for psychology (Lashley, 1951). The ”regret theory”
of Loomes and Sugden (1982) challenged more standard theories of decision-making under
uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), by proposing that subjects are influenced by
regret, which arises when they discover that the option they took is worse than one they
could have taken instead; and ’rejoice’, when the option turns out better. The idea is that in
making choices, subjects try to anticipate and take account of future regret and rejoice. This
is rather in line with the FP encoding of foregone value that we observed, and the time point
at which this is seen.
Two very recent studies reported subtle differences compared with controls in the be-
haviour of monkeys with lesions that included the area of FP from which we recorded.
One of these studies highlighted the role of FP in rapid learning of the relative value of
wide-ranging novel alternatives (Boschin et al., 2015). The other study found that FP le-
sioned animals were less prone to distraction than controls while maintaining task-relevant
information (Mansouri et al., 2015). This has led the authors to propose that FP redis-
tributes cognitive resources away from the task at hand, in line with proposals from human
studies involving FP in coordinating attention between externally-presented and internally-
represented information (Burgess et al., 2007). This latter possibility could fit with our
findings in that a rare transition that occurs when the subject’s first-stage choice should have
given access to a valuable second-stage option, could lead to disengagement. The subject
could just choose randomly and hope for a better first- to second-stage transition next time.
Equally, it could be the case that the choice in this unchosen second-stage state could be
highly rewarding, and in this case the FP signal might help the subject to focus on this
exploratory benefit. Indeed, tracking alternative task strategies is of particular importance
during exploration, and could explain this apparent functional correlate of the FP (Daw
et al., 2006).
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Second-stage reward prediction error in striatum
In the final section, we focused on the second-stage TD reward prediction error (i.e., the
difference between received and expected reward), a key teaching signal for second-stage
reward-based learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Midbrain dopamine neurons, which send
many projections to the striatum and prefrontal cortex, are known to encode reward pre-
diction errors (Schultz et al., 1997) and the release of dopamine promotes corticostriatal
plasticity in target neurons (Barto et al., 1995; Calabresi et al., 2007; Suri and Schultz,
1999). Non-dopaminergic cells have also been found to report elements of temporal differ-
ence prediction errors at this time point. Similar (but not identical) feedback-related signals,
revealing differences between received and expected outcome, have been reported in stria-
tum (Apicella et al., 2009; Asaad and Eskandar, 2011; Kim et al., 2009; Oyama et al., 2010)
as well as in prefrontal cortex, particularly in ACC (Kennerley et al., 2011; Matsumoto et al.,
2007). However, in most of these studies the definition of reward prediction error was not as
crisp as in RL theory, the analysis did not address the quantitative features of the signal, or,
more critically the neurons did not exhibit the negative aspect of the prediction error, when
outcomes were worse than expected.
We found that the firing rates of both caudate and putamen neurons at the time of feed-
back were very similar to what would be expected of dopaminergic neurons: a phasic re-
sponse, with a short-onset latency and, most importantly, with parametric features of a re-
ward prediction error (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Schultz et al., 1997). Hence, the firing
rate in these striatal neurons correlated positively with the upcoming reward revealed by the
secondary reinforcer, and negatively with what was expected given the previous outcome
history of the second-stage choice. In fact, more recent outcomes exerted greater influence
on firing than outcomes in more distant trials, resembling the exponential decay also ob-
served on first-stage choice behaviour with the reward history effect (see chapter 3). Further
evidence confirmed the quantitative properties of this second-stage reward prediction error
signal, taking advantage of the trial-by-trial estimates derived from our best-fit computa-
tional model.
One interesting difference between the second-stage reward prediction error signals of
caudate and putamen should be highlighted. The neural activity of these two regions showed
distinct encodings of the subjective value of medium outcome level: in the caudate, it was
treated either neutrally or slightly more like a low outcome; in the putamen, the response
was closer to that expected for a high outcome. One possibility is a link of this difference
with the similar divergence found in our behavioural analysis for choice and reaction times
at the first stage. The medium outcome was treated more like the low outcome in terms
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of choice 3.3, thereby being putatively more closely related to the caudate, but the high
outcome in terms of reaction time 3.12, thereby being more closely associated with the
putamen. The former is consistent with the slightly earlier and stronger population code
observed in caudate when compared to putamen, the latter is consistent with the selectivity
exhibited by the putamen with respect to the hand movement during the choice epoch.
The difference could also reflect distinct processing or sensitivity to delayed rewards,
similar to the segregation found between signals in the dorsal and ventral primate stria-
tum related to temporally discounted values (Cai et al., 2011). Dorsal striatum had a more
important role in choosing a particular action based on temporally discounted values than
the ventral striatum, in line with what we observed in our caudate data. Whereas ventral
striatum was found to be more involved in the state-value, i.e., it encoded the sum of the
temporally discounted values of the available options. This latter possibility hints at some
hierarchical structure within striatum for reward processing (Bornstein and Daw, 2011; Kim
and Hikosaka, 2013), where caudate (particularly more anterior parts; see Kim and Hikosaka
2013; Miyachi et al. 1997; Williams and Eskandar 2006) incorporates more choice-outcome
information and it is closer to a MB strategy; putamen (particularly more posterior parts; see
Kim and Hikosaka 2013; Miyachi et al. 1997) will be more focused on the links between
the actual motor response and the outcome; and finally the ventral striatum associated with
the role of the ’critic’, which learns predictions of long term future reward (O’Doherty et al.
2004; see also Dayan and Berridge 2014 for MF and MB Pavlovian reward learning).
The ACC has been implicated in monitoring behavioural errors, with studies showing
that ACC neurons can encode either a positive or a negative difference between actual and
expected outcomes (Critchley et al., 2005; Holroyd et al., 2004; Kennerley et al., 2011;
Matsumoto et al., 2007; Paulus et al., 2002; Silvetti et al., 2013b). An important view is that
these ACC error- or feedback-related responses to both positive or negative outcomes do not
encode prediction errors as such, but rather that they signal outcomes that are relevant for
behavioural adaptation (Hayden et al., 2011b; Quilodran et al., 2008). Two good examples
of this are the ACC activity that signals the end of an exploratory period and thus the shift
towards exploitation (Karlsson et al., 2012; Quilodran et al., 2008), and the coding of the
relative value of foraging compared to exploiting a resource (Hayden et al., 2011b).
This interpretation is consistent with our finding that the overall response in the ACC as
a function of the expectation context (i.e., the value of second-stage choice) was particularly
high for situations that were more instructive about what to do on the next trial. To illustrate
this, if the second-stage choice had previously been rewarded, but was then associated with
a low outcome, ACC neurons increased their firing rates, potentially signalling the need
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to search for a different second-stage option. On the other hand, if the previous outcome
had been medium or low, ACC neurons fire if the new outcome is the best one, which
indicates the need to exploit that option. It was also notable that the spiking activity for
low reward was stronger than for medium in this latter case. Low outcomes are relatively
more instructive than medium ones, because the associated action should definitely not be
repeated. Medium outcomes lead to an exploration-exploitation dilemma. It is likely that
the specificity of the ACC relates in part to its position within the reward circuit and to
the use of outcome information for action value adjustments and behavioural regulation or
global changes in goal-directed policy.
The response pattern observed in the FP rather closely resembled that in the ACC, except
that it was more phasic. This outcome-related activity is consistent with the only other pri-
mate neurophysiology study in the FP. There, neurons encoded the response that was correct
(or behaviourally relevant) according to the cued strategy around feedback time (Tsujimoto
et al., 2010, 2012). Human fMRI studies have also reported significant FP feedback activity
consequent on the absence of an expected reward, as well as for the unexpected occurrence
of a reward, particularly in an instrumental context (Ramnani et al., 2004). Furthermore,
some authors have observed clear FP surprise responses that could not be accounted for
as a classic reward prediction error or state-prediction error (Chumbley et al., 2014). This
reinforces the account we gave above of the feedback-related signal in the ACC. The re-
semblance of the observed signals between ACC and FP also fits well the specific, dense,
and direct neuroanatomical crosstalk between these two structures, which generally suggest
strengthening of FP excitation by ACC projections (Medalla and Barbas, 2010).
Outcome-related activity in DLPFC has more consistently been found to be affected
by previous actions (several trials into the past) than by prediction errors (Asaad and Es-
kandar, 2011; Barraclough et al., 2004; Tsujimoto et al., 2010). Indeed, we also failed to
find evidence suggestive of an error signal in DLPFC. Others have also reported much less
prediction error coding in DLPFC when compared to other prefrontal regions (Kennerley
et al., 2011; Matsumoto et al., 2007). Note a particular feature of the design of our task,
namely that the secondary reinforcer was presented in the center of the screen. This was to
avoid a potential confound associated with the observation that DLPFC neurons are known
to encode both value and spatial position (Kennerley et al., 2009; Kennerley and Wallis,
2009b; Rao et al., 1997). Consider a task in which visual feedback informing subjects as
to whether or not they are being given reward is presented on the chosen side (as in Asaad
and Eskandar, 2011). DLPFC neurons, by responding according to whether or not reward is
presented on their preferred side of the screen, could erroneously be classified as reflecting
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prediction errors.
Conclusion
In conclusion, using a decision task which admits formally distinguishable MF and MB
values, we showed that key RL elements were encoded in different brain regions at dif-
ferent time points. The observed widespread and simultaneous representations of MF and
MB value computations are consistent with the view that these controllers operate in paral-
lel. However, we found that their associated signals were more richly intertwined than had
originally been expected. We found that the ACC lay at the heart of the arbitration process
between MF and MB control, being crucial both in valuation and in the promotion of opti-
mal behaviour. Our data also confirmed the well known role of striatum in reinforcement
and for guiding actions based on past rewards. Finally, we provided novel neurophysiologi-
cal evidence in favour of the role of the FP in representing or processing counterfactuals. By
extending such a sophisticated concept into identifiable activity in the FP of nonhuman pri-
mates, we offer further buttressing of the utility of this animal model for the understanding
of some of the most complex cognitive behaviours exhibited by humans.
Chapter 6
Concluding remarks
Abstract
This thesis used behavioural measures, computational modelling and single-neuron phys-
iology to investigate the role of the prefrontal cortex and the basal ganglia in model-free
and model-based reinforcement learning approaches. Here, we bring together some of the
major points made in the experimental chapters (chapter 3, chapter 4 and chapter 5), high-
lighting the reasons why they constitute advances for our understanding of MF and MB
computations in the brain.
Introduction
The study set out to explore contemporary computational approaches that suggest two ma-
jor competing and cooperating systems for reinforcement learning (RL) and behavioural
control: model-free (MF) or habitual, and model-based (MB) or goal-directed. Although a
wealth of studies in various species, has revealed regions of the brain that are particularly
implicated in these forms of control – notably prefrontal cortex and the basal ganglia – much
less is known about their neural realisations. Furthermore, although various studies have tra-
ditionally favoured their computational, behavioural and neural segregation, recent findings
in humans (Daw et al., 2011) have challenged this idea. Instead, they have suggested a more
promiscuous computational architecture. In this thesis, we aimed to contribute further data
and understanding about the implementation and interaction of the two systems.
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To achieve these goals, the three levels of computational modelling proposed by Marr
(1982) have served as a constant inspiration:
• Computational level: our main goal focused on studying control policies of a two-
stage, non-stationary, decision process such that the acquisition of reward is max-
imised. As ways of tackling the computational problem, we focused on RL methods.
This was introduced in chapter 1, but also discussed in the remaining chapters.
• Algorithmic level: the algorithms used involved MF-RL methods, for which esti-
mates are calculated from direct, retrospective, experience of rewards, using a tem-
porally sophisticated form of prediction error; and MB-RL methods, for which es-
timates are prospective, based on a learned characterization of the environment and
its affordances. The algorithms were formally detailed in chapter 1; however, further
refinements proved necessary in the light of our behavioural data (chapter 3).
• Implementational level: the spiralling, richly connected, midbrain-striatal-prefrontal
network known to be part of the neural architecture for affective decision-making
was dissected in chapter 2. The signals derived from the algorithmic solutions to the
computational problem were correlated with several behavioural measures, such as
reaction time (in chapter 3) and pupil response (in chapter 4), as well as with single-
neuron activity of three prefrontal cortex regions and two striatal areas (in chapter 5).
The experimental work presented in chapter 3, chapter 4 and chapter 5 was therefore
strongly hypothesis-driven. In the next section, we evaluate the fate of these hypotheses in
summarising and discussing the main findings from each experimental chapter.
Summary of contributions
Behavioural results
The behavioural analysis in chapter 3 suggested:
• Choice behaviour in non-human primates revealed combined MF and MB influences,
with the influence of the latter approaching 90%
• The best-fit hybrid computational model used S ARS A as the MF algorithm, and a MB
approach in which the state-transition probabilities were known from the start
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• A credit assignment weighting procedure was required in the model so that the influ-
ence of the immediately previous trial information was strengthened
• The reaction time (RT) analysis found that decisions taking into account both outcome
and transition structure took longer, whence the main effect of outcome was stronger
overall
The fact that both subjects showed clear evidence of combined MF and MB-RL choice
behaviour was essential for the main goal of the project. At the same time, this work was
the first to replicate in animals other than humans concomitant use of both learning strate-
gies. The way both descriptive and computational types of analysis were related ended up
being very fruitful, as discrepancies prompted refinements to the initial, more conventional,
hybrid model. The key discrepancy was the apparently excessive influence of information
from the immediately previous trial. The required additional credit assignment was based
on both MB and MF principles: MF, as the implementation was retrospective; and MB, as,
algorithmically, it integrated both reward and transition information. Although this innova-
tion had not previously been considered for variants of the two-step task, it does relate to
other suggestions in the literature (Akam et al., 2015). One possibility is that it arises as a
form of counterfactual thinking associated regret/rejoice theories. Support for this was also
found in our pupil and neural data. Pupil dilation was influenced by disappointment; frontal
pole (FP) single-neuron findings were also suggestive of value arising from the action that
was not chosen. Unfortunately, the present work did not directly test the impact of this neu-
ral counterfactual evidence on behaviour and further analysis may be needed. Nevertheless,
given that little is yet known about the computational and neural foundations of counterfac-
tual reasoning these results and further analyses, our result could shed some light onto the
field and foster further theoretical and experimental research.
The RT analysis corroborated the main behavioural findings, but it also provided inter-
esting evidence regarding different influences. Theoretical accounts have suggested a speed
accuracy trade-off between MF and MB computations, with the former being fast and the
latter relatively slow. Indeed, the RT analysis confirmed that decisions taking into account
both outcome and transition structure took longer. This RT effect followed a similar expo-
nential decay with trials into the past as in the choice data. It would be harder to square with
the suggestion that faster responses arise from the chunking of sequential actions, something
that our design deters, with randomized positions for second-stage stimuli. It also militates
against MB proposals emphasizing pre-computations at the time of outcome, where the re-
evaluation of the utility of states given the received outcome helps future choice. Overall,
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the RT evidence is supportive of a forward looking MB valuation process happening at the
time of choice. It was notable that the RTs, particularly at the time of fixation, were more
strongly influenced by the main effect of outcome, than any effect of transition or outcome
× transition. This may be consistent with the observation that the average outcome rate,
estimated in a MF way from recent past trials, and putatively reported through tonic activity
of dopamine neurons, is a main mediator of the vigour of actions.
Finally, I would like to share two findings from the challenging and laborious training
protocol. Unfortunately, the constant changes required to tackle the adversities encountered
during this training process made any formal analysis of the task training approach unre-
liable or almost impossible. First, in initial phases of learning the task the outcome levels
only differed in the magnitude of the rewards. The training proceeded well, with significant
differences in first-stage choice behaviour between common and rare trials for the highest
outcome level (repeat if common-high and switch if rare-high). This was a signature of the
presence of MB behaviour. However, the expected difference between transition types for
the lowest outcome level was hard to elicit (i.e., we did not see common-low being different
than rare-low, although the overall probability of repeat was low). Two possible reasons
were considered: the lowest outcome level was not as instructive as the highest outcome;
and the overall subjective value of the low outcome level might not have been sufficiently
low as to promote further attentional effort for further optimisation of the task. We therefore
tried aversive outcomes (by delivering a diluted quinine solution) for the low outcome level.
This rapidly had the expected consequence. Unfortunately, though, the change was proba-
bly too dramatic and, with time, led to some stereotypical behaviour on the next first-stage
choice (the subject always chose a particular response side) if a low outcome level was re-
ceived. As a consequence, not only did we introduce delays, but also we tried having three,
rather than two, possible motor responses. This was very successful in achieving the results
presented in this thesis.
Second, in another experimental phase of the training protocol, the stimuli used as well
as the background colours for each state varied every day, but keeping the 70%/30% state-
transition structure remained constant throughout the session. These changes elicited new
transition matrix learning on every session. As a whole, the results were consistent with
a MF response profile in these earlier phases of learning. This anecdotal evidence is not
consistent with the idea that goal-directed or MB learning is prominent in initial phases of
learning (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002), given the statistical inefficiency (and consequently
higher uncertainty) of the MF-RL, as proposed by some theoretical views (Daw et al., 2005).
This finding deserves further exploration in future experimental work.
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Pupil results
The analysis of pupil dilation in chapter 4 suggested:
• Pupil size encoded positively the expected chosen value both pre- and post-choice
• The choice valuations reflected in the pupil were overwhelmingly MB
• The effect of what can be construed as a disappointment signal elicited pupil constric-
tion
• Pupil dilation around the time of feedback reported the reward prediction error of the
second-stage choice
A conventional suggestion is that the locus coeruleus-noradrenaline system mediates
pupil dilation and cognitive states. Thus, a large proportion of pupil studies have focused,
often with success, on testing theoretical proposals related to this neuromodulatory system.
Hence, pupil dilation has been linked to high uncertainty or contexts where this happens,
such as when a change point occurs or in exploratory behaviour. Although our experimental
work did not aim to disprove these findings, it suggests that expectations of value might also
be important. In any case, the value-based nature of the pupil modulation is not necessarily
unpredicted or specific, as it an ubiquitous signal throughout the brain.
The observation that MF values made no contribution to the value expectation signals
observed in pupil dilation, i.e., that they were purely MB, was more unexpected. In addition,
the pupil diameter showed an independent effect of the state-transition information, another
MB feature, and in a way inconsistent with just surprise, because its diameter decreased
in rare trials (whereas others have reported pupil dilation for surprising events). Despite
the reports of cognition-related pupil responses, dilation is more consistently regarded as a
measure of emotional and autonomic activation, and furthermore to be controlled by evo-
lutionarily primitive brainstem centres. With this in mind, when applying a task designed
to detect simultaneous signals of both MF and MB-RL approaches, one might have thought
that pupil would report the less sophisticated MF valuations. By revealing the contrary, the
present work unmasks our ignorance regarding the neural substrates mediating the influence
of cognitive state on pupil diameter. It also emphasises the role of top-down influences that
could also arise, for instance, from prefrontal and basal ganglia structures.
Pupil diameter also reported the discrepancy between the expected value and either an
external factor which bore on the final outcome (i.e., the type of transition) or the actual
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received outcome. These prediction error signals are known to drive learning in both eco-
nomics and psychology studies, and they have also been observed to control pupil diameter.
To our knowledge, this finding is novel, and so needs further confirmation. However, disap-
pointment is indeed just an evaluative process that takes other signals claimed to be present
in the pupil into account: the value expectation and the uncertainty.
A similarly new interesting finding was the robust correlation between feedback-related
pupil activity and a reward prediction error. The fact that this occurs at second-stage of the
task, and both MF and MB valuations are the same prevents us from concluding its status
as a signal of one or other controller.
A final speculation concerns the neural substrates of these pupil signals. If one had
been asked to select the brain region that could best correlate with the above pupil findings,
various lines of evidence point to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Anatomically, the
ACC has strong projections to the locus ceruleus, as mentioned in chapter 2. Functionally,
the ACC has been shown to be involved in many relevant processes discussed in chapter 2
and chapter 5, which include value-based learning and foraging, error monitoring and con-
ditions of high estimation uncertainty. Physiologically, our own results in chapter 5 speak
directly to this link, although no actual mediation analysis was performed. Single-neuron
activity in ACC was strongly correlated with expected chosen value, chosen MB estimates
and transition type. Nevertheless, the disappointment effect is more closely related to the FP
counterfactual evidence, and the second-stage reward prediction error to striatal activity. In
conclusion, if the eyes are really the window onto the soul, it is crucial that future research
dissect the neural mechanisms underlying all these influences in pupil in order to take full
advantage of this simple and non-invasive measure.
Neuronal results
At a neural level, the present study found rich representations of key elements of RL theory.
Highlights presented in chapter 5 include:
• The ACC was the region that most prominently encoded the value of the reward at the
time of feedback. This information remained present until the subsequent first-stage
choice
• The relationship between firing rate and the reward magnitude was predominantly
positive for striatal regions and negative for both ACC and FP
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• The ACC was also the region that most prominently encoded the transition type from
when this was revealed until the feedback epoch
• At the level of the whole population, FP coding showed a particular bias towards
positive encoding of rare transitions
• At the time of feedback, reward and transition information was simultaneously present
in ACC
• There were specific relationships between the way FP neurons were selective for the
transition, when this was revealed, and the way they coded for rewards, at the time of
feedback
• For FP neurons, the actual transition experienced in a trial influenced the coding of
reward at the time of feedback
• The identity of the first-stage stimulus that was picked weakly coded across all regions
at the time of choice, but the side of the chosen first-stage response was strongly coded
in the putamen
• Exclusively MF and exclusively MB action-value coding neurons were discovered in
all brain areas recorded and in relatively similar proportions
• The same broad distribution was observed for neurons showing both MF and MB
computations; the ACC showed significantly greater proportion of these hybrid RL
cells than other regions
• Neural activity in the caudate and, to a lesser extent, the putamen, at the time of
the first- to second-stage transition was consistent with a first-stage reward prediction
error
• FP neurons increased their firing rate more when a rare transition was revealed for
higher expected values of the outcome that was thereby out of reach
• Both caudate and putamen encoded the second-stage reward prediction error, albeit
exhibiting slight qualitative differences
Just a note on probably one of the most prevalent questions among readers of this the-
sis – why neural activity from orbitofrontal cortex (or even ventromedial prefrontal cortex)
was not performed? –, given the extensive literature suggesting links with MB behaviour.
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Unfortunately, for both health and welfare reasons, there is a limit to the amount of neuro-
physiological data collection that can be obtained from a given subject, and a limit to how
long they will remain motivated to work on the task. We had hoped to record from OFC
and vmPFC, but because of the depth of these areas, we reserved these areas for last and
unfortunately were not able to explore these areas in the end. Nonetheless, this should not
diminish the results obtained from 5 different brain regions, all of which provided unique
functional selectivity types other than perhaps DLPFC. We hope to examine OFC, vmPFC
and dopamine responses in a MB task in the future.
Given the extensive collection of neuronal findings and the thorough discussion in chap-
ter 5, here we provide a brief summary as to how each region’s signals might contribute to
MF and MB learning.
The ACC was the region whose activity was most closely related to all aspects of the
task. In terms of its role: first, neurons there most consistently covaried with aspects of
both MF-RL (reward coding) and MB-RL (reward and transition coding). This does not
imply that the region is particularly focused on performing MF or MB updates, or that it
is involved in transition learning. Instead, it means that the key ingredients for both value
computations are present at the same time, across different time periods in ACC.
Note that although the neural implementation of MF predictions has been much in-
vestigated recently, much less is known about the mechanisms supporting MB control in
the brain. Therefore, our single-neuron activity showing ACC representation of the state-
transition information, its evolution across the trial and the concomitant coding with reward
have important implications, and might perhaps prompt new theories about the algorithmic
underpinnings of MB control.
Second, the above findings together with the disproportionately larger proportion of cells
with access to both MF and MB values at the time of choice, implicate ACC in the arbitra-
tion process between the two learning strategies that has been considered crucial to guide
optimal behaviour. This latter view could provide a new theoretical framework to unify
the different roles attributed to ACC, in particular performance monitoring, error learning,
conflict resolution and cognitive control.
The basal ganglia is believed to lie at the heart of the machinery for reinforcement learn-
ing in the brain, with the striatum being regarded as a particularly important area for action
selection. The clearest and most singular characteristic we found for both the caudate and
the putamen was their encoding of the second-stage reward prediction error. Such a teaching
signal is well known to be encoded in midbrain dopamine neurons, which send strong pro-
jections to the striatum as well as prefrontal cortex, but has scarcely been reported in the past
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in striatal cells themselves. Comparing this activity to prior reports of the phasic responses
of dopaminergic neurons to reward-predicting stimuli, caudate and putamen modulation oc-
curs at much longer latency (dopaminergic cells: latencies of <100 ms and durations <200
ms; here, caudate and putamen with latencies of ranging from 250-350 ms). It is therefore
tempting to speculate that such striatal response is consequence of the dopamine release in
the region. Having said that, this is quite a complicated task and some neuronal variance is
likely associated with other functions. Most dopaminergic cells studies used relatively sim-
ple intrumental tasks or even just pavlovian ones. Although, striatal responses were not as
fast as the ones reported to dopamine, one should bear in mind task complexity differences
when evaluating latencies differences between studies.
The same caudate and putamen regions showed neurons involved in MF and MB action
valuation. Thus, the ingredients for both action selection and action reinforcement are both
present in the same regions. However, there were different response patterns in caudate and
putamen suggesting that the two regions are not exact mirrors of each another: activity in
the caudate matched better the subjects’ choices; putamen responses was more in line with
the profile observed in the reaction time analysis. This may suggest that activities in each
region are updated in a segregated manner, supporting a more choice-based influence in
caudate and a response vigour-based influence in putamen. The more prominent negative
prediction error signal in caudate relative to putamen observed in rare transitions relative to
first-stage chosen value expectation further supports this view.
In humans, the FP occupies the most anterior position at the proposed rostro-caudal axis
processing gradient of the frontal cortex. It also has a much larger volume in the human brain
than in any other animal. It is thus a target of immense debate in the human neuroscience
literature, as it only seems necessary in complex multi-task scenarios, where engagement
in branching processes (Koechlin et al., 1999), exploratory decisions (Daw et al., 2006) or
monitoring of alternative choices values (Boorman et al., 2011, 2009) are required. One
notion is that it supports some unique anthropoid reasoning and planning ability.
Our results suggest that this putatively unique function cannot be counterfactual reason-
ing. Indeed, it was the FP encoding of foregone value, at the particular time point at which
this became apparent, that most clearly suggested a role of this region in counterfactual
thinking. This result is neurophysiologically novel. It was specially compelling, given the
overall weak selectivity in the FP.
Very little can be said about a specific DLPFC role in our task as the only most prominent
observation was the relatively long and maintained coding of reward from feedback into the
inter-trial period. This might be seen as a contrast to other studies suggesting its involvement
190 Concluding remarks
in value computations or choice. This might result from the facts that choice in the present
task was indicated by a hand movement instead of a saccade, and that working memory
related processes were not particularly addressed in this task.
6.1 Future directions
Finally, the work presented here paves the way for future theoretical and experimental in-
vestigations to address a number of new questions, some of which include:
• Following our modelling findings suggesting refinements to more conventional hy-
brid approaches with rich credit assignment features, the next question is: what are the
neural substrates supporting credit assignment processes? Does this have a widespread
distribution as well or is it governed by specific interactions between certain regions?
Finer-grained analyses exploring correlations between stimulus specific and feedback
activity may reveal insights into this important learning signature.
• In our task, the behavioural analysis suggested that the transition matrix was known
from start. However, several questions remain unanswered: how is the state-transition
structure learned? What structures are involved? How do neural signals allow the
creation of the internal state-space that the subjects use?
• Throughout our experimental work, several independent processes identified through
behavioural analysis, reaction time, pupil and single-neuron activity, could be indi-
rectly linked. A good example of this is the speculation about an influence of puta-
men outcome-related activity on reaction time. However, our analysis lacked depth
into more direct assessments of such relationships (e.g., mediation analysis). A more
detailed description of how the different elements are linked should provide further
insights into the actual mechanism as well as its influences.
• In our analysis, we only considered the reward magnitude given that the delays were
fixed. However, the contribution of delay to choice could have important implications
and deserve further analysis in the future.
• To extend our understanding of how this task is implemented and the signals that other
structures could provide, it would be very interesting if other areas were also recorded.
As main targets, it would be interesting to see recordings in dopamine midbrain neu-
rons, orbitofrontal or ventromedial prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, entorhinal cortex
6.2 Conclusion 191
and amygdala. Previous work suggests involvement of these structures in MF and
MB, but most studies did not offer the advantage of simultaneous single-neuron ac-
tivity.
• Given the preponderance of ACC in encoding most information relevant for the task,
interference manipulations (lesion, inactivation or stimulation) during performance of
the two-stage decision task implemented here could further confirm our hypothesis or
generate more questions.
• To further address the possibility of an ACC involvement in the arbitration process
of MF and MB RL, one could try to model uncertainties in the estimates of each
learning strategy and correlate on a trial-by-trial basis with the single-neuron activity.
This way, not only proposals that uncertainty is crucial in such arbitration process are
tested, but it would also provide more direct evidence.
6.2 Conclusion
This project started with a relatively straight forward aim to test theoretical proposals of
RL principles that could govern animal learning and decision-making. More importantly, it
tested whether some of the postulated computational signals are used by the brain to solve
the problems it faces. Such reverse engineering process has the advantage of providing more
quantitative information regarding the neural mechanisms and the underlying model, which
could have critical contributions in either detecting or fixing encountered anomalies in the
system. It turned out to be an initially ambitious approach but with successful outcomes.
While training non-human primates on a complex sequential decision task, we were able
to unravel by their choices and their response vigour, features of a combined MF and MB
RL control. More importantly, the thorough analysis employed discovered incongruence
with more conventional models of such hybrid behaviour. This motivated new ideas of
credit assignment where reward, contextual and temporal information could be integrated
to boost the choice either performed or not. Interestingly, we found that other behavioural
measures such as pupil diameter, reflected prospective MB valuation and the consequent
disappointment if the expected reward can no longer be achieved. All these correlates were
relatively novel and prompt further confirmatory evidence and dissection of the underlying
mechanisms.
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Regarding the actual implementation of the MF and MB computations in the brain, the
simultaneous recordings in several different prefrontal and basal ganglia regions was for
sure appropriate. Not only it was found that the signals involved in both learning methods
are more complex and richly intertwined across the prefrontal-striatal circuitry, but a variety
of specific signals were also found in support of functional segregation. There was no sur-
prise to see the ACC very participative in a demanding learning task, but it was unexpected
to see evidence that offers hope in reuniting dispersed ACC theories in a well established
computational framework. Although the evidence is not causal enough, the reported find-
ings push forward the idea that the role of ACC is the resolution of the competition or the
need for cooperation between MF and MB control, with the final intent to promote adaptive
behaviour. The striatal feedback-activity elegantly reflected a clear involvement in learn-
ing by reporting a reward prediction errors. Finally, one is only reassured that it is doing
science if it experiences that feeling of the unexpected discovery. The FP results presented
in this thesis, are novel in the sense that it implicates neurophysiologically this region in
counterfactual reasoning and relates nicely with the modelling refinement proposed here as
well as the pupil signal. By challenging some views of unique human cognitive capacities,
the data presented here reassures future research that the doors are still open to dive into the
complexities of animal reasoning.
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Appendix A
Behavioural analysis and recordings in
Subject J
The disparity in the number of recorded neurons between the two subjects is because of
a health-related issue in Subject J. Subject J exhibited an isolated epileptic episode just
prior to the start of electrophysiological recordings. After several days of observation and
behavioural testing without another epileptic incident, electrophysiological recordings com-
menced. We collected 16 sessions (of the total 27 sessions) worth of behavioural and elec-
trophysiological data without incident, when epileptic episodes returned. Under the advice
of the Named Veterinary Surgeon and the Home Office Inspectorate, Subject J was placed
on a long-lasting course of phenobarbital and over the next four months of observation and
adjusting drug levels, we settled on a dose of 30mg phenobarbital given in the morning and
evening of each day (60mg total/day).
Subject J maintained task motivation on this drug dosage and could perform the MB task
normally. We collected another 11 sessions of behavioural and neurophysiological data (left
hemisphere mostly and only one of the sessions from right hemisphere) with the subject on
this drug dosage without any epileptic incidents before we ceased data collection with this
subject. An analysis of the behavioural data, when considering the session effects present
in both subjects (see Fig. A.1 and A.2; Table A.1), failed to demonstrate that the drug had
a main effect on behaviour. The overall percentage of task-selective neurons (see Fig. A.3
and A.4) as well as the profiles of the population coding (see Fig. A.5 and A.6) were also
relatively similar in the drug off/on sessions, as such, we pooled all sessions together in both
the behavioural and neuronal analyses.
To note that for the analysis we adopted a comparative analysis process between first
part (i.e., for subject J it corresponds to before the medication, 16 sessions out of 27; for
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subject C it corresponds to 18 sessions out of 30 as this is the approximate same proportion
of sessions out of the total, around 60%, as in subject J) and second part (remaining 11
sessions in subject J; remaining 12 sessions for subject C), and using two-sample t-tests or
χ2 tests. Statistical significance was evaluated at α = 0.05 and α = 0.01.
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Fig. A.1 Comparison between first and second parts of recordings for the impact of
both reward and transition information on observed first-stage choice behaviour The
probability of repeating the same first-stage choice, averaged across sessions for each sub-
ject, as a function of outcome level and transition type (common transition in blue; rare
transition in red) of the previous trial. First part corresponds to the first 18(C)/16(J) ses-
sions out of a total of 30(C)/27(J). Error bars depict standard errors of the mean. ∗∗ for
α = 0.01 and ∗ for α = 0.05 in two-sample t-test with null-hypothesis that the probabil-
ities of repeating across sessions between the corresponding first and second parts come
from independent random samples from normal distributions with equal means and equal
but unknown variances.
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Fig. A.2 Comparison between first and second parts of recordings for the logistic re-
gression on observed first-stage chosen picture using predictor variables from the five
previous trials. For the given trial t, the variables used as predictors of the dependent vari-
able first-stage choice (1=car picture, 0=watering can picture) were: C is first-stage choice
(1=car picture, 0=watering can picture); R is outcome level (assumed as continuous and
with low=1, medium=2, high=3); and T is transition (rare=1, common=0). Const is the
constant term. Predictors were mean centred and continuous variables were also scaled by
dividing them by two standard deviations (adjustments made before the computation of the
interaction terms). First part corresponds to the first 18(C)/16(J) sessions out of a total of
30(C)/27(J). Each dot represents the fixed-effects regression estimate for a given session
(coloured red when p < 0.05 and grey otherwise). Bar and error bar values correspond,
respectively, to the mean and SE of the fixed-effects coefficients. ++ for α = 0.01 and + for
α = 0.05 in two-sample t-test with null-hypothesis that the regression coefficients across
sessions between the corresponding first and second parts come from independent random
samples from normal distributions with equal means and equal but unknown variances
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Fig. A.3 Comparison between first and second parts of recordings for the encoding of
reward at the single-neuron level. Bar plot with the prevalence of neurons significantly
encoding reward, based on the sign of the regression coefficient (+ or -). Double black aster-
isks for α = 0.01 and single black asterisk for α = 0.05 in chi-squared tests for differences
between respective first and second-parts in the number of selective cells overall; double
white asterisks, p < 0.05 for the proportion of neurons with positive or negative regression
coefficients different from the chance 50%-50% split (binomial test).
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Fig. A.4 Comparison between first and second parts of recordings for the encoding of
state-transition information at the single-neuron level. Bar plot with the prevalence of
neurons significantly encoding transition type, based on the sign of the regression coefficient
(+/− for increased firing rate if rare/common transition, respectively). Double black aster-
isks for α = 0.01 and single black asterisk for α = 0.05 in chi-squared tests for differences
between respective first and second-parts in the number of selective cells overall; double
white asterisks, p < 0.05 for the proportion of neurons with positive or negative regression
coefficients different from the chance 50%-50% split (binomial test).
226 Behavioural analysis and recordings in Subject J
- First part -
Subject C
- Second part -
Subject C
- First part -
Subject J
- Second part -
Subject J
Reward coding
A
bs
o
lu
te
 
m
ea
n
 
CP
D
 
(%
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
FP
ACC
DLPFC
Caudate
Putamen
Reward coding
A
bs
o
lu
te
 
m
ea
n
 
CP
D
 
(%
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
FP
ACC
DLPFC
Caudate
Putamen
Reward coding
A
bs
o
lu
te
 
m
ea
n
 
CP
D
 
(%
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
FP
ACC
DLPFC
Caudate
Putamen
Reward coding
A
bs
o
lu
te
 
m
ea
n
 
CP
D
 
(%
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
FP
ACC
DLPFC
Caudate
Putamen
Fig. A.5 Comparison between first and second parts of recordings for the population
encoding of reward. Time course of the reward coding at the population level, as deter-
mined by the absolute coefficient of partial determination (CPD) value, from feedback to
choice1 epochs. First part (left-column) correspond to the first 18(C)/16(J) sessions out of
a total of 30(C)/27(J). The 5% trimmed absolute mean (solid coloured line) and respective
SEM (shading) across recorded neurons was used; solid vertical line corresponds to sec-
ondary reinforcer presentation; dotted vertical line represents the mean first-stage reaction
time across subjects and sessions.
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Fig. A.6 Comparison between first and second parts of recordings for the population
encoding of state-transition information. Time course of the transition coding at the
population level, as determined by the absolute coefficient of partial determination (CPD)
value, from transition to feedback epochs. First part (left-column) correspond to the first
18(C)/16(J) sessions out of a total of 30(C)/27(J). The 5% trimmed absolute mean (solid
coloured line) and respective SEM (shading) across recorded neurons was used; solid ver-
tical line corresponds to the moment the background colour changes indicating the second-
stage state, and hence the transition type; dotted vertical line represents the secondary rein-
forcer presentation.
228 Behavioural analysis and recordings in Subject J
Table A.1 Comparison between first and second parts of recordings for the best fitting
mixed-effects estimates from the best model.
Model Subject α1 α2 β1 β2 κ1 κ2 λ ω L1 L2 L3
Hybrid+
Subject C
First part 0.77 4.77 2.57 0.06 - 0.86 0.26 -0.06 -0.09
Second part 0.78 4.27∗ 2.52 0.05∗ - 0.86 0.25∗∗ -0.06 -0.08
Subject J
First part 0.59 5.51 1.86 0.04 0.31 - 0.91 0.52 -0.11 -0.17
Second part 0.56 4.22∗∗ 1.84 0.04 0.31 - 0.91 0.51∗∗ -0.08 -0.15
Hybrid+ (was the best model) model included the S ARS A algorithm as model-free strategy and the Forward1 model-
based algorithm (see full text for details). First part corresponds to the first 18(C)/16(J) sessions out of a total of
30(C)/27(J). Values correspond to mean parameter estimates. ∗∗ for α = 0.01 and ∗ for α = 0.05 in two-sample t-test with
null-hypothesis that the parameters estimates across sessions between the corresponding first and second parts come from
independent random samples from normal distributions with equal means and equal but unknown variances. Regarding the
parameter nomenclature used (when placed in between parameters, the respective parameter estimate was shared between
both first-stage and second-stage): learning rate for first-stage (α1) and second-stage (α2) choice; inverse temperature for
first-stage (β1) and second-stage (β2) choice; perseveration for first-stage (κ1) and second-stage (κ2) choice; eligibility
trace (λ); L11, L22 and L3 are the reinforcement strength (or aversion) for high, medium and low outcome, respectively
(see text for full details); ω is the model-based weight.
